that feature of the situation they propose to protect themselves against the possibility of Germany attempting a new invasion of their country-Belgium is in a similar case-Poland also envisages Germany as a menace to her peace, because of the former's well-known desire to dispossess her of the free port of Danzig and its approaches. Russia, too, is a perdurable source, of uneasiness to Poland as well as to Rumania, and neither of these countries could be expected to favour a policy that would spell danger and detriment for them. Greece, before consenting to disarm, would naturally seek some ássurance from the United States that the Turks would be restrained in their hostility towards her and that the Bulgars would not seize Dedegatch on the Aegean sea if she were powerless to defend it. And so the tale of European discontent proceeds. But there would be no difficulty about a second Disarmament Conference if the United States would first give its adhesion to the League of Nations. That most becoming and desirable thing once fait accompli, International Law could be clothed with that ineluctable sanction it needs but has always lacked in order to afford the world a means of abolishing the arbitrament of war.

Of course it is quite conceivable that if President Coolidge should exclude land armaments from this consideration of the proposed Conference, the objections of the European powers of no considerable naval strength would be withdrawn; and in such case France would be the only power to propitiate.

C. M.

LA SALLE DES PAS PERDUS.-Members of the Bar who visit Paris generally find time to wend their way to the Palais de Justice. At one time a royal residence it was presented to Parliament by Charles VII., and became the home of the Law Courts in 1431. One of the most interesting features is the Salle des Pas Perdus, which dates from the time of Louis IX., and was long known as the Grand Salle, for its dimensions are immense, being 240 feet long, 90 feet wide and 33 feet high. This great hall serves as a vast antechamber to the Courts of Justice, where barristers meet their clients, and pass much of their time when not engaged in the adjacent court rooms.

Not all of our visitors, however, stop to enquire the origin of the name of this great antechamber, nor is it given in the many books which describe its beauties. It is left for Littré in his great Dictionary to tell us that the christening was jocular and that it was ainsi nommée parce que les plaideurs y perdent souvent leur pas et leur temps." C. S. M.

66

PRESIDENT COOLIDGE AND THE SENATE.-As related to the office of President of the United States we are inclined to think that statesmanship lies in successful achievement in domestic matters even of small moment as well as in international issues big enough to shape the weltpolitik of the time. In this view, if the name of Mr. Coolidge is not to be writ in water he must show himself a man of more prudence than he was able to do in his first official encounter with the Senate. At the outset it was a blunder to submit his nomination of Mr. Warren for confirmation by the Senate before making sure that his adherents in that body would see to it that such confirmation would follow upon the taking of the original vote. Nothing in the history of deliberative assemblies was more tactless than the conduct of the senators supporting the President's nomination. To insist upon a second vote and to accompany it by a public announcement-savouring of a threat-that if confirmation were again withheld he would offer Mr. Warren what is known as a recess appointment after the special session of the Senate had adjourned sine die, was both undignified and impolitic. And, finally, when his second submission. of Mr. Warren's name was rejected and his avowed intention of making an appointment of the character mentioned was challenged as unconstitutional, for Mr. Coolidge to execute a volte face by accepting the dictation of the Senate majority and nominating another gentleman for the office, was a source of humilation in the eyes of the public that his political opponents will make the most of. It will take some time to live down. The result of this whole episode between the President and the Senate serves to remind us of the humorous verses in "Alice in Wonderland" which relate that

"The Owl and the Panther were sharing a pie:
The Panther took pie-crust, and gravy and meat,
While the Owl had the dish as its share of the treat."

So far as the legal aspect of the quarrel is concerned it looks as if the dissident senators were right in disputing the President's authority to make a recess appointment in the circumstances. While the Constitution provides that the President shall have power to fill all vacancies" that may happen during the recess of the Senate," could this be said to cover a case where that body had been specially convened to confirm this appointment, amongst others, and had expressly declined to confirm it? If this question must be answer d in the affirmative an impasse is at once adumbrated in the exercise of the executive power of appointment to office under the United States Constitution.

C. M.

NOTES.

APPEAL JURISDICTION-CRIMINAL MATTER-In Rex v. Davis,' a far-reaching decision has been given by the Supreme Court of Canada.

The crime was murder-Davis was convicted, but having appealed to the Court of King's Bench in Quebec, that court ordered the taking of certain testimony from the convict and one Morel. This was done before the court itself, with the result that while the majority of the court upheld the conviction, two out of the five judges dissented, namely the Chief Justice and Guerin, J.

The convict then appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada which decided that no appeal lay notwithstanding the difference of opinion among the judges. The reason given is that the Statute permits only one judgment to be given on questions of fact, although on questions of law, the court may permit separate and differing opinions to be expressed.

