Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and FiascoesGroupthink - the psychological drive for consensus at any cost that suppresses disagreement and prevents the appraisal of alternatives in cohesive decision-making groups. In the first edition (Victims of groupthink), Iriving L. Janis showed how this phenomenon contributed to some of the major U.S. foreign policy fiascos of recent decades: the Korean War stalemate, the escalation of the Vietnam War, the failure to be prepared for the attack on Pearl Harbor, and the Bay of Pigs blunder. He also examined cases, such as the handling of the Cuban Missile Crisis and the formulation of the Marshall Plan, where groupthink was avoided. Here, in this revised and expanded edition, Janis applies his hypothesis to the Watergate cover-up, portraying in detail how groupthink helped to put the participants on a disastrous couurse and keep them there. In addition, he presents some fresh ideas on how and why groupthink occurs and offers suggestions for avoiding it. |
From inside the book
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Page 66
... enemy had given fair warning , and a major source of frustration was the failure of all responsible leaders in the Truman administration to expect the worst from that enemy . The domestic " vilifiers " of the administration were a ...
... enemy had given fair warning , and a major source of frustration was the failure of all responsible leaders in the Truman administration to expect the worst from that enemy . The domestic " vilifiers " of the administration were a ...
Page 85
... enemy air or naval attack . The fleet was not considered a possible target . Kimmel's advisers thought the Japanese would be unbelievably stupid to risk losing their carriers and aircraft by sending them thousands of miles over the ...
... enemy air or naval attack . The fleet was not considered a possible target . Kimmel's advisers thought the Japanese would be unbelievably stupid to risk losing their carriers and aircraft by sending them thousands of miles over the ...
Page 152
... enemy Stereotypes of the enemy as evil , weak , and stupid - which were so much in evidence during the White House discussions of the Bay of Pigs decision- seldom , if ever , were voiced after the bitter anger of the opening session of ...
... enemy Stereotypes of the enemy as evil , weak , and stupid - which were so much in evidence during the White House discussions of the Bay of Pigs decision- seldom , if ever , were voiced after the bitter anger of the opening session of ...
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Common terms and phrases
Acheson administration Admiral Kimmel advisers advisory group Allen Dulles alternative American assumptions attack avoid Bay of Pigs bombing CALIFORNIA LIBRARY Castro Chiefs of Staff Chinese cohesive group Communist concurrence-seeking consensus course of action critical Cuba Cuban missile crisis danger Dean Defense deliberations discussion effect Ehrlichman enemy evidence Executive Committee expected fiasco group dynamics groupthink hypothesis groupthink syndrome groupthink tendencies Haldeman Hawaii Ibid in-group inner circle invasion plan Japanese Johnson Joint Chiefs Kennan Kennedy's Korean War leader major Marshall Plan McNamara meetings military moral naval Nixon norms North Korea North Vietnam officers participants Pearl Harbor Pentagon Papers policy-making group political present President Kennedy President's pressures problem procedures psychological questions responsible risks Robert Kennedy role Rusk Schlesinger Secretary shared social Sorensen Soviet Union stereotypes stress symptoms of groupthink thinking threat tion transcripts Truman UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA Vietnam Vietnam War warning Watergate cover-up White House group