judicial a mind as possible, but this will have no legal effect if he decides there is rent due and issues a distress warrant, when in fact there is no rent due. And the tenant would not have to issue a writ of certiorari to quash his warrant or his decision: no Court would entertain such an application. The tenant's remedy would obviously be by action for wrongful distress, simply because neither the decision nor the distress warrant had any binding effect. That seems to be exactly the situation in the Hetherington Case. If something has no binding effect, what possible object can there be in setting it aside or quashing it? The warrant is only for the bailiff's benefit, the landlord must rely on the fact that the sum he has distrained for is due, not on the fact that he has decided it is due.

While he may exercise a discretion before electing between distress and action, in so doing he does not decide anyone's rights, he simply decides whether the matter is sufficiently clear to make it safe for him to resort to self-help. And even on the facts assumed by the majority of the Supreme Court, it is difficult to see how the Secretary-Treasurer stood in any different position.

Brodeur, J. (p. 565), states and the reasoning of Idington and Duff, JJ., implies that by the issuing of a distress warrant, the Secretary-Treasurer has "imposed a liability and has affected the rights of the appellant company." This seems as unwarranted a conclusion as that a landlord by signing a distress warrant for rent imposes a liability or affects rights. It may seem to a tenant whose goods are seized that he is affected by a distress warrant, but his rights are not, if he has any. The warrant does not prevent his asserting them as he sees fit.

The Judicial Committee's reasoning may be taken as covering this point, but the chief ground for reversal was that new evidence. showed the amount of the tax was computed by the Attorney-General and not by the Secretary-Treasurer, so that the latter's acts were ministerial only. The question of whether the assessment was binding or not was not discussed. There seems, however, to be strong ground for saying that it was not binding, and that there was only a computation and not an adjudication; for the statute makes no provision such as is usual where assessment tribunals are created, that an appeal shall lie or that an assessment, if not questioned within a certain time, shall be conclusive. The fact that the act provides for the recovery of taxes by action tends to confirm this view.

If it is correct, certiorari is as inappropriate a remedy to review the acts of the Attorney-General as those of the Secretary-Treasurer. D. M. G.

LIQUOR LEGISLATION.-In the recent case of The Quebec Liquor Commission v. W. H. Moore, the Supreme Court of Canada had before it an action of negligence for improper conduct on the part of the commission's manager. The commission, an incorporated body, was held not liable. In the course of his judgment Mr. Justice Duff remarked that "It is now recognized that there is nothing to prevent the Crown being served by a corporation, and nothing to prevent such a corporation claiming the same immunity as an individual. Bainbridge v. The Postmaster-General, and Roper v. The Commissioners of His Majesty's Works and Public Buildings.3

To affirm the responsibility of the commission is in effect to affirm the responsibility of the Crown for a tort."

The Quebec Liquor Commission is incorporated, but the Liquor Control Board of British Columbia is not, nor is the Liquor Commission of Saskatchewan. With regard to the relation of these bodies to the Crown, however, the same view was taken by the British Columbia Court of Appeal in Callow v. Hick, and by two judges of the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal in Johnson v. Hawkes, as was taken by the Supreme Court in the above case.

Government control of the sale of liquor, now established in British Columbia, Alberta and Manitoba, and the subject of a bill before the Legislature of Saskatchewan, is likely to give rise to other questions of a serious nature. During the recent campaign in Ontario one eminent counsel publicly declared that under government control of the sale of liquor in Ontario for beverage purposes, The Canada Temperance Act, which now prohibits importations of intoxicating liquors, would automatically cease to apply." And another eminent authority, a former attorney-general of the province, said "the moment the province lets down the bars on provincial prohibition, that moment the Dominion bars against prohibition are lowered to just the same extent, and it makes no difference whether the lowering of the provincial bars is for sale by licensees or for sale by the government itself."

When the question comes before the courts no doubt we shall know more about it, but in the meantime there seem to be some reasons for dissenting from the opinions above expressed. They are based upon the proviso to section 154 of The Canada Temperance Act, 1919 (2nd Sess.), c. 8, s. 1, which reads in part as follows:

"Provided, however, that the provisions of this section shall not apply or extend to the importation . . . into . . . any province in which the prohibition is in force of any intoxicating liquor . which under the laws of the province may be lawfully sold therein." Therefore, the conclusion is, if liquor may lawfully be sold, though by the Government, section 154 ceases to apply and the protection against importation is automatically withdrawn.

It is to be noted that Part IV. of The Canada Temperance Act, in which section 154 is found, was passed in aid of provincial legislation. Its purpose is to make effective provincial laws "prohibiting the sale of intoxicating liquors for beverage purposes." The prohibition referred to indicates the substantial character which the provincial enactment must possess. But a law is none the less prohibitory because it is partial in its operation, because for example, it permits the manufacture and sale of wine containing a large percentage of alcohol: Smith v. Allorney-General for Ontario. Similarly, it seems reasonable to hold that an Act restricting sale to government vendors is a prohibitory law, because it forbids sale by the general public. The Crown is never bound by a statute unless by express mention or necessary implication. Statutes are in general made for subjects and not for the Crown: Attorney-General v. Donaldson."

