To the Assembly. EXECUTIVE CHAMBER, ALBANY, May 3, 1875. I return herewith, without my approval, Assembly Bill No. 375, entitled "An Act to amend Section 10 of Chapter 830 of the Laws of 1873, entitled an Act to legalize the adoption of minor children by adult persons." The Act of 1873, which the Bill proposes to amend, defines the adoption for which it provides as a "legal act whereby an adult person takes a minor into the relation of a child, and thereby acquires the rights and incurs the responsibilities of a parent in respect to such minor." It prescribes the method whereby the adoption is to be accomplished; concerning which it is only necessary to say here, that if the child is upward of twelve years of age, his consent is required; that the consent of parents is also required, but if both parents are dead, or the survivor has been guilty of certain acts of misconduct specified in the Act, or is incompetent to consent, it is sufficient to procure the consent of "an adult person having the lawful custody of the child;" that the persons required to consent are to appear before the county judge, who, if he is satisfied that "the moral and temporal interests of the child will be promoted by the adoption," must make an order "directing that the child shall be regarded and treated in all respects as the child of the person adopting." Then follows the tenth section, declaring that the child and the person adopting "shall sustain to each other the legal relation of parent and child, and have all the rights and be subject to all the duties of that relation excepting the right of inheritance, except that, as respects the passing and limitation over of real and personal property, under and by deeds, conveyances, wills, devises, and trusts, said child adopted shall not be deemed to sustain the legal relation of child to the person so adopting." The Bill now returned proposes to strike out all of the tenth section after the word "relation," so that the adoption will thenceforth have precisely the same legal effect as if the child and the person adopting were parent and child by blood. The exceptions created by the provisions proposed to be stricken out are of two different descriptions. The first prevents the application to the relation by adoption of the rules of law regulating the descent of real property and the distribution of personal property. If the only effect of striking out this exception would be to enable the adopted child to inherit or take as next of kin from the parent adopting in like manner as a child by blood, the change might be unobjectionable. It would generally be only carrying out the presumed intent of the person adopting in entering into the relation. Whether the child would be entitled to inherit from the collateral relatives of the parent adopting, is a very grave and doubtful question, which ought to be settled by the statute. But it is certain that the rules of descent and of distribution, as between the parent adopting and the child, would work both ways, that the parent would inherit from the child as well as the child from the parent. It appears to me manifestly unjust and inexpedient to provide that the adopting adult shall inherit and take as heir and next of kin from the adopted minor. If the law should be thus changed, an unprincipled or even a selfish man or woman, notwithstanding the guards thrown around the child by the statute, might easily, in many cases which may be suggested, cause all the forms of the statute to be complied with in such a manner as to adopt as his own child a rich orphan minor for the purpose of inheriting from him. If the child is under twelve years of age the adopting parent may be substituted as his heir and next of kin, if this Bill becomes a law, without his consent; and even supposing that the consent of a child of upward of twelve years ought to carry any moral or legal weight in a question of property, it would be irrevocable till he attains majority, and then only by means of the positive act of making a will. On the other hand, on the next day after the adoption, the adopting parent may by a will cut off the child from any share in his property. But apart from this consideration, the proposed Bill would thus operate unjustly; it would, in case of the death of a child. before attaining the age when he can make a will, or after that age if he die intestate, cut off his natural heirs and next of kin, who might be his own infant brothers and sisters by blood. The Legislature ought not to enable a child who has not legal capacity to make a will, to change the course of succession to its real and personal property by means of a legal proceeding taken by him in connection with interested strangers; still less ought the State to allow such a change to be effected by the act of strangers alone. The second exception which this Bill proposes to strike out prevents the fictitious relation of parent and child created by the adoption, from affecting the passing and limitation over of real and personal property. This qualification was also inserted for the protection of third persons; its effect is to prevent the intent of a testator or grantor of property from being defeated in consequence of the adoption by the diversion of the property from the direction which he intended. The clause operates in both