Thus a man domiciled in London, England, is a domiciled Englishman, and the area of his domicil is that of England.

But is a man domiciled in Winnipeg domiciled in Manitoba or in Canada or in both? Does it depend upon whether it is a matter within provincial or Dominion jurisdiction? Might it not have an important bearing when it comes to a question of change of domicil? Mr. Dicey says (p. 95):

"If, indeed, it happened that one part of a country, governed generally by one system of law, was in many respects subject to special rules of law, then it might be important to determine whether (a man) was domiciled within each particular part, e.g. Brittany, of the whole country France, but in this case, such part would be pro tanto a separate country, in the sense in which that term is employed in these rules."

The question has been raised in our Canadian Courts in connection with attempts to enforce judgments in personam pronounced by the Courts of one province against a person in another province. These decisions and certain English decisions bearing on the same point may be grouped as follows:

1. The effect of a common right of appeal to the Privy Council.

In Simpson v. Fogo (1863), 1 H. & M. 195, at p. 226, there appears a dictum of Sir W. Page Wood, V.C.: "Subject to exceptions . the Courts have held

the judgments of foreign countries to be conclusive: a rule which has been considered to apply with additional force to judgments in colonies of our own, because they are subject to a special appeal to the Privy Council."

2. The effect of distribution of jurisdiction between different provinces under one sovereignty.

In Sirdar Gurdyal Singh v. Rajah of Faridkote (1894), A.C. 670 (Earl of Selborne, Lord Watson, Lord Hobhouse, Lord Macnaghten, Lord Morris, Lord

Shand and Sir Richard Couch), the Earl of Selborne said (p. 684):—

"As between different provinces under one sovereignty (e.g. under the Roman Empire) "-and see the argument of Sir Robert Finlay in the same case the legislation of the sovereign may distribute and regulate jurisdiction; but no territorial legislation can give jurisdiction which any foreign court ought to recognize as against foreigners who owe no allegiance or obedience to the power which so legislates."

This language was referred to in Gifford v. Calkin (1911), 45 N.S.R. 277, by Meagher, J., at p. 278. The action was brought in Nova Scotia against a domiciled Nova Scotian upon a default judgment recovered against him in New Brunswick upon a promissory note payable there. Counsel argued on one branch of his case: "The Bills of Exchange Act being Dominion legislation and binding upon (both) all provinces creates a peculiar relationship, and if nothing more it is, therefore, a matter of policy that the judgment should be enforced." The argument was not dealt with by the trial Judge or the Full Court (Sir Charles Townshend, C.J., Graham, E.J. and Russell and Drysdale, JJ.), which dismissed the action.

In Deacon v. Chadwick (1901), 1 O.L.R. 346, Armour, C.J.O., giving the judgment of a Divisional Court (Armour, C.J.O. and Falconbridge, C.J.Q.B.), said at p. 351: "The provinces of Manitoba and Ontario are independent provinces so far as the power to make laws in respect of the classes of subjects enumerated in sec. 92 of the British North America Act is concerned, among which are 'property and civil rights in the province' and 'the administration of justice in the province, including the constitution, maintenance and organization of Provincial Courts, both of civil and criminal jurisdiction and including procedure in civil matters in those courts.'"'

His following remarks should carefully be noted.

This decision was followed by the Full Court of the North-West Territories (Sifton, C.J., Scott, Prendergast, Newlands and Harvey, JJ.), in Dakota Lumber Co. v. Rinderkneckt (1905), 6 Terr. L.R. 210, Scott, J., using Professor Dicey's term "law-district" and pointing out (p. 222) that "it cannot be said that a British subject residing in this province is subject not only to the laws of each province of the Dominion, but also to those of all parts of the Empire."

Reference may also be made to Walsh v. Herman (1908), 13 B.C.R. 314 (Full Court) and British American Investment Co. v. Flawse (1911), 4 Sask. L.R. 372 (Wetmore, C.J.).

