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with reference to a different subject matter, and under a different system of law. The cases cited from the British reports have no bearing on this case."

Another ground asserted by the appellant for reversing the award of the majority of the Board of Arbitration was that certain evidence given by a witness before a railway Commission in Canada which was not repeated or made evidence before the Board, had been relied on by the Chairman of the Board in his reasons for the award. Their lordships found that while this contention was correct yet all the material facts deposed to by the witness in question before the said Commission were to be found in the documentary evidence before the Board, and that if no reference had been made to the impugned evidence the majority of the Board would have arrived at the same conclusion upon the same materials. That being so their lordships declined to regard it as a ground for setting aside the award.

Liability of Lunatic in Tort. In the trial of an action of Wood v. Tennant, recently heard at Brockville, Mr. Justice Latchford followed with approval the judgment of the late Chancellor Boyd in Stanley v. Hayes, 8 0. L. R. 81, holding that a lunatic is civilly liable in tort, although, being incapable of criminal intent, he is not liable in

a criminal proceeding.

It is interesting to note that some of the English text books point out that there is no reported instance in England of an action of tort ever having been brought against a lunatic. The excellent group of writers on “Lunatics and Persons of Unsound Mind” in the nineteenth volume of Halsbury seem to think that if such an action were brought in these latter days, insanity would prove to be a good defence, but consideration of a couple of cases upon which they base their opinion gives very little reason for doubting either the soundness or the utility of the

Ontario decisions.

Waiver-Release of Right Accrued. In Lord Sumner's judgment in Atlantic Shipping v. Dreyfus, (1922), 2 A. C. at p. 261, occurs a passage which supports Mr. Ewart's contention, on page 42 of his Waiver Distributed,

that "waiver” is often improperly used where "release” is the right word. Lord Sumner expressed himself as follows:

“There is the further contention that a clause relieving a shipowner from damage to cargo caused by breach of the condition as to seaworthiness, to be effectual must be clear. Now to say that a claim is to be waived is incorrect. If a right has accrued, it must be released or discharged by deed or upon consideration. Waiver applies to an election as to something in futuro; it is not a term by which to describe the answer to a right, which is complete in præsenti.”

Parent and ChildSupport of Infant-Contract. Childs v. Farfar, 51 O. L. S. 210, is an interesting discussion of the liability of a parent for the maintenance of his infant child. It is pointed out that while there is no common law liability, certain duties are imposed by the Criminal Code, and neglect to supply the child with necessaries is an indictable misdemeanour at common law. Added to these is the undoubted moral obligation of the parent, and it is not difficult to find an implied contract to remunerate any person who, at the request of the parent or with his knowledge, undertakes to care for his child. Once established, the contract of course governs.

Sale of Intoxicating Liqour-Loss in Transit-Action Against

Carrier.

Major v. Canadian Pacific Railway Company, 51 0. L. R. 370, affirms the old proposition that "no court will lend its aid to a man who founds his cause of action upon an immoral or an illegal act." The plaintiffs were importing liquor into Ontario, and it was found as a fact that the liquor was intended for sale in Ontario contrary to the provisions of the Ontario Temperance Act. Part of it was stolen or lost in the course of carriage, and the plaintiffs were not permitted to recover from the carriers by reason of the ancient rule. This judgment has since been affirmed by the Supreme Court of Canada, and may be found in vol. 64 S.C.R.

Revenue-Income Tax-New Zealand Land and Income Tax

Act, 1916.

In the case of Ward and Company, Limited v. Commissioner of Taxes (1922, 39 T.L.R. 90) the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (Viscount Cave, L.C., Lord Atkinson, Lord Sumner, Lord Parmoor and Lord Carson) decided that under the New Zealand Land and Income Tax Act, 1916, it was not open to the appellants, who were brewers and maltsters, to claim a reduction from the assessable income of their business in respect of a sum of money spent in canvassing, advertising and printing with a view to defeat the enactment of a law prohibiting the sale of intoxicating liquors throughout New Zealand.

International Law-Debt-Sovereign State-Garnishee Order

Jurisdiction. Russell, J., in the Chancery Division of the High Court of Justice in England, recently decided an interesting case in International law. The case in which the point arose was the Duff Development Co., Ltd., v. Kelantan Government and the Crown Agents for the Colonies, (1922, 39 T.L.R. 96). In an arbitration between the Company and the Government of Kelantan the arbitrator awarded costs to the Company and the Government of Kelantan in the result became liable to taxed costs of the litigation in a very considerable amount. The Company obtained

garnishee order nisi attaching all debts owing from the Crown Agents to the Government of Kelantan, and then asked the court for an order on the garnishees to pay them a sum of money on account of such taxed costs. The court refused to order the garnishees to pay over the sum that was

hands and due by them to the Government of Kelantan, the ground of the refusal being that Kelantan was & Sovereign State which had not submitted to the jurisdiction of the court for the purpose of execution.

