Manitoba by (1920), 10 Geo. V. c. 77, s. 2), it takes the domicil of the father at the time of legitimation.

The domicil of origin is peculiar in this: it is always in abeyance: it may be displaced by a domicil of choice or domicil by operation of law; but either of these may be lost, in which case the domicil of origin attaches.

If a man leave one domicil of choice intending to acquire another domicil of choice and die before he reaches the place fixed on, the domicil of origin attaches.

2. Of the Domicil of Choice.

Any person sui juris can at any time change his domicil the domicil of persons under disability changes with that of their parents or guardians, except in the case of a lunatic. But a parent may not change a child's domicil fraudulently to benefit the parent: Re Beaumont (1893), 3 Ch. 490.

In order to change a domicil there must be the voluntary intention to make the change coupled with the acts necessary. There must be both animus and factum-there must be a combination of intention and fact; of mind and act.

Udny v. Udny, L.R. (1869) 1 H.L. (Sc.) 441.

The intention must be formed voluntarily. Thus there is no change in the case of political refugees no matter how long the residence may be: there can hardly be said to be an intention.

The principal criteria of the change may be summed up thus:

1. A fixed intention to change. Without the intention no length of residence in the foreign country will work a change: Winans v. A.-G. (1904), A.C. 287 (residence in England 28 years-no intention and therefore no change).

2. The change must take place: Bell v. Kennedy (1868), L.R. 1 H.L. (Sc.) 307.

3. The change must be intended to be permanent.

There must be the animo manendi, 4 Ency. L.

of E. 700: Bonbright v. Bonbright (1901), 1 O.L.R. 629 (Ferguson, J.), 2 O.L.R. 249 (Div. Ct.): In re Murray Estate (1922), 31 M.R. 362 (Dysart, J.).

4. The intention must be voluntarily formed-4 Ency. L. of E. 700.

It is not considered to be voluntary in the case of :1. Persons in the diplomatic or consular service 4 Ency. L. of E. 700, or otherwise in the service of the Crown, 6 Hals. 189.

2. An invalid going abroad for the benefit of his health (although he may form an intention to change his domicil because of his health, the motive is then immaterial): 4 Ency. L. of E. 700. 3. Prisoners: 6 Hals. 188.

4. Exiles: Ib.

5. Moral pressure, as to avoid creditors: 6 Hals. 188.

The onus of proving a change of domicil is upon the person asserting the change: Winans v. A.-G. (1914), A.C. 287: there will be no presumption of a change from mere change of residence: Coleman v. Coleman (1919), 3 W.W.R. 490 (Alta.-Walsh, J.), where a wife deserted by her husband was granted a divorce, there being no evidence that he had acquired another domicil although he had apparently left Alberta, which was the matrimonial domicil: In re Murray Estate (1922), 31 M.R. 362 (Dysart, J.).

The following matters are some only that have been considered to be some evidence of an intention to change:

1. Removing to a foreign country settling there and engaging in the trade of a country: The Venus (1814), 8 Cranch (U.S. Sup. Ct.) 253; Casdagli v. Casdagli (ante).

2. Enrollment on the voter's roll in the new country: Barry v. James (1919), 3 W.W.R. 182 (P.C.— South Africa); but not the exercise of civil franchise: In re Murray Estate (ante).

3. Payment of income tax in the new country: Barry v. James (supra), where the person in question had successfully resisted attempts to make him liable for income tax in England.

4. The desertion of a wife left in the domicil of origin and obtaining a divorce on the ground of desertion: Re Seilo Estate (1918), 1 W.W.R. 441 (Sask.-Elwood, J.). Compare this with Coleman v. Coleman (ante).

5. A change of residence itself raises a presumption of intention to change, but more than that is needed: In re Murray Estate (ante).

6. Descriptions in wills and other legal instruments: 6 Hals., p. 190.

7. The form or contents of the same. Ib.

8. The purchase or ownership of land: 6 Hals., p. 190; Bonbright v. B. (ante); In re Murray Estate (ante).

9. The purchase of a grave: 6 Hals., 190.

Statements made in his lifetime by a deceased person as to his intentions were considered and given effect to by the Privy Council in Barry v. James (supra) and In re Murray (supra).

In Wadsworth v. McCord (1886), 12 S.C.R. 166 (Ritchie, C.J., Fournier, Henry, Taschereau and Gwynne, JJ.), it was held that a declaration at the time of marriage and in the marriage certificate of a domicil in Quebec had only relation to the matrimonial domicil and was not evidence of a domicil in reference to the civil status of the parties-where all the other evidence shewed an Ontario domicil.

For some time it was thought and held that a subject of a Christian power could not acquire a domicil by residence in a country not under Christian government, even if he intended to make it his permanent home. It was thought that he must also intend to adopt the method of life of the society in which he lived: Re Tootals Trusts (1883), 23 Ch. D. 532 (Chitty,

J., held no domicile acquired at Shanghai); Abd-ulMessih v. Chukri Farra (1888), 13 App. Cas. 431.

Sir Thomas Raliegh, K.C. [6 Hals., 186 note (r)] submitted that "the question was one of evidence and that non-Christian countries form no exception to the general rule as regards the content of the animus manendi" adding, "It is probably impossible to acquire a domicil in an uncivilized country.'

The question came up for decision by the House of Lords in the recent interesting case of Casdagli v. Casdagli (1919), App. Cas. 145; 88 L.J.P. 49 (Lord Finlay, L.C., Viscount Haldane, Lord Dunedin, Lord Atkinson and Lord Phillimore), and it was decided that an Egyptian domicil had been acquired by a British subject whose domicil of origin was English, who was registered at the British Consulate at Cairo as a British subject and who, as such, was subject only to the jurisdiction of the British Consular Court in Egypt.

Time will not permit of the discussion here of Anglo-Indian domicil, but reference should be made to 6 Hals., p. 190, and Lord Advocate v. Jaffrey, [1921] 1 A.C. 146 [H.L. Sc.].

3. Of Domicil by Operation of Law.

The domicil of a wife is that of her husband-and she cannot acquire a domicil distinct from him even though she be living elsewhere with the consent of her husband. Nothing short of judicial separation will enable a wife to acquire a different domicil from that of her husband: 6 Hals., 191; Westlake, p. 333; Lord Advocate v. Jaffrey (ante).

Upon the death of the husband or the dissolution of the marriage (a vinculo) the power of the wife to acquire a domicil for herself revives; until she makes a change she retains the domicil of her late husband at the time of his death or of the divorce: 6 Hals., 192.

In conclusion, it should be observed that this consideration of "domicil" is not-and, of course, could not be in any part, exhaustive. It is merely an attempt to give a general view of the subject and to indicate some phases of particular interest in Manitoba. It is so submitted in the hope that it may serve as a starting point for a future discussion, by ourselves, of the law of domicil.