The injustice of an exclusive commerce.

12. The sea belongs to no one; it is the property of all men; all have the same equal right to its use as to the air they breathe, and to the sun that warms them. Seas are the great highways, traced by nature between the different parts of the world, to facilitate and expedite communication between the various nations who inhabit it. If a nation seizes on these highways, if it arrogates to itself the exclusive privilege of traversing them without opposition, and repels, by the fear of being plundered, all those who wish to make the same use of them, it is no better than a nation of robbers. The liberty of the sea is interesting, not only to nations who carry on commerce in their own ships, but is beneficial to all mankind. All civilized countries, at the present day, have nearly the same habits, the same wants, and require the same articles of consumption. If a nation usurps the whole commerce, it destroys all competition, and fixes, at its pleasure, the price of every commodity. By its arbitrary imposts it draws to itself the riches of every state; the colossus of its own opulence is raised on the common distress and ruin. Such a nation becomes the plunderer and the enemy of the human race.

13. Can any thing be more just, than for the whole world to rise up against a nation that wishes to prevent others from sharing those common advantages, which, by the laws of nature and of nations, belong equally to all? And why may not the same events, the account of which we read in ancient history, again happen at the present day? We behold the an-.

All nations should unite against the tyrant of the sea.

cient nations uniting their forces, to avenge an outrage committed against the laws of nature and of nations; for, to claim the exclusive dominion of the sea, is an outrage against both. All should combine their efforts against the usurper. A nation, in a condition to punish a maritime power that attempts to domineer over the sea, and who endeavours by vigorous attacks to restrain such power within just limits, deserves well of mankind; since the necessity of restoring to every nation its rights, is the motive which impels it to action, since its power rests on the general cause which it defends, since its commission is derived from nature, and its right from the absolute wants of the human race. Those nations whose situation does not allow them actively to co-operate, will, at least, indulge good wishes towards another so generous as to attack, even in their harbours, the tyrants of the ocean. It was thus, in former times, that Cimon knew how to expel the Persians from the maritime coasts, and to subject them to such terms as he thought proper to impose, after the battle of Salamis. It was thus, that the people of Argos united with the Athenians to prevent the Spartans, not only from navigating the sea, but even to deprive them of the right of passage. It was thus that the power of the Egyptians was subjected to the pleasure of the Greeks, and they were constrained to sue for the liberty, granted them by treaty, of sending, each year, two vessels beyond the Bosphorus.*

* In the above paragraph, and in some others, to be found in the first chapter of the new edition of his work, our author evidently

Each ought to be content with his own property.

14. The law of nature enjoins us to be content with the acquisition of property sufficient for our own support, and of those who are dependent on our care. If reason and experience admonish us to think of futurity, this foresight should not lead us to indulge ambition and an unjust cupidity, nor to prevent others from providing equally for their own wants. The liberty of navigation and of fishing is derived from natural law, and the law of nations, as well as

writes under a bias, and with a particular view to existing circumstances.

Themistocles commanded the Grecian fleet at the battle of Salamis. An enlightened advocate of the rights of mankind, would hardly recommend the conduct of the Athenians, as a maritime power, to the imitation of nations at the present day. The establishment of the naval power of Athens was, no doubt, the principal means of her salvation from Persian tyranny. Her efforts to maintain her liberty and independence against foreign invasion, are deserving of our admiration. But in her conduct towards the Grecian states and cities, we discern nothing worthy of praise. In the instances cited by our author, she transcended the bounds of moderation and justice, and violated the principles on which the freedom of navigation and commerce is founded. In fact, the Athenians no sooner felt the greatness of their maritime power, than they became intoxicated by it. It was converted into the instrument of unjust ambition and boundless rapacity. Their naval commanders, dispersing themselves over the sea, laid waste and plundered de*fenceless towns, and brought home their spoils in triumph to Athens. Friends and foes, allies and neutrals, were equally a prey to their lawless depredations. Themistocles himself, once proposed, in an assembly of the people, to burn the fleet of their allies, then lying without suspicion in the port of Pagasæ, and thereby to render themselves masters of Greece. The opinion of Aristides, and some sense of justice in the people, alone prevented its adoption.......T.

The high sea is as free as light and air.

from the civil law. For these reasons, the high sea ought to remain as common to the human race as air and light.(12) The use of those elements, unquestionably, can never belong to any one nation, to the exclusion of others.(13)

15. From these principles, it follows, that the right of prior occupancy cannot give to a nation the absolute empire of the high sea, and for the reason already mentioned, that this element is not susceptible of

...

(12) Et quidem naturali jure omnium communia sunt illa, aër aqua profluens et mare. quia non sunt jure gentium sicut est mare. Dig. lib. 1. tit. ix. 1. 2, 4.* Mari quod natura omnibus patet servitus imponi privata lege non potest. Dig. lib. 8. tit. iv. 1. 13. Maris communem esse usum omnibus ut aëris.

(13) Instit. lib. 11. § 2. et 10. Dig. lib. 47. tit. 10. 1. 13. § 7. Id. lib. 43. tit viii. 1. 2. § 9.—An elegant passage of Petronius, ch. 10, may be here cited: Quid autem non commune est quod natura optimum fecit? Sol omnibus lucet. Luna innumerabilibus comitata sideribus etiam feras ducit ad pabulum. Quid aquis dici formosius potest? In publico tamen manant. Vid. Noodt. probat. juris, lib. 1. cap. 7. So Ovid, Metamorphose 6. 1. 349—

Quid prohibetis aquas? Usus communis aquarum est,

Nec solem proprium natura, nec aëra fecit,

Nec tenues undas. Ad publica munera veni.

And Virgil. Æneid. 7. l. 229.

littusque rogamus

Innocuum, et cunctis undamque, auramque patentem.

Azuni follows the very inconvenient and pedantic mode of quoting the civil laws, which prevails among the writers of the other continent, referring only to the number of the law, and giving the first words of its title. By searching the general index, in some editions, the book and title may be found, but to save the reader that trouble, a different reference is substituted...... T

A nation may renounce its maritime rights.

individual appropriation. If it were otherwise, the grand Seignior, in quality of sovereign of Phoenicia, might claim to be the proprietor of every sea, as having succeeded to the right of the Phoenicians, who were the first navigators with whom history has made us acquainted.

16. In order that the empire of the sea may belong to any particular nation, it is necessary that all others should renounce the rights of navigation and fishing, which nature has conferred equally on all mankind. By this means, only, by the general consent and agreement of all sovereign and independent societies, can the sea become the apanage, or, if we may be allowed the expression, the dower of such fortunate nation. In this manner, mankind may be supposed free to renounce the liberty of the sea, or to cede it to a single nation, who may give an equivalent for the possession, or leave it in its ordinary state, so that it may be enjoyed equally by all, as it is, in fact, at the present day.

17. In the first case, the empire of the sea would, undoubtedly, be in the hands of a single nation, to the exclusion of every other; but in consequence only of an agreement or universal compact of the human race, and not by force of natural law. Other nations may, in like manner, divest themselves of the free exercise of the rights of navigation and fishing, of which the one in possession will become the absolute master. But as such a compact never has been,