Transactions of the Grotius Society. Vol. 8-Sweet & Maxwell, Ltd., London, 1923.

The Transactions of the Grotius Society are always full of interest and instruction to reading men at the Bar. The volume before us is no whit behind its predecessors in excellence of matter. In Mr. W. S. M. Knight's paper on " Grotius' Earliest Years as Lawyer," we have much light thrown on the educational foundations upon which the great jurist reared his splendid reputation. He became a qualified practitioner before he had attained his seventeenth year. Still earlier he had received the degree of Doctor of Laws at the University of Orleans; his diploma reciting that the honour was conferred upon him "because of his honest behaviour, pious life, literature and famous name (which is widespread here and through other places and which he has won himself by his praiseworthy diligence), as had been testified by the many who knew him." Mr. Knight is constrained to tell us that he was a law student proper for a period of little more than a year at most. And he could hardly have been, as jurist, an academic product at all."

The volume includes papers by Dr. Baty (Diplomatic Rank and Function); by Mr. A. J. Jacobs (Neutrality); by Mr. F. N. Keen (Duties of Nations); by Mr. W. S. Armour (Customs of Warfare in Ancient India); by Mr. Claude Mullins (Private Enemy Property); by Mr. Frank Gahan (Codification of Law), and by Dr. Manfred Nathan, K.C. (Dominion Status). The paper last mentioned will be found especially interesting to Canadian readers. Dr. Nathan points out that "Dominion Status" does not carry the self-governing dependencies of Great Britain far along the road of international recognition so long as they are subject to the authority of the Imperial Parliament, and that the term itself imports the admission that this status is of an incomplete nature.

C. M.

History of English Law. By W. S. Holdsworth, K.C., D.C.L. Volumes II. and III. Methuen & Co., Ltd., London, 1923.

We spoke in high commendation of the new edition of Professor Holdsworth's history in the REVIEW for February (p. 198 sqq.), and we find no ground to depart from our estimate of its value as the work of revision progresses. Volume II. contains much fresh material illustrating the growth of a distinc

tive system of English law in the middle age. In following the various steps in the process of this growth the author has no doubt realized the force of Bishop Stubbs' remark that the history of social institutions cannot be mastered-can scarcely be appreciated-without effort, and "holds but small temptation to the mind that requires to be tempted to study the truth." But whatever his pastime therein Dr. Holdsworth has mastered his subject, and made knowledge the easier for those who would enter upon the fruit of his labours. Much has been written during the last fifty years around the enquiry as to the extent of the debt English Common Law owes to the Civil Law; and while Sir Paul Vinogradoff, in his Essay on "Roman Law in Mediæval Europe," probably supplies us with the correct answer when he says that the real test of the character and extent of the debt is found in the influence of Roman teaching in the development of English juridical ideas rather than in the practical rules of law, it is interesting to follow Dr. Holdsworth's survey of the avenues by which certain principles of the Civil Law and the Canon Law found their way into the Common Law. Speaking generally, the learned author says:

"After the end of the thirteenth century the study of the Civil and the Canon Law ceased to influence directly the development of English Law. But up to that period their influence was direct. So great was their influence, so speedily did English lawyers, at the head of a strong royal court, impart to the customary law of England the essence of what they had learned, that they were able to construct a system which could stand without foreign aid.” (ii, p. 177).

The true relation of Bracton's famous De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Anglia to the Common Law of later times is stated with great clearness (ii, pp. 244, 290):

"It gives us a picture of English Law as developed by judges who were not merely lawyers and not merely common lawyers. The authorities for English Law at the time of Bracton consisted of the rolls of the King's Courts, the incipient register of writs, a few legislative enactments, and Glanvil's Treatise. To suppose that Bracton could have obtained from the study of these materials alone the legal instinct needed to construct from them a philosophical treatise upon English Law would be to suppose a miracle. He was inspired, as many lawyers all over Europe had been, and were being, inspired by the legal instinct of

the Roman jurisconsults, as interpreted by the school of the glossators. The supremacy of the law, in the sense which Bracton had taught it, was guaranteed by the growth of the powers of Parliament. The legal historian

may fairly claim for Bracton and his works an influence, not only upon the history of English Law, but also upon the general history of England."