If this view be correct, it follows that when a Dominion enactment speaks of "any province . . in which there is at the time in force a law prohibiting the sale of intoxicating liquor for beverage purposes" it is not referring to a law prohibiting sale by the government of the province, but to one barring such sale by the general public. In the same manner, the injunction that "no person shall import, send, take or transport into such province any intoxicating liquor," is to be construed as directed only to persons who are subjects, that is, to the general public.

Finally, the proviso to section 154 which excepts from the ban upon importation "any intoxicating liquor which under the laws of the province or territory in which the prohibition is in force, may be lawfully sold therein," should be read as referring only to liquor that may be lawfully sold by the general public. To put the same idea in different language, under a liquor stores system it is only liquor imported by the provincial government that can lawfully be sold within the province.

The above argument is consistent with the purpose with which

Part IV. of the Canada Temperance Act was passed. namely, to supplement and complete provincial legislation, whereas the construction placed upon it by the authorities quoted above would defeat that legislation where a government liquor stores system is introduced. R. W. S.

EDITOR'S NOTE.-In the recently decided case of Rex v. Nadan the Supreme Court of Alberta has expressed the same view as our contributor re Part IV., C.T.A.

BOOKS AND PERIODICALS.

Publishers desiring reviews or notices of Books and Perodicals must send copies of the same to the Editor, care of THE CARSWELL COMPANY, LIMITED, 145 Adelaide Street West, Toronto, Canada.

The Attornment Clause and the Licence to Distrain. By Roy Bayne MacInnes and John Jamieson Milne. Burroughs & Co., Ltd., 1924. This is a thorny subject, and these diligent authors have written a little book that clears it up materially. Indeed it is a work that practitioners who handle mortgages and similar interests can hardly do without. This is true for the whole Dominion, but doubly true for the prairie provinces, for the volume discusses the statutes of Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta with a thoroughness that can leave the enquirer in little doubt of his rights. And certainly the work is up to date. Not long before it was published the present writer had to draw a brief in one of these cases of Distress. Now, he finds, after an interval of weeks merely, his case reported and the authorities on which he chiefly worked discussed in useful fullness. This sort of effort can not in royalties pay the writers. The research must have been too exacting for the show these 150 pages make. But it must be a satisfaction to the authors to leave a well-made road where they found a rough one; while solicitors who deal even occasionally in Mortgages and Agreements will for a trifle enter into the fruits of workmanlike labours. It is pleasant to add that the writing is not dry, technical though the theme must be. Here and there are literary touches that lighten up the reading, and show that the authors have read more than law. G. C. T.

A History of English Law. By W. S. Holdsworth, K.C., D.C.L., Vinerian Professor of English Law in the University of Oxford, etc., Vol. 5. London: Methuen & Co. 1924.

We have already taken leave to describe this great undertaking of Dr. Holdsworth as one of the most important contributions to the literature of the law the world over. The fifth volume shows no falling off in excellence of material garnered in its pages, or in the author's luminous method with which we have become familiarized in the earlier volumes. Of course there are printer's errors and minor slips in the enterprise as a whole that give occasion to the criticasters to make the discord of their

scrannel pipes heard amidst the general appreciation of competent critics. It is easy for anyone to pick out such a passage as this from p. 26 of the volume before us and call it platitudinous and school-boy stuff: "International law, as understood at the present day, was unknown in the Middle Ages. The law which prevails among the independent States of modern times could not arise till these independent States had been fully developed." But que voulez-vous? Homer is surely entitled to his nod now and then. We suppose it is quite impossible to expect a compendium of learning like this to be thoroughly read by the busy practitioner, but we would commend to anyone's leisure moments Chapter IV of the volume in hand. It deals in a most engrossing way with the development of English Law outside the sphere of the Common Law in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries-the administration of justice in the Council and the Star Chamber being exhaustively considered.

Chambers Encyclopædia: A Dictionary of Universal Knowledge.

Edited by David Patrick, LL.D., and William Geddie, M.A., B.Sc. Volume V. London and Edinburgh: W. & R. Chambers, Limited. 1924.

We commend to professional readers the following among the contents of this volume: Game Laws, by Lord Sands; Government, by C. I. Elton; and Guilds, by T. Kirkup. There are also instructive articles on Habeas Corpus, Henry Hallam, Henry VIII., and Thomas Hobbes. The volume is exceptionally full of interesting matter for the general reader, and is a valuable addition to the library of the office or the home.

C. M.

CORRESPONDENCE.

The Editorial Board of the Canadian Bar Association does not hold itself responsible for the opinions of Correspondents. Contributions to this department of the REVIEW will be published only over the genuine names of the writers.

THE KING'S TITLE.

To the Editor of the Canadian Bar Review:

SIR: I have read with great interest the article written by Mr. Mac Kenzie in your November number and entitled "The King's Title." It is an admirable and timely exposition of a most interesting subject. There is one paragraph, however, to which exception might be taken. It is stated that "Edgar (959) The Peaceful' seemed to have imperialistic tendencies, for he styled himself at one time or another 'Rex,' 'Basileus,' 'Imperator' and 'Dominus.'"

This statement is, I submit, based upon an erroneous idea of the true meaning of the words " Imperator" and " 'Imperium.". The word "imperium" or "empire" in the English political vocabulary is a very old one, and has been used there with a peculiar insular meaning. It was used by some of the mediaeval rulers before the Norman Conquest to