Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and FiascoesGroupthink - the psychological drive for consensus at any cost that suppresses disagreement and prevents the appraisal of alternatives in cohesive decision-making groups. In the first edition (Victims of groupthink), Iriving L. Janis showed how this phenomenon contributed to some of the major U.S. foreign policy fiascos of recent decades: the Korean War stalemate, the escalation of the Vietnam War, the failure to be prepared for the attack on Pearl Harbor, and the Bay of Pigs blunder. He also examined cases, such as the handling of the Cuban Missile Crisis and the formulation of the Marshall Plan, where groupthink was avoided. Here, in this revised and expanded edition, Janis applies his hypothesis to the Watergate cover-up, portraying in detail how groupthink helped to put the participants on a disastrous couurse and keep them there. In addition, he presents some fresh ideas on how and why groupthink occurs and offers suggestions for avoiding it. |
From inside the book
Results 1-3 of 60
Page 92
... tion , at any American base . They thought that they were alerting Hawaii to the possibility of real danger , particularly when they agreed to send out the war - warning messages in late November . Nevertheless , their low - probability ...
... tion , at any American base . They thought that they were alerting Hawaii to the possibility of real danger , particularly when they agreed to send out the war - warning messages in late November . Nevertheless , their low - probability ...
Page 107
... tion . The evidence shows that even if his main arguments against the quagmire myth are subsequently verified by fresh evidence about the deliberations of the policy - makers , his analysis of the major escalation decisions made by the ...
... tion . The evidence shows that even if his main arguments against the quagmire myth are subsequently verified by fresh evidence about the deliberations of the policy - makers , his analysis of the major escalation decisions made by the ...
Page 251
... tion within the United States became so strong that he and other top officials could no longer give public speeches without being picketed and heckled ) by becoming more rather than less vigilant ― he instituted a thorough informa- tion ...
... tion within the United States became so strong that he and other top officials could no longer give public speeches without being picketed and heckled ) by becoming more rather than less vigilant ― he instituted a thorough informa- tion ...
Other editions - View all
Common terms and phrases
Acheson administration Admiral Kimmel advisers advisory group Allen Dulles alternative American assumptions attack avoid Bay of Pigs bombing CALIFORNIA LIBRARY Castro Chiefs of Staff Chinese cohesive group Communist concurrence-seeking consensus course of action critical Cuba Cuban missile crisis danger Dean Defense deliberations discussion effect Ehrlichman enemy evidence Executive Committee expected fiasco group dynamics groupthink hypothesis groupthink syndrome groupthink tendencies Haldeman Hawaii Ibid in-group inner circle invasion plan Japanese Johnson Joint Chiefs Kennan Kennedy's Korean War leader major Marshall Plan McNamara meetings military moral naval Nixon norms North Korea North Vietnam officers participants Pearl Harbor Pentagon Papers policy-making group political present President Kennedy President's pressures problem procedures psychological questions responsible risks Robert Kennedy role Rusk Schlesinger Secretary shared social Sorensen Soviet Union stereotypes stress symptoms of groupthink thinking threat tion transcripts Truman UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA Vietnam Vietnam War warning Watergate cover-up White House group