for where enhancing, preventing or lessening is specifically referred to, it is qualified by the word 'unreasonably' or 'unduly. Sub-section (b), then, cannot well have been intended to embrace every combination to prevent or restrain particular kinds or systems of trading, or particular kinds of bargaining. At most, I can take it to include only combinations for the direct purpose of preventing or materially reducing trade or commerce in a general sense with reference to a commodity or certain commodities, or for purposes designed or likely to produce that effect." This view was confirmed unanimously by the Court of Appeal of Manitoba. In that particular case, certain members of the Winnipeg Grain and Produce Exchange came to the conclusion that the Plaintiff was using his position as a member to assist other dealers not members to deal with members in violation of the rules of the Exchange as to Commission, and they agreed among themselves that they would neither sell nor buy grain from him. In so combining, they were not actuated by any malicious feeling towards him, but solely by the desire to serve the business interests of themselves and the members of the Exchange generally, and to protect the market created under the rules of the Exchange. They did not attempt to coerce the Plaintiff by violence or threats, or to induce him or others to break any contract nor had they tried to induce others to refrain from dealing with him. "I do not consider" said the first Court:

"that the rules of the Exchange could be properly taken as intended or as likely to enhance the price of grain, or to prevent or lessen competition in the purchase, barter, sale or supply of grain, and still less could they be intended or likely to do so unreasonably or unduly. The members of the Exchange must be expected to deal for profit, and the commission provided for, and which it was the main object of the commission rules to secure, does not seem to have been in any respect unreasonable."

To these considerations may be added those of the Supreme Court of the United States, quoted by our Courts in the case of The King v. Gage already referred to. Out of several citations I take the following from the case of the United States v. Joint Traffic Association, 171 U. S. R. 68, in which Peckham, J., delivering the opinion of the Court, said:

"In Hopkins v. United States, decided this term, we say that the statute applies only to those contracts whose direct and immediate effect is a restraint upon interstate commerce, and that to treat the Act as condemning all agreements under which, as a result, the cost of conducting as interstate commerce business may be increased, would enlarge the application of the Act far beyond the fair meaning of the language used. The effect upon interstate commerce must not be indirect or incidental only. An agreement entered into for the purpose of promoting the legitimate business of an individual or corporation, with no purpose to thereby affect or restrain interstate commerce, and which does not directly restrain such commerce, is not, we think, covered by the Act, although the agreement may indirectly and remotely affect the commerce."

This, after all, is only to repeat the general principles referred to by the Privy Council in the case of the United Shoe Machinery Company of Canada v. Brunet (Canadian Reports, 1909 A. C. 148), where, speaking of the "privilege which the law secures to all traders, namely, that they shall be left free to conduct their own trade in the manner which they deem best for their own interests, so long as that manner is not in itself illegal," their Lordships say:—

"This privilege is, indeed, the very essence of that freedom of trade in the name and in the interest of which the Respondents claim to escape from the obligations of their contracts: Hutton v. Eckersley, 6 E. B. 47, approved of in the Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor, Gow & Co., 1892,

A. C. 25. The latter case, indeed, affords a striking example of the lengths to which traders, in the bona fide defence or promotion of their own interest, may lawfully push this privilege, regardless of the injury, clearly foreseen by them, which they may thereby incidentally inflict on the trade of their rivals."

If these considerations prevail then, except in extreme cases, the offences that are generally referred to as combinations in restraint of trade will be found not, strictly speaking, as restraints under subsection (b), but as one or other of the high crimes dealt with in the three other subsections of Article 498. Weidman v. Shragge (ubi sup.) is a case in point.

DOMICIL.'

By E. K. WILLIAMS.

The important subject of Domicil has acquired an additional significance in Manitoba since the decision of Walker v. Walker (1919), A.C. 947, (1919), 2 W.W.R 935, in which it was held that the Divorce and Matrimonial Causes Act, 20-21 Vict. (1857), C. 85 (Imp.) was in force in this province. The Manitoba Courts have no jurisdiction to pronounce a decree of divorce (a vinculo matrimonii) which completely dissolves the marriage tie, unless the parties are domiciled within the jurisdiction at the time the proceedings are commenced. 6 Hals., p. 262, Le Mesurier v. Le M. (1895), A.C. 517.

In the same year that Walker v. Walker was decided, the House of Lords in Casdagli v. Casdagli (1919), A.C. 145, dealt authoritatively with the question of acquisition of a domicil of choice in a nonchristian country by a British subject whose domicil of origin was English and who was a member of an ex-territorial community. This decision disapproved authority that had been accepted-in the Courts at least since 1883 and will probably have far-reaching consequences. It shews, too, that the law upon this subject is still in a state of formation, further evidence, if any were needed, that law is yet, as it has always been, the most progressive science. The case is also of particular present interest in the light of the discussion now going on at Lausanne as to the abrogation by Turkey of the various capitulations.

We shall further see that the subject presents for consideration peculiar local problems arising out of our constitution and method of government.

It is advisable at this stage to enumerate some of

'Read at the Annual Meeting of the Manitoba Bar Association, held in Winnipeg on the 6th February, 1923.

the matters which under English and Manitoba law are determined by the test of domicil.

1. Capacity to contract. This is still an open question. Marriage is considered by some authorities to be a matter of status, 6 Hals., p. 254: by others a matter of contract: 6 Hals., p. 255. The capacity to marry may be said to be governed by the lex domicilii (the law of the domicil) of both of the contracting parties, 6 Hals., pp. 234, 254.

The tendency is to consider that the capacity to enter into commercial contracts is governed by the lex loci contractus (the law of the place where the contract was made), 6 Hals., p. 234. Capacity to enter into contracts relating to immovables is governed solely by the lex situs (the law of the place where the immovable is situate), 6 Hals., p. 233.

2. Jurisdiction to dissolve the marriage tie. We have already seen that this jurisdiction is only given to the Court of the matrimonial domicil at the time of commencement of the action. But residence of the petitioner within the jurisdiction of the Manitoba Courts is enough to found jurisdiction "to grant judicial separation, to decree the nullity of a marriage celebrated in the British Dominions and to order aliment, protection and restitution of conjugal rights," 4 Ency. Laws of Eng., 2nd ed., p. 702; 6 Hals., p. 262: McCormack v. McC. (1920), 2 W.W.R. 714 (Alta.-App. Div.); Kalenczuk v. K. (1920), 2 W.W.R. 415 (Sask.-C.A.); Rex v. Woods (1903), 6 O.L.R. 41 (C.A.).

3. Validity and construction of marriage settlements. If no other law is adopted by the contract the lex domicilii at the date of the marriage governs: 6 Hals., p. 276; Re De Nicols, De Nicols v. Curlier (1900), 2 Ch. 410; (1900), A.C. 21; 16 L.Q.R. 289: except as to immovables.