an importance undreamt of even twenty years ago. Particular reference might be made to our rapidly growing law relating to motor vehicles in which the question of negligence and contributory negligence forms naturally so large a part. "Although we may not all know it we are in the thick of the locomotive revolution," as a writer in the London Times put it recently.

Widdifield, Law of Motor Vehicles, at p. 29: "Where motor vehicles are using the streets and highways, negligence at common law is the basis of all liability for damages arising from such use, except as otherwise provided by statute or by statutory regulation." Huddy on Automobiles, 1922, at p. 317: "The circumstance that new systems of locomotion, such as electricity, steam, etc., have been added to vehicles using the public highway has not wrought any legal change in the general principles of the law of the use of highways. In determining whether the driver of an automobile has exercised proper care, the size and speed of the machine, its capability of frightening horses or causing other injuries are to be considered. Considering the question from this point of view, it is clear that greater precautions and diligence are required of an automobile than is to be expected from the driver of a horse drawn conveyance. At p. 321: "The care to be exercised under given circumstances is commensurate to the danger involved The addition of

automobiles on account of their speed, size and other characteristics is attended with greater danger to pedestrians and other travellers than is the movement of a horse drawn carriage. Thus it may be said that the care required of the driver of a motor vehicle is commensurate with the danger of such a machine. This may require that the driver shall at all times use greater diligence than would be imposed on the driver of a horse and wagon or on other travellers."

There is an interesting article in the Law Notes for February, 1923, which reads in part: "The profession is familiar with the difficulty which Admiralty Judges

have experienced because of the fact that every seaman 'swears for his ship.' Moreover, a distinct hostility among different classes of vessels has often been commented upon. The officers of a steamer regard sailing vessels as an intolerable nuisance, while the 'wind jammer' considers all steamers as reckless bullies, regardless of the rights of others. A like feeling exists between pleasure craft and working boats. The result of this is that in navigation the conduct of vessels is largely influenced by this feeling and in the trials subsequent to collision the testimony is colored by it. A very similar situation is growing up as between the automobile and the pedestrian and in its development it will cause many avoidable accidents and much conflicting testimony. If it does, the situation will be more complicated than the maritime conflict referred to, for it will be impossible to secure a tribunal aloof from the animus which affects the parties."

Mr. Justice Walsh in the case of Black v. City of Calgary (1915), 24 D. L. R., p. 59, made the following remarks on the questions here discussed:-—

"In dismissing the action I do so without costs. The law as it now stands in actions such as this is most unsatisfactory and unjust. No matter how great may have been the negligence of a defendant, if the plaintiff has by his own negligence contributed to the accident, he cannot recover except, of course, in cases where ultimate negligence is brought home to the defendant. The result is, that although the damage done is due to their concurrent negligence the plaintiff alone must bear the whole of the loss.

"In Quebec the much more equitable principle prevails of apportioning the damage between the parties. If a man is injured partly by his own fault and partly by that of another it is surely fairer to make each of them pay a part rather than one of them suffer all of the resulting loss, for they are both to blame, and without carelessness on the part of each the accident would not have happened. If, as often happens in collision cases, both parties suffer injury because of

C.B.R.-VOL. I.-55

fault on both sides, there surely can be nothing unfair in pooling the damages and apportioning the aggregate loss between them."

The case of Grand Trunk Pacific Ry. Co. v. Earl, (1923), Can. Law Reports 397; (1923), 2 D. L. R. 741, decided on 3rd April, contains striking statements by Duff, Anglin and Mignault, JJ., as to the harshness of the English doctrine of contributory negligence, and the more equitable doctrine of the civil law in force in the Province of Quebec, but "this is a matter for the consideration of the law-maker, for the Courts are obliged to apply the law, however harsh it may seem."

After being read a second time and referred to the Legal Committee of the Ontario Legislature, Bill No. 68 was withdrawn at the suggestion of Chief Justice Sir William Meredith to the Attorney-General that the Bill should be held over for another year to enable the Bench and Bar of Ontario to consider it carefully.

Prior to this the opinions of the Judges of the Supreme Court at Ottawa were obtained by the Attorney-General of Ontario. With the exception of Mr. Justice Idington-who expressed no opinion-all the Judges expressed themselves as being strongly in favour of the principle of the proposed measure. It must be generally conceded that the law relating to contributory negligence is not in a satisfactory condition. It is hoped, therefore, that those who are the most qualified to decide how it can be improved will give their earnest attention to the best means of improving the law in this respect. As an illustration of the confusion that has arisen in applying the principles of the common law, reference may be made to the recent case of Clark v. Canadian National Railways, 67 D. L. R. 674; 16 Sask. L. R. 31, which has been summarized as follows: "In a case of a collision between a railway train and an automobile on a level crossing at the intersection of the defendant company's line with a public highway, where primary negligence only had been established against the defendants, and no question of ultimate negligence on its part arose, the inquiry by the

jury should not have extended further than to ascertain whether or not there was any contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff, and a further question as to whether the accident should be attributed to the negligence of the one rather than of the other, which may have altered the significance of the other questions in the minds of the jury, is ground for granting a new trial." See also (1923), 3 D. L. R. 387.

The writer desires to acknowledge the valuable assistance given him by Mr. K. L. G. Bailey of the Bar of New Brunswick and Ontario, and two articles on the subject by M. J. Gorman, K.C., of the Ottawa Bar, published in C. L. T. [1917] Vol. 37, p. 23 and [1922] Vol. 42, p. 425, in the preparation of this paper.

LEGAL EDUCATION AGAIN.

BY O. M. BIGGAR, K.C.

It is fashionable just now to advocate the extension and intensification of the academic part of legal training and to decry the value of apprenticeship as an adequate or even a useful preparation for the practice of law. Legal studies are popular, the importance of lawyers in the community increases with the increasing complication of social life, and money is not wanting for at least some extension of the machinery for shaping the raw material out of which practising lawyers are made. It is not very long since, in Canada as still in England, the training of youthful aspirants to the service of the law was wholly under the control of the practising members of the profession, but a great change has come about. The law societies of most of the provinces have confided control of legal education to the universities, and the academicians have become on this subject the "experts" upon whom, as in all departments of life, we are becoming increasingly prone to rely. The academic tendency is strengthened by the example of the United States where the professional bodies, to the misfortune of the public, enjoy narrower privileges, and admission to practice is, even more than in Canada, a mere matter of scholastic studies. In the Legal Education Number of the CANADIAN BAR REVIEW, Dr. Stone, the Dean of the law school affiliated with Columbia University, argues in favour of full time academic studies on the case system. Dean MacRae, of Dalhousie University, speaking for the Legal Education Committee of the Canadian Bar Association, supports the same proposition with reservations, and Mr. Paul Home in a useful paper discusses some details of the academic methods by which legal instruction can be best imparted and legal knowledge most usefully tested. All the protagonists are on one side, or at least in the same interest and, if judgment has not yet