3. The relations between the provinces having a preconfederation connection.

The point has been raised in Ontario, as between Ontario and Quebec, by reason of certain statutory provisions; see Vezina v. Will H. Newsome Co. (1907), 14 O.L.R. 659 (Meredith, C.J.), who said, p. 664: “I need hardly add that for the purpose of the application of the rules of private international law, it is well settled that the province of Quebec is to be treated by the Courts of the province (of Ontario) as a foreign country"

These decisions, do not, however, it is submitted leave the matter in satisfactory shape-see what Beck, J., says on the question of divorce jurisdiction in McCormack v. McC. (1920), 2 W.W.R. [Alta. App. Div.] 714, at p. 720-and there remains the difficult question whether a man may not have two or more domicils in Canada-for different purposes: and see Mr. Dicey's query at pp. 100 et seq.

This may be a matter of considerable importance when we contrast the law affecting property and civil rights administered in the province of Quebec with that administered in the "common-law" provinces.

Let us now return to Mr. Dicey's definition. The use of the word "home" in this definition, if necessary, is unfortunate. "Domicil" and "home" are not the

same. Every one has in the eye of the law a domicil: every one has not necessarily a home. A man may be domiciled where he has no home; and may be resident where he has no domicil.

The attempt is made to avoid confusion by using the word "permanent."

In Roman Law that place was regarded as a man's domicil which he had freely chosen at once as the centre of his legal relations and business, the place where he kept his household gods (lares), and the place to which he invariably returned from any temporary absence. Cod. Lib. X. tit XXXIX. 7.

The well-known definition of the Roman Code is set out in Dicey, p. 790, is translated in McCormack v. McC. (1920), 2 W.W.R. 714, at p. 716, and considered in 48 C.L.J., at p. 474 [Dr. N. W. Hoyles, K.C.].

It is interesting to observe that the Quebec Civil Code says: Art. 79: "The domicil of a person, for all civil purposes, is at the place where he has his principal establishment." It is, of course, a copy of the provision of the French Civil Code.

Mr. Foote [Private International Law (1914), 4th ed.] attempts to get over these various difficulties by defining domicil (p xli.) as "the relation of an individual to a particular state which arises from his residence within its limits as a member of its community" partly following the wording of Lord Westbury in Bell v. Kennedy (1868), L.R. 1 Sc. & Div. 307, 320.

This definition, however, merely gives the starting point for another analysis-and it seems preferable to avoid definitions and deal only with the criteria of domicil and the evidence from which it may be inferred. This may most conveniently be done when considering change of domicil.

Mr. Foote points out (p. xli.) that the status of every natural person is made up of three elements:1. Nationality;

2. Domicil;

C.B.R.-VOL. I.—17

3. Capacity; a thing only important when it does not exist, as in the case of a minor or person of unsound mind.

He also mentions the quasi-element of legitimacy. The general rule is that the law attributes a domicil to every person at every period of his life and no person has more than one domicile at a time: Udny v. Udny (1869), L.R. 1 H.L. (Sc.) 441.

Time will not permit of the discussion of the very interesting question as to whether a man can have a double domicil: see Dicey, pp. 99 et seq.

"Commercial domicil" is a matter, not of private international, but of International Law, and must be considered separately.

There are three kinds of domicil:

1. Of origin (domicilium originis): naturale.
2. Of choice-Voluntarily acquired by a person
proprio marte-voluntarium.

3. By operation of law-necessarium-consequen-
tial-acquired by a woman marrying a man
domiciled in a foreign country.

1. And First of the Domicil of Origin.

The law of England attributes a domicil of origin to every person, and it attaches upon birth.

A natural legitimate child takes the domicil of its father at the time of the child's birth no matter where the child is born: 4 Ency. L. of E. 698.

If the father be not living at the time of the birth of the child it takes the domicil of the mother ib.; also if the father dies before the child becomes of age.

An illegitimate child takes the domicil of the mother at the time of the child's birth: if the mother be unknown its domicil is determined by the place where the child was born and, if that be unknown, by the place where the child is found, ib. 699.

If an illegitimate child be legitimated per subsequens matrimonium of its parents (as it now is in