ways, it prevents a diversion of property limited over after the death either of the adopting parent or of the adopted child, and in either aspect it is eminently just and proper, and should be retained. From the nature of the case, the person who creates an intermediate estate with a limitation over does not intend that the holder of the intermediate estate shall absolutely dispose of it. He generally means that it shall go to his own blood, and his intention is defeated if a stranger is interposed. For instance, a testator leaves an estate to his son for life, with remainder to the children of the son, or, in default of such heirs, to another son and the latter's children. The first taker, having no children, adopts a child under this Act, perhaps in consequence of a family quarrel, and for the express purpose of disappointing his brother's children. Can there be any doubt that the testator's intent is defeated? The consequences which would ensue if the child adopted was the holder of the lesser estate are of the same general character. Again, the abrogation of the exception now under consideration may work an injury to the adopted child by depriving him of an estate limited to him as the child or an heir of his parent by blood. It would at all events raise a difficult question for decision by the courts. The Bill is unnecessary for any purpose, except to protect the adopted child of a person neglecting to make a will. Though there might be a certain small convenience in providing by law against such an oversight or neglect in such a possible case, the motive is totally inadequate to call for or justify a fundamental change in the laws which define the relations of kindred, and their rights in respect to property. The rules of our customary jurisprudence which regulate these relations and the rights of property incident to them are the gradual growth of many centuries, and have become a refined and complicated system, adapted by the best intellects to the wants of our society in the infinite diversity of conditions which experience has developed. Such a change as is proposed by this Bill would be likely to produce many consequences not foreseen by its projectors, and should not be adopted without a consideration and discussion to which it has not been submitted. The people have become acquainted with the laws which have existed from time immemorial, and are accustomed to act with reference to them. A deviation to meet a special and peculiar instance may be worked out by affirmative acts. It would be unwise, in order to accommodate such a case, to enact a revolution of legal rules which would require a series of affirmative acts to produce the results which the people are accustomed to regard as a matter of course. To the Assembly. EXECUTIVE CHAMBER, ALBANY, May 3, 1875. I return herewith, without my approval, Assembly Bill No. 262, entitled, "An Act supplementary to Chapter 200, Laws of 1874, entitled an Act to authorize the appraisal and sale of leased fine salt lots on the Onondaga Salt Springs Reservation by the Commissioners of the Land Office, and authorizing the Commissioners of the Land Office to exchange lands on said reservation." The constitutional provision regulating the lands owned by the State contiguous to the salt springs is as follows: "The Legislature shall never sell or dispose of the salt springs belonging to this State. The lands contiguous thereto, and which may be necessary and convenient for the use of the salt springs, may be sold by authority of law and under the direction of the commissioners of the land office, for the purpose of investing the moneys arising therefrom in other lands alike convenient; but by such sale and purchase the aggregate quantity of these lands shall not be diminished." "If any lands heretofore acquired by the State on the Onondaga Salt Springs Reservation as lots on which to manufacture fine salt, shall have been so acquired by gift or grant, without compensation to the original owner or owners thereof by the State, and if the commissioners of the land office and the superintendent of the Onondaga Salt Springs shall at any time determine and officially certify that any of said lots are no longer necessary for the purpose of manufacturing fine or boiled salt thereon, the commissioners of the land office shall not sell the same, but may in their discretion reconvey, without cost to the State, such lot or lots to the original owner or owners, their heirs or assigns, without cost or expense to the State, and discharged from all obligation, expressed or implied, on the part of the State to furnish said lot or lots with salt water from the public pumps." " will be The words "gift or grant without compensation construed to mean a conveyance for which no money has been paid by the State. The lands may, however, have been conveyed in consideration of advantages to the grantors other than the receipt of money. It may have been greatly for their interest to convey these lands to the State, and to take back leases with "the obligation on the part of the State to furnish said lot or lots with salt water from the public pumps." It can hardly be believed that the in pure generosity, with a view domain. Their former owners lands were given to the State simply to increase the public converted them from private |