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in

their

ShippingCollision-DamagesExpert EvidenceRegistrar

and Merchants.

In the case of the “Steadfast.” Hill, J., sitting in the P.D. and Admiralty Division of the High Court of Justice in England

C.B.R.-VOL.I.—7+

a

(1922, 39 T.L.R. 96) decided an interesting point in admiralty procedure. The case involved a collision occurring in the English Channel between Danish schooner called the Danmarkand the United States Shipping Board's steamship "Steadfast." In the hearing before the Registrar, evidence as to the value of the Danmark” had been given by expert witnesses on both sides. In arriving at their decision the Registrar and Merchants relied on their own opinion as to the value. Hill, J., said in dismissing objections to the report of the Registrar in assessing the damages, that in his view

great advantage of trial before the Registrar and Merchants was that they had so wide an experience of ships and shipping matters that they were able to test and correct the evidence which was put before them. They are not bound to accept the opinions of experts, even if they are all one way, but nay test those opinions by their own experience and arrive at a judgment accordingly.

а

Vicarious Liability-Master and Servant-Damages caused "in

the performance of the work."

A most interesting case calling for the application of the difficult doctrine of vicarious liability has been recently decided by a hitherto unreported judgment of the Quebec Court of Appeal, i.e. Hudson's Bay Co. v. Vaillancourt (Superior Court judgment reported 60 S.C. 457). It arose out of the following circumstances:

A man named Wilson was placed in charge of a lonely post of the appellant company in northern Quebec. He had, as staff, the plaintiff-respondent, acting as man of all work, and the latter's mother, who looked after the affairs of the household. All three lived in the same dwelling, and Wilson had general control and supervision over the other two. Before engaging Wilson, the company had written his former employer for reference, asking for information in the following terms : “Would you kindly let me know whether in your opinion Mr. Wilson is capable of taking charge of a post, and whether he is honest, sober and industrious." In due course, and before Wilson was engaged, the following reply was received: "He is a first-class bookkeeper, and a man that can handle goods and keep them in good shape; he is a good judge of fur. I have always found him honest and industrious."

Early one morning in October, 1920, some four years after Wilson's engagement, Vaillancourt, whose room was on the second floor, went downstairs to look after the horses, in accordance with the usual routine. After finishing his chores, he returned to his room to prepare for work in the bush. While he was getting ready, Wilson, whose room was on the floor below, called out, “Who is that up there?” Vaillancourt answered that it was he, and shortly afterwards came downstairs. He saw Wilson standing at the threshold of his bedroom, in rather scanty attire and obviously the worse for liquor. Putting his hand on Wilson's shoulder, Vaillancourt suggested that the latter return to his room and get dressed, since it was not decent to appear as he was.

He then proceeded downstairs to put on his working boots. As he was thus engaged, Wilson appeared, rifle in hand, and fired at him point blank, hitting him in the leg. Amputation became necessary, and Vaillancourt sued the company. The defendant pleaded (a) that the accident did not occur in the performance of the work for which Wilson was employed, and (b) that it had moreover exercised reasonable care and prudence in engaging him.

Modern French doctrine, like the old Canon law, rests the vicarious liability of the master for the servant or "préposé” upon the liberty of choice, and if the servant thus freely chosen commits an offense or a quasi-offense (tort) in the performance of his work, the master will be liable, presumably on the ground that he chose his servant badly. But, rather illogically it would seem, the presumption is irrebutable, and the master cannot exonerate himself by proving that he has exercised all reasonable care in his selection. To constitute the relationship of "commettant” and “préposé”, there must exist (according to Sourdat), two elements: (1) The "préposé” must have been voluntarily chosen ; and (2) The “commettant” must have the power or authority to give the former instructions as to how the work is to be done. Whenever these two conditions are fulfilled there is potential vicarious liability. This liability will attach, however, only if the damage be caused, in the words of the French Code, “par les préposés dans les fonctions auxquelles ils (the "commettants”) les ont employes. “And it is in deciding whether a given act does or does not come within these "fonctions” that difficulties usually arise.

According to a recent English work on the subject (T. Baty: Vicarious Liability, Clarendon Press, 1916), the phrase "scope

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