Casualties and Consensus: The Historical Role of Casualties in Domestic Support for U.S. Military Operations

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Rand Corporation, 1996 - Battle casualties - 126 pages
It is often said that the Vietnam War taught us that the American public is no longer willing to tolerate American casualties in U.S. wars and military operations. There are also two contradictory corollaries: one that the first deaths in a conflict will spark demands for immediate withdrawal, the other that casualties lead to an inexorable demand for "escalation to victory." The truth is far more subtle and sensible. The simplest explanation consistent with the data is that public support for U.S. military operations and public tolerance for casualties are based upon a sensible weighing of benefits and costs that is influenced heavily by consensus (or its absence) among political leaders. When such agreement is missing, even low costs can erode public support for the intervention. In the end, most Americans do not want lives to be sacrificed for any but the most compelling and promising causes, and they rely on their leaders to illuminate just how compelling and promising these causes are.

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Contents

INTRODUCTION
1
ORGANIZATION OF THIS REPORT
2
THE BASES OF SUPPORT
5
CASUALTIES AND SUPPORT
7
A SIMPLE WEIGHING OF ENDS AND MEANS
10
WORLD WAR II
14
Prospects for Success
16
Expected and Actual Costs
17
THE KOREAN WAR
54
Escalation Sentiment
55
An Unhappy Equilibrium
56
Conclusions
59
Escalation Sentiment
61
Withdrawal Sentiment
62
A Return to the Unhappy Equilibrium
63
Conclusions
66

Conclusion
18
THE KOREAN WAR
19
Perceived Stakes and Benefits
20
Prospects for Success
21
Costs
22
THE VIETNAM WAR
24
Perceived Stakes and Benefits
25
Prospects for Success
26
Expected and Actual Costs
27
Conclusion
29
THE GULF WAR
30
The Question of Costs
35
Conclusion
40
Costs
42
Perceived Benefits and Prospects
43
Costs
44
Somalia and the Myth of the CNN Effect
45
Conclusion
47
CHAPTER CONCLUSIONS
49
POLARIZATION OVER COMMITMENT
53
SOMALIA
67
Revisiting the Myth of the CNN Effect
71
Conclusions
72
LEADERSHIP CONSENSUS AND DISSENSUS
75
LEADERSHIP AND FOLLOWERSHIP
76
KOREA
79
Support for the Korean War
80
Policy Preferences
82
VIETNAM
86
Support for the War
87
Policy Preferences
88
THE GULF WAR
91
SOMALIA
94
Policy Preferences
95
CHAPTER CONCLUSIONS
96
Chapter Five
99
IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICYMAKERS
101
PUBLIC OPINION DATA
105
BIBLIOGRAPHY
121
Copyright

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