This conclusion is the more striking because although section 1024 remains unrepealed, it is made ineffective by this decision, as to questions of fact. Section 1024 allows an appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, if the court below is not unanimous. Such was the case here, but the Supreme Court said that the words of the new section (1013) "no judgment with respect to the determination of any question shall be separately pronounced by any other member of the Court" involved the result that the judgment (to be pronounced by the President of the Court or at his direction) must be conclusive although not in fact unanimous. This is only relaxed by the statute when questions of law are involved provided the court below itself permits separate judgments to be given.

This decision entirely deprives a person convicted of a criminal offence even a capital one-of an appeal on the facts to the Supreme Court.

The seriousness of this sudden cutting off of a valuable privilege to those convicted by a jury of serious crime may be seen when it is realized that success on the initial appeal to the Court of Appeal in each province is carefully limited to cases where "the verdict of the jury is unreasonable or cannot be supported by the evidence."

'1924, S.C.R. 522.

In the above mentioned case much is said that will prove of great embarrassment to the Judges in certain appeals.

While not necessary to the decision, the learned judge who wrote it construes the words (which relate to cases where the court does not permit independent judgments) "no judgment with respect to the determination of any question shall be separately pronounced by any member of the court" as meaning that on a question of fact there can be no dissent expressed nor separate judgment pronounced by any member of the court, "and on a question of law it is only when the Court of Appeal so directs that dissenting members of the court can pronounce their dissent.”

He is of opinion that the statute is peremptory and excludes the expression of either dissent and lack of unanimity.

It was not necessary to go thus far. The statute does not say so. It only prevents the separate determination of any question involved on the appeal. There may be many grounds of appeal, each necessitating individual treatment. This, however, is forbidden and the majority view is accepted. But why can there be no dissent from that majority view expressed? Why should judges who in certain important or doubtful cases desire to disagree and to say so be precluded from so doing? The reason given is that the Statute so provides. Does it? Mr. Justice Mignault does not think so. In view of the manifest absence of proper provisions regarding appeals from a Judge alone, sitting without a jury, this restriction, if correct, adds greatly to the difficulty of administering with clearness and definiteness the criminal law-so far as the Court of Appeal is concerned.

REX VS. LONG BRANCH RACING ASSOCIATION-56 0.L.R. 303.Sub-section 2 of Section 235 of the Criminal Code exempts from the provisions of that section and Sections 227 and 228, which deal with betting operations upon the race course of any association incorporated before the 20th day of March, 1912, or since that date, by Special Act permitting betting upon the race course of such an association during the actual progress of a race meeting conducted by it. The defendant association in this case was incorporated as a company by Letters Patent in 1911, under a different name, with power to encourage athletics, but without power to operate race courses. By supplementary Letters Patent, issued in 1924, its objects and purposes were extended to encourage horse racing and to operate race courses. It is now held that the exempting sub-section of the Act did not protect the association, the supplementary Letters Patent having operation only from their date.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA VS. NAMOTH OIL COMPANY-56 O.L.R. 307-AFFIRMED ON APPEAL, NOT YET REPORTED.-This is a very interesting discussion of the question of the privilege of a solicitor in respect of communications between himself and his client. As it arises out of the much-talked-of Teapot Dome transaction in the United States, and as the situation with which it deals affected a very well-known Toronto counsel, the case itself has attracted a great dea! of attention. It is well worth serious consideration, however, if only because of the fact that it deals with a very important question of legal ethics.

CURRENT EVENTS.

TRIENNIAL ELECTION OF BENCHERS OF THE LAW SOCIETY OF MANITOBA.The triennial election of Benchers of the Law Society of Manitoba took place on the 2nd of April when the following were declared elected: For the Eastern Judicial District-His Honour Sir James Aikins, K.C., Mr. Edward Anderson, K.C., Mr. A. J. Andrews, K.C., Mr. Isaac Campbell, K.C., Mr. R. B. Graham, K.C., Mr. R. D. Guy, Mr. A. E. Hoskin, K.C., Mr. T. A. Hunt, K.C., Mr. C. H. Locke, K.C., Mr. Edwin Loftus, K.C., Mr. H. Ormond, K.C., Mr. Isaac Pitblado, K.C., Mr. W. J. Tupper, K.C., and Mr. C. P. Wilson, K.C.; all of Winnipeg. For the Central Judicial District: Mr. E. A. McPherson, K.C., of Portage la Prairie; for the Western Judicial District: Mr. S. E. Clement and Mr. H. E. Henderson, K.C., of Brandon; for the Southern Judicial District: Mr. G. T. Armstrong, K.C., of Manitou; for the Northern Judicial District: Mr. G. A. Eakins, of Minnedosa; for the Dauphin Judicial District: Mr. C. S. A. Rogers, of Dauphin.

The Civil Service Commission is receiving applications for the post of joint law clerk of the House of Commons. Forms of application and particulars relating to the appointment may be obtained from the Secretary, Civil Service Commission, Ottawa.