in the administration of justice in Canada. We have always had just reason to be proud of our Courts, but the fact must be faced that during the unsettled period through which we have been passing, a great deal has happened to tend towards pessimism. A brighter day is dawning, and it is not unnatural for those who have the greater part to play in the administration of justice, being as they are, only human, to take heart and be glad to feel that the public is behind them. Apropos of this subject, we are reminded of an occasion when the late Sir William Meredith, Chief Justice of Ontario, expressed openly the opinion that the REVIEW should regard it as a duty to frankly and fearlessly criticise the Judges whenever occasion should require. The answer given to him at the time was that his invitation would be gladly accepted, and, therefore, let it be understood that it is not the intention to seize upon opportunities for praise only. It is nevertheless gratifying to be able to point out that while the reference in our last number was to a Chief Justice who has enjoyed a long and distinguished career on the Bench of Ontario, and who is a member of one of the most distinguished families in Canada, the present reference is to a Judge of a Court of lesser standing, who we are glad to believe to be typical of his brother Judges of the same Courts, and who by his conduct of the Home Bank cases has justly earned the sincere admiration of those best qualified to understand the difficulties with which he has been faced. Altogether the whole situation is most encouraging. While upon this subject, however, there is a word in passing which may not be amiss. Judges should not overlook the fact that the public is always watching them, and that confidence in the administration of justice depends very largely upon the extent to which the public feels that each litigant in each case has had what the common man calls a square deal. Some of our Judges have learned to their great satisfaction that this result is best accomplished by painstaking effort on their part, and that it is not a good thing that they should be unduly expeditious in disposing of cases at trial. Others have failed to realize this very important fact, and lack what we call popularity on that account. When one hears of a Judge disposing of a number of cases in a single day, one wonders if they were really tried with a proper degree of thoroughness, and sometimes one is not surprised to hear that Counsel concerned, especially if members of the Junior Bar, have left the Court impressed with a feeling that they were not able to properly present their cases. This is not as it should be. The lawyer is very apt to excuse himself to his client, and the client is very apt to pass the information on to his friends, the result being a lack of confidence in the administration of justice. Some of our Judges might very well give this matter their serious consideration. G. F. H. UNIFORMITY IN LAW. The subject of legal education in Ontario as discussed in an article. published in the October number of this magazine has some indirect bearing upon a vexed question which interests lawyers in every Province of Canada. The establishment of a teaching faculty in law in the University of Toronto implies very much increased attention being given to the study of Roman Civil Law, which is substantially the Civil Code in force in the Province of Quebec. Indirectly the greatest obstacle to uniformity is the difference between the law of Quebec and that of the other Provinces. Their own law is assured to Quebec by the Confederation Act, and no one would for a moment question this right. The only hope of uniformity lies in convincing all parties that in certain branches, particularly Commercial Law, this is in the highest degree desirable, unless business interests are to be handicapped to their serious disadvantage. One is led to enquire what efforts have been made to discover the extent to which the English and French laws differ. If they are not far apart, would not a friendly conference make this evident, and perhaps permit of some uniform legislation, on certain lines, being adopted. We have been so accustomed to accentuate the fundamental differences between the English Common Law and the Civil Law that we forget the fact that most of our equity jurisprudence was by our great English Judges of the past derived from the latter source. So with our Maritime and Commercial Law. If when the Ontario "Sale of Goods Act" of 1920 was in the course of preparation it had been known the Act would be adopted substantially in every Province of Canada except Quebec, possibly an effort would have been made to obtain the co-operation of the latter Province. Out of curiosity the writer has hastily compared a few sections taken at random from the "Sale of Goods Act" with the Civil Code of Quebec and found them substantially identical. Compare section 3(1) with article 1472; section 27 with articles 1492 and 1532; section 28 with articles 1496 and 1533, and section 29 with articles. 1152, 1493 and 1497. At no time in the past has a friendlier feeling existed between the English and French speaking people of Canada than at present. This is manifest in the sympathetic attitude in Ontario to the French request that their language may be used in the education of their children in the higher forms of the public schools; something that the Privy Council has said they have no legal right to, and which can only be brought about by persuasion and a generous and tolerant spirit actuating those in control of the Public School System in Ontario. E. R. C. NOTES. CAR OWNERS AND THEIR CIVIL LIABILITY.-When the motorist, driving from Toronto towards the setting sun, reaches the western boundary of Manitoba he leaves behind him a certain freightage of care. The point is emphasized by an examination of the recent decision in Manitoba on the liability of the car owner for whatever his car may do when driven by a stranger hand. Ontario and Manitoba are in harmony. They have extended the common law against the owners of instruments causing danger. In effect they say-Whoever drives Brown's car, unless it be a thief, Brown is answerable. No matter. that Brown was absent, ignorant, and would have disapproved: Brown must make good the fines for police offences; and Brown must satisfy any claims for damages. In Aikens v. The City of Kingston,' a policeman was in charge of a car owned by the corporation of his city. He drove it with rank recklessness, and at a hair-raising pace through the city streets. The city was sued not under the common law of employer and employee, but under the Motor Vehicles Act, and had to stand the shock of $1,400 civil damages to Mr. Aikens. The Manitoba case is Weller v. Conklin and Lavergne. There the relatives of a woman killed by a motor car obtained damages against the owner of the car, although that owner was neither in the car nor near the accident, nor was it driven by his chauffeur or any member of his family. It was driven by an acquaintance to whom the owner had lent it. True, the borrower had no driving licence, and he slew the victim in drunken recklessness; but the unfortunate owner would have been just as liable had his friend been a man of lofty character and equipped with triple licences. The reason is the 1 1923, 3 D. L. R. 869. Motor Vehicles Act c. 131 of the Revised Statutes of Manitoba, sec. 63, which provides that a driver is liable for civil damages caused by his negligence or improper conduct, "and the owner thereof shall also be liable to the same extent as the driver unless at the time of the injury the motor vehicle had been stolen from him or otherwise wrongfully taken out of his possession or out of the possession of any person entrusted by him with the care thereof." This salutary provision does not exist when the tourist passes the portals of Saskatchewan. The Saskatchewan car owner is at present concerned with section 43 of chap. 42 of 1924. It is dissected at length by Mr. Justice Martin of Regina in the appealed case of Haggerty v. McKay, when none of the recent analogous cases from the other provinces were overlooked. The section reads: "(1) The owner of a motor vehicle shall be responsible for any violation of this Act by a person in charge or control of the vehicle with his consent. "(2) If the employer of a chauffeur operating a motor vehicle is present in the vehicle at the time of a violation by such chauffeur of any of the provisions of this Act, such employer as well as the chauffeur shall be liable to conviction therefor. "(3) When loss or damage is sustained by any person by reason of a motor vehicle on a highway, the burden of proof that such loss or damage did not arise through the negligence or improper conduct of the owner or driver of such motor vehicle shall be upon such owner or driver." The conclusion of the Court of Appeal on the above was that the legislature had not intended to deal with more than police offences and the general burden of proof, and that so far as concerned civil damages the owner of a destroying car had no greater enemy than the common law. This judgment conformed to the Alberta case of Johnson v. Mosher. There the Appellate Division decided that the section (21) of the Motor Vehicles Act, which purported to find the owner of the car liable for what the driver did, applied only to offences, and not to civil suits. Previously the reverse had been the law, for the old section was an Ontario one, and had been passed upon in the East; but the Alberta Legislature in 1913 and in 1917 changed the wording of the section, and the phrasing existing in 1919 was held to clear the innocent owner of that civil burden. That intention, by a subsequent touching up of the Act, has been made more definite than ever. The section now reads: 1923, 3 W. W. R. 1288. "67. The owner of a motor vehicle for which a certificate of registration has been issued under the provisions of this Act shall be liable for violation of any of the provisions thereof in connection with the operation of such motor vehicle, unless such owner shall prove to the satisfaction of the justice of the peace or police magistrate trying the case that at the time of the offence such motor vehicle was not being driven by him, nor by any other person with his consent, express or implied: "Provided that if the owner was not at the time of the offence driving the motor vehicle, he shall not in any event be liable to imprisonment." Mark that generous proviso! The owner, if not driving, shall not be liable to imprisonment in any event. The owner might have been sitting beside his young daughter or guest, and encouraging her to beat the speed limit, or to hog the best (and wrong) side of the road. The mischance might have been easily preventible by the owner, were he in the car or beside the car, and he may have stirred neither hand foot nor tongue to prevent it; but in no such event is the owner liable to imprisonment. No doubt the Legislature of Alberta carefully weighed the contingencies involved, and went as far as they felt they could safely go; for which caution reckless owners may yet live to thank them. The foregoing Alberta Act clears up another point, who is the owner of a hired car? "Owner shall include any person renting a motor vehicle or having the exclusive use thereof under a lease or otherwise for a period of more than thirty days." So that the harassed garagemen, who rents out a car for four weeks, has no burden on his mind as to what may happen to a pedestrian or a cow; but he suffers financial anguish for the pedestrian or the cow when his renter has contracted for a whole month. Could the garageman escape if he recalled his car regularly every four weeks and re-rented it to the same hirer? Or would he by that manœuvre suffer a like fate to the chattel mortgagee who, to avoid registration, gets his mortgage continuously renewed before the thirty days is up? So much for the Alberta Act. In Boyer v. Moillets, the Court of Appeal of British Columbia decided (though not unanimously) in terms similar to the Alberta Court. A strong inclination to follow the Ontario judges was evident throughout, but it was decided that the sections of the two statutes were sufficiently distinct. For one thing, in the tail of the British 1921, 3 W. W. R. 62. |