Maximizing the Security and Development Benefits from the Biological and Toxin Weapons ConventionMalcolm R. Dando, Cyril Klement, Marian Negut, G.S. Pearson The Editors would like to thank the authors of the papers at the Advanced Research Workshops for their excellent presentations at the workshops and the production of their drafts. We are indebted to those who helped in the preparation of this volume. We should particularly like to acknowledge the help of Piers Millett, who compiled the papers, set them into camera-ready format and produced the index and Dr. Simon Whitby who made the final changes to the manuscript. Any remaining errors are, of course, our responsibility. Malcolm R. Dando Cyril Klement Marian Negut Graham S. Pearson IX ACHIEVING SECURITY BENEFITS FROM TECHNICAL COOPERATION UNDER THE BIOLOGICAL AND TOXIN WEAPONS CONVENTION GRAHAM S. PEARSON Visiting Professor of International Security, Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, Bradford, West Yorkshire BD7 IDP, UK 1. Background l The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention which opened for signature in 1972 2 and entered into force in 1975 currently has 144 States Parties and 18 Signatory States Article I of the Convention is all-embracing in its complete prohibition of biological weapons stating that: Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never in any circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain: (1) Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes; (2) Weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such |
Contents
8 | |
29 | |
Reporting Outbreaks of Plant Diseases | 53 |
Outbreaks of Disease Current European Reporting | 97 |
Surveillance and Monitoring of Infectious | 121 |
Investigations of Suspicious Outbreaks | 139 |
An Unusual Outbreak of West Nile Fever in Romania | 161 |
Maximizing the Security Benefits from | 177 |
Benefits from International | 221 |
Measures to Provide Biosafety at the Research Center | 247 |
The Development of Biotechnology in Poland 273 | 277 |
Good Manufacturing Practice and Licensed Products 295 | 303 |
Industrial Aspects of Technical CoOperation | 309 |
Increasing Transparency and Building Confidence | 343 |
Maximizing the Security Benefits from Technical | 363 |
Index | 403 |
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Common terms and phrases
activities antibodies antigen antimicrobial resistance areas Article Bacteriological Biological biological agents Biological and Toxin biological warfare biological weapons Biological Weapons Convention biotechnology BTWC BTWC Organization BTWC Protocol Bucharest BWC/AD HOC Centre Chemical Weapons Convention collaboration communicable diseases Dando databases detection Development Benefits diagnostic disease outbreaks disease surveillance Emerging Infectious Diseases epidemic epidemiological epidemiological data epitopes European facilities future BTWC genes genetic engineering Geneva genome global hantavirus Hoc Group human ICGEB identified implementation improve infectious diseases Institute international cooperation Internet investigation laboratories Manufacturing Practice Maximizing the Security measures microbiology microbiology and biotechnology molecular monoclonal antibodies notification OPCW organisation outbreaks of disease PAHO Parties pathogens Production and Stockpiling programmes Prohibition protection public health regional relevant reporting requirements Security and Development Slovakia specific Stockpiling of Bacteriological surveillance networks suspicious outbreaks technical cooperation techniques Toxin Weapons Convention University of Bradford Vector viral virus VTEC Workshop