This pretty effectually disposes of Maine's charge against Bracton that he "put off" whole slices of the Corpus Juris in the guise of a compendium of the law of a country where the systematic study of Roman Law "was formally proscribed." It also lends some force to Nietzsche's jibe that the English people have no native talent for philosophy.

In Chapter V. of Book III. the student will find a very complete and instructive examination of the Working and Development of the Common Law during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Here, as a sort of by-product, is to be had much information concerning the part played by the Common Law in developing the two fundamental characteristics of the English constitution-the system of self-government and the rule of law.

Volume III. deals with the medieval Common Law; tracing, in the earlier chapters, the development of the doctrines of Real Property Law, Crime and Tort, Contract and Quasi-Contract. Chapter IV. is a valuable monograph on "Status," in which the following classes of persons are considered: The King, the Incorporate Person, the Villein, the Infant, the Married Woman. Chapter V. considers the law of succession to chattels. It is sufficient merely to mention these categories to convince the reader of the value and importance of this volume as related to the whole scheme of the work.

C. M.

Books and Periodicals received: Federalism in North America, by H. A. Smith, M.A., Chipman Law Publishing Company, Boston, 1923; Report of Thirty-first Conference of the International Law Association at Buenos Aires, 1922, Sweet & Maxwell, Ltd., London; International Review of Agricultural Economics, New Series, Number 1, International Institute of Agriculture, Rome; The Lawyer and Banker, Vol. XVI., No. 3, Lawyers' and Bankers' Co., New Orleans; Estoppel by Misrepresentation, by George Spencer Bower, Butterworth & Co., Lon

don, 1923; University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. II., Number 4; Yale Law Journal, Vol. XXXII., Number 7; Law Quarterly Review, Vol. XXXIX., Number 154, Stevens & Sons, Ltd, London; Harvard Law Review, Vol. XXXVI., Number 7; Historical Jurisprudence, by Sir Paul Vinogradoff, Vol. I., Oxford University Press; What the Judge Thought, by His Honour Judge Parry, T. Fisher Unwin, London.

CORRESPONDENCE.

The Editorial Board of the Canadian Bar Association does not hold itself responsible for the opinions of Correspondents. Contributions to this department of the REVIEW will be published only over the genuine names of the writers.

THE PROPOSED UNIFORM WILLS ACT.

Editor Canadian Bar Review:

Sir, I have just been reading the report of the proceedings of the Uniformity of Legislation Commissioners as contained in the Bar Association Annual. I note that Section 33 of the "Draft of Uniform Wills Act" proposes to perpetuate the existing (in Manitoba) anomaly between The Wills Act and The Devolution of Intestates Estates Act.

Under Section 4 of The Devolution of Estates Act in case of the death of any of the children of the intestate, the share which would have gone to the deceased child goes to his children in equal proportions. By Section 31 of The Wills Act where any person being a child of the testator to whom any estate is devised or bequeathed dies in the lifetime of the testator leaving issue such devise or bequest shall not lapse, but shall take effect as if the death of such person had happened immediately after the death of the testator. The effect of which is that in the one case (Devolution of Estates Act), the grandchildren take directly from the grandfather, but in the other (The Wills Act) the father's creditors get the grandfather's bounty. That at least is how I read it. Should the sections not be made uniform? Personally I see no reason for the creditors of the intermediate to have the standing they get under The Wills Act.

Winnipeg.

ARCHIBALD C. CAMPBELL.

THE SPIRIT OF LAWLESSNESS.

Editor Canadian Bar Review:

In your issue for February last you discuss the regrettable. spirit of lawlessness that is so prevalent at the present time. May I offer some further reflections on a matter of such grave importance to us all?