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The disenfranchisement of the Estate Tamils, in 1948-1949, was certainly an unnerving event to the Ceylon Tamil population at the time. Almost immediately a party called the Federal Party came into existence, demanding a federal system for Ceylon with each of the provinces to have considerable authority to govern itself. That party was helped along enormously when, in 1952, S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike broke with the ruling UNP, and started his own, more Sinhalese nationalist party called the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP). He promised to restore Buddhism to its proper place in society by making it the national religion, to restore Ayurvedic (local) medicine to its proper place, and most important, he promised to make Sinhalese the only official language of the country. In 1956, Bandaranaike, with a coalition of parties he had formed, was swept into office on that platform. In 1958, rioting broke out and perhaps as many as a thousand Tamils were either killed or injured by Sinhalese nationalists.

Also in 1958, Prime Minister Bandaranaike was assassinated by, of all people, a Buddhist monk who felt that Bandaranaike was not moving fast enough to implement his Sinhalese Buddhist platform. Ultimately, Bandaranaike's widow took over the party. Sirimavo Bandaranaike was elected as the world's first woman Prime Minister in 1960. When she came to power again in 1970 with a coalition of like-minded parties who took control of two-thirds of the seats in parliament - enough to amend the constitution - Mrs. Bandaranaike instituted an "ethnic preference program" in the educational system which would make it easier for Sinhalese to get into universities, and more difficult for Tamils.

Shortly after coming to power in 1970, however, Mrs. Bandaranaike was faced with an armed uprising of radical Sinhalese youth, many of whom had gone through the university in the Sinhalese medium of instruction. When one creates 60,000 university graduates who only speak Sinhalese, one had also better create 60,000 jobs for university graduates who only speak Sinhalese. The government had failed to do that. These radical youth were known by the English initials JVP, and they caught the government completely off guard. All political parties in Sri Lanka condemned them, including the Communists and Trotskyites who were in her coalition government, and with the help of most foreign governments, including India and the United States, they were brutally crushed.

Among Ceylon Tamil youth, similar sentiments were stirring. Under the language policy, they had been allowed to study only in the Tamil language, in schools in Tamil areas which included Jaffna University but there weren't any more jobs for "Tamil only" educated youth then there had been for "Sinhalese only" educated youth. With the education reforms of the 1970s, even fewer Tamil youth were going to be admitted to universities to study in Sinhalese. In addition, young Tamils were increasingly frustrated with Tamil politicians who had not been able to deliver even federalism, which would have granted them some degree of control over their own destiny, at least in Tamil areas. One of the tragedies of Sri Lanka is that the Sinhalese have never understood the meaning of federalism. To them it meant creating a separate country on the island, which they simply could not abide.

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One of the essential elements that must be kept in mind in understanding the Sri Lankan ethnic conflict is that, since 1958 at least, every time Tamil politicians negotiated some sort of power-sharing deal with a Sinhalese government - regardless of which party was in power - the opposition Sinhalese party always claimed that the party in power had negotiated away too much. In almost every case - sometimes within days - the party in power backed down on the agreement.

By the late 1970s, small bands of Tamil teenagers began forming to demand total independence from Sri Lanka, and they had become convinced that violence was the only way it was going to happen. While most Tamils didn't approve of their violent ways, they did approve of their message and soon the largest mainstream Tamil party changed its name and began calling for total independence - Tamil Eelam (Tamil homeland) - for the North and East, combined. When in July of 1983 a group of these "boys" (as they were called by their Tamil elders) ambushed and killed 13 Sinhalese soldiers, whose bodies were brought back to Colombo for a public funeral, riots broke out. The government did nothing to stop the riots, whether because they felt that they couldn't control the military, or because the government wanted to let the Sinhalese vent their anger with Tamils generally. For five days the riots continued, some argue with government assistance. When it was over, several thousand Tamils had been killed or injured, and over 100,000 had fled to India. For many Tamils, this was the major turning point. It was a pogrom of such intensity that many former moderate Tamils suddenly became convinced that only a totally separate Tamil state could protect Tamils.

The Sinhalese government's attempt to stamp out the militants was so Draconian that they created many more militants than they killed. Every time the government launched an offensive into Tamil areas, hundreds of innocent civilians were killed, and hundreds more otherwise moderate Tamils became militants.

Let me be very clear about these Tamil "militants." They are ruthless. They terrify Sinhalese villagers, particularly in the Eastern Province which they consider part of their traditional homeland. They consider the Sinhalese, who have been settled by the government on the better land there, as unlawful trespassers on their land. They have no compunction about going into villages at night and slitting the throats of men, women and children. What is more, one particular group of militants - the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE or "Tigers") - has now brutally eliminated all of the other militant groups who once fought at their side. They have also killed most moderate Tamil leaders whom they label as "traitors". Indian courts believe that they have enough evidence to convict the Tigers of having killed former Indian Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi, and probably Sri Lankan President Premadasa as well.

As far as I can tell, most ordinary Tamils support the Tigers, not necessarily because they like them, but because they like the Sri Lankan - or Indian - armies less. The Tigers are ruthless and authoritarian but they are not corrupt - they don't tolerate stealing, bribery or rape, things other armies are famous for. In fact they are perceived as being single

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minded in their defense of Tamils. They are so disciplined that when captured, they swallow cyanide capsules that they carry with them at all times, rather than risk revealing anything under torture.

Until now, their mistrust of the Sinhalese has been so intense that they have not been willing to consider anything but complete independence. To them "compromise" is a dirty word, but there is now some talk that the Tigers would be willing to consider some form of federalism, provided that they were guaranteed that this arrangement would survive any change of government in the south.

Causes for the Renewal of Fighting:

Mrs. Kumaratunga (who by the way, is the only head of state whose father and mother were both heads of state before her, and a woman whose father and husband were both killed due to the ethnic crisis) was elected to the office of president, in part on a platform of negotiating an end to the ethnic conflict. Within weeks of taking office she had sent a delegation north to talk directly with the Tigers. A cessation of hostilities was worked out, but the Tamils insisted on four conditions for continuing the cessation.

The government agreed to one immediately: the lifting of the embargo - which had been in effect for some years - on food, commodities, gas, and other supplies to the North. The problem is that it was never really implemented very effectively in practice. Some goods got through, to be sure, but nothing like the amount that was needed, or the amount southern Tamils tried to send North. Trucks were stopped and searched - as indeed they needed to be to prevent smuggling of arms to the North - but frequently they couldn't get through because of bureaucratic red tape, and probably military distrust and hostility.

A second demand, to allow Tamil fishermen the right to fish the northern coastal waters, was not agreed to until shortly before the resumption of hostilities. The Tamils saw this, of course, as one way to increase their food supply, as well as to start to restore normalcy of life to the North. The army, on the other hand, saw it as a way for the LTTE to smuggle more arms from India, in fishing boats.

The last two demands, for the removal of a military camp in a strategic position in the North, and permission for the LTTE cadre to carry guns when they are in government controlled territory in the east, the government insisted could not be met until there was a general peace accord.

The LTTE saw all of this as just one more example of the government's inability to deliver on agreements made, and on Sinhalese refusal to meet what they considered legitimate demands. They set a deadline of March for the demands to be met and later extended it, but on April 19, 1995 (despite having signed an agreement saying that either

10 side would give 72 hours notice before abrogating the agreement) the Tigers gave 4 hours notice and then blew up two ships in an east coast harbor.

President Kumaratunga and the people around her felt that they had been duped by the LTTE. They now believe that the LTTE agreed to the truce merely to regroup and rearm. They were told specifically that the Tigers cannot be trusted, that they will break any agreement when it serves their purpose. They were warned of this by their military, by Indian government officials, by other Tamil militant groups upon whom the Tigers at some point turned and by their Sinhalese chauvinist critics.

Almost immediately the LTTE launched a major offensive against the Sri Lankan military, not a direct frontal assault but attacks here, there and elsewhere. Almost 1/4 of the Sri Lankan navy has been sunk, several planes have been downed by what may have been ground to air missiles, and scores of military personnel have been killed, all in the first months after the peace talks collapsed. This was particularly difficult for Mrs. Kumaratunga's relations with the military since during the talks she canceled approximately 72 million dollars worth of contracts for military hardware. At the time she argued that the government was talking peace, not war, and therefore military hardware was not necessary.

The LTTE also accuses the government of having used the cessation of hostilities to regroup and rearm, but I find no evidence of this whatsoever. The evidence since the truce was broken, however, is rather convincing that the LTTE did just that.

The government responded to the breaking of the truce with an ill-advised offensive called "Operation Leap Forward." They used 10,000 armed men in the largest single military operation undertaken in the war up to that time, but it was a disaster. They were able to conquer approximately 78 kilometers of land, but they were able to hold only 7 or 8 kilometers. What's more, the government admits to 234 civilian deaths, and having created 183,000 refugees. Many Sri Lankan soldiers were killed and they lost a great deal of equipment as they were pushed off the newly captured land.

In August of this year, Mrs. Kumaratunga unilaterally announced a peace package which went much further than anything that had ever been offered to the Tamils in the past. Not only was she offering federalism (although one isn't allowed to use that word: "devolution" is preferred), but it is a federalism that gives the regions even more power than they have under the Indian, American, or even Canadian models. Virtually all of the powers that in previous proposals would have been held concurrently by the center and the regions, were to be handed over to the regions, more or less exclusively. With some modifications to the boundaries of the Eastern Province to be worