because no separate Law School balance sheet is published, so that certain receipts and payments in the Law Society's financial statement cannot be accurately apportioned. Administration expenses are not, for instance, charged to the Law School. The student ordinarily pays admission, examining, tuition, call and solicitors' fees, aggregating $570 plus some minor charges of no great importance. Roughly speaking the school has always paid its way, if we credit to it all sums paid by students. From 1919 to 1923 inclusive, since the flood came, their fees have far exceeded the outlay on them. The Law Society revenue for these five years was $727,173.32, of which the students paid $443,958.53, over 60 per cent., and the School cost $140,303.46 excluding administration, or less than 20 per cent., leaving a surplus of over $300,000. The ordinary expenses of the society no doubt absorbed part of this, but the total five years' surplus shown by the Society's revenue accounts is $206,305.96. As there is no published capital account the actual surplus on hand cannot be stated, but the annual interest returns show that it must be large. There is evidently ample money for a present endowment of $200,000 and every prospect of sufficient future revenue to justify a great extension of its school activities.

Further, the education of Law students, unlike Arts and Medical students, does not cost the country anything, and much less is spent on him than on the others. The average yearly cost of a Law student, between 1918 and 1922 inclusive, was about $79 or $80. According to statements furnished to the Commission on University finances a Toronto Arts student costs $170 (excluding administration), and a Toronto Medical student $150 in 1919-20; though on an average he costs $260. A Queen's Medical student costs, including administration, $318. In 1922 each Harvard Law student cost $234, while in the same year the Osgoode man cost $70.

Harvard is the banner Law School of this Continent, and we can scarcely hope to emulate it, but a glance at its budget shows that pre-eminence is expensive. In 1922 its total revenue was $276,567.25. Osgoode students contributed $71,014, of which $49,612 was credited to the Law School. Harvard spent $242,611.80, of which $110,750 were salaries paid for instruction and research. Osgoode spent $23,929.71, of which $20,930.93 was for salaries. Harvard's revenue from law school endowments alone that year was over $75,000. Osgoode has endowments for scholarships, aggregating $500 a year, and for the School Library about $500 a year. Harvard spent for prizes, scholarships, fellowships and loans to students, $28,292.46. Osgoode students for medals and scholarships cost about $1,200.

The Law Society's annual contribution for medals and scholarships has remained at $720 for over thirty years.

In conclusion, two questions which excite popular interest might be touched upon. One is pre-legal education, the other the case

system.

The intending student must be a graduate or the holder of an Ontario certificate of complete pass matriculation. This standard is not very high and many, including Dr. Hoyles, would like to see it higher. The American Bar Association is agitating for two years at College, and some Law Schools accept only graduates. There is a well grounded opinion that the standard of the profession is higher ethically when its members have a good general education; naturally its legal attainments will be greater. These views, however, do not altogether take account of the difference between voluntary and compulsory schools. The Ontario neophyte must attend the Law School. He may be, and generally is, hard up. There are no formal grades in our profession. The same course is necessary for the future humble practitioner and for the coming leader of the Bar. If we make the course too expensive and difficult democracy will seek some other approach to the profession and the Law Society will endanger its present strict and beneficial control over its members. This, broadly speaking, happened many years ago in the States, and now its best lawyers lament in vain the absence of efficient control of those who practice law and the low standard of education necessary to qualify them. There is no reason why our school should not have two departments, a compulsory pass course for all, and an optional honour course with proper pre-legal qualifications for those far-seeing students who wish to excel in their profession. This would avert the charge made by one newspaper in the States that the American Bar Association is "slamming the door on brains."

The other matter is the case method. Case books exist in England and are used by teachers to induce students to read and analyse cases for themselves. In some United States Universities they have practically supplanted other forms of teaching and are published by the score.

Dean Langdell of Harvard introduced teaching in this way in 1871. He was a great lawyer, with an original mind and a strong personality, and through his efforts and those of his successors it became extremely popular. Any great teacher will ultimately popularize any method he employs. It appeals to the full time. voluntary schools whose students get no concurrent office experience, and it lays a very necessary emphasis upon legal principles. It

necessarily usually ignores local legislation, it is slow and renders the orderly development of a topic difficult.

If pursued to the exclusion of lectures the student finds it hard. to obtain a general view of any large branch of law. It is regarded as excellent mental training, but this is apt to depend upon the skill of the teacher in posing problems and leading the student to think them out. It takes so much time that it is impracticable in a part time school, and many teachers also regard it as undesirable unless preceded by a general survey of the subject through lectures or text books. Dean Langdell in later years did not always adhere to this method. He not only delivered set lectures, but read them from his manuscripts. The case method cannot be ignored, but its adoption in a compulsory Law School for a pass course calls for careful and critical investigation. While very generally adopted in full time schools in the States, the comments upon it are not always enthusiastic. Toronto.

SHIRLEY DENISON.

DUTIES OF OCCUPIERS AND OWNERS OF DANGEROUS

PREMISES.

(Concluded.)

III. Duty to Trespassers.

Duty Stated.-The occupier of premises owes no duty to trespassers who unlawfully enter upon his premises, except that he must not deliberately or wilfully entrap them to their injury. Since the trespasser does not enter by permission, the occupier need not even warn him of the dangers existing on the premises. The general rule is that a man trespasses at his own risk, and cannot complain if he is injured through the insecurity of the premises. In one leading case the facts were that the plaintiff was a trespasser on a railway train which was wrecked by the negligence of the servants of the railway company. The train was not in use as a passenger train as the plaintiff knew, and the plaintiff had taken a precarious stand on the platform in disobedience of a by-law of the company, and was subsequently injured. It was held that there was no breach of duty to the plaintiff by the railway company which was merely "under a duty to the plaintiff not wilfully to injure him; they were

52 Grand Trunk Ry. v. Barnett, 1911, A. C., 361; Bondy v. Sandwich Ry. Co. (1911), 24 Ont. L. R., 409.

not entitled unnecessarily and knowingly to increase the normal risk by deliberately placing unexpected dangers in his way." Subject to that limitation he trespassed at his own risk. The rule in this case was followed by the Supreme Court of Canada in a case which arose in Nova Scotia.53 An engine of the appellant company was making an extra trip at an unusual hour on a stormy night in winter, and the engine ran over and killed a doctor, who had left his home for the purpose of attending a sick call, and was walking along the railway track when killed. By the Nova Scotia Railway Act every person who walks on a railway track is liable to a penalty. The jury found that the railway company was negligent in not having lights on the engine, and in having a defective whistle. The jury also found that, to the railway company's knowledge, the public had habitually travelled on the track at the place in question. It was held by the Supreme Court of Canada that he was a trespasser, and that the only duty of the railway company to him was not to run him down wilfully or not to act recklessly in disregard for human life. And in Great Central Ry. v. Bates, it was held that a policeman on his beat who saw a warehouse door open and entered to investigate in accordance with his duty and fell into an unfenced sawpit inside, could not recover, because having no legal right to enter and not being an invitee or licensee he was a trespasser to whom the occupiers owed no duty of care.

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Defective Premises.-A trespasser cannot recover for injuries sustained by reason of defects in the premises over which he is trespassing. For as to him the occupier is under no liability if, in trespassing, he injures himself on objects legitimately on the premises, nor is he bound to take care lest a trespasser suffer injury through the premises being in a state of disrepair;55 nor can he recover if injured through the negligent activities of the occupier on the premises.50

Intentional Injury.-But though the trespasser must take the premises as he finds them, and has no right of action for injuries sustained by their defective condition, yet he is not wholly without remedy. The occupier must not seek to injure a trespasser by setting traps for him so as to "increase the normal risk by deliberately plac

Maritime Coal Co. v. Herdman (1919), 59 Can. S. C. R., 127; Cf. Lajoie V. The King (1921), 20 Can. Ex. Court R., 473; DeVries v. C. P. R., (1916), 10 W. W. R. 85; Baldrey v. Fenton (1914), 6 W. W. R., 1441; 29 W. L. R., 258.

[1921] 3 K. B., 578.

Hardy v. Central London Ry.. [1920] 3 K. B., 459.

Jones v. Foley, [1891] 1 K. B., 730; Coffee v. McEvoy, [1912], 2 I. R., 290. As to the duty of care owed to trespassers whose presence is known to the occupier, see Petrie v. Rostrevor Owners, 1898, 2 Ir. R. 556: C. P. R. v. Henrich (1913), 48 Can. S. C. R., 557; 21 Halsbury's Laws of England, 394.

58

ing unexpected dangers in his way."57 Thus he must not intentionally assault the trespasser, or set spring guns or other engines dangerous to human life. Where trespassers stealing a ride on the back of a railway tender were forced off by a brakeman, so that one of them fell beneath the train, a verdict against the railway company was held to be justified.59 But an occupier is, of course, entitled to protect his property from trespassers provided the thing done is no more than is reasonably necessary for that purpose. He may lawfully keep a dog, or put up a barb-wire fence.60

IV. Liability on Warranty of Safety.

Rule in Francis v. Cockrell.-The owner or occupier of premises owes towards persons who come upon the premises upon business of mutual concern the common law duty stated in Indermaur v. Dames, -to take reasonable care to prevent damage from unusual danger, which he knows, or ought to know. But sometimes there is a greater obligation imposed by the law upon the owner or occupier of the premises. Persons who pay to enter upon premises are, of course, invitees, but are also entitled to greater protection by reason of their contractual relation to the occupier which leads to the implication of a warranty that the premises are reasonably safe. Such an invitee if injured on the premises has therefore an additional cause of action. for breach of an implied warranty of safety.1 The rule on this point has been thus stated:

"Where the occupier of premises agrees for reward that a person shall have the right to enter and use them for a mutually contemplated purpose, the contract between the parties (unless it provides to the contrary), contains an implied warranty that the premises are as safe for the purpose as reasonable care and skill on the part of anyone can make them. The rule is subject to the limitation that the defendant is not to be held responsible for defects which could not have been discovered by reasonable care or skill on the part of any person concerned with the construction, alteration, repair or maintenance of the premises. . . But subject to this limitation it matters not whether the lack of care or skill be that of the defendant,

57 Grand Trunk Railway v. Barnett, supra; Lowery v. Walker, [1910] 1 K. B., 173; Gilbert v. Southgate (1915), 24 D. L. R., 202.

68 Bird v. Holbrook (1828), 4 Bing. 628. The setting of spring-guns and mantraps is now, in Canada, a criminal offence. See section 281 of the Canadian Criminal Code.

Diplock v. C. N. R. Co. (1916), 26 D. L. R., 544 (Sask.). See Petrie v. Rostrevor Owners, [1898] 2 Ir. R., 556; Degg v. Midland Ry. Co. (1857), 1 II. & N., 773.

60 Sarch v. Blackburn (1830), 4 C. & P., at p. 300; Brock v. Copeland (1794), 1 Esp. at p. 203; Halliday v. Hewitt, 8 Brit. R. R., 573.

1 Maclenan v. Segar, [1917] 2 K. B., at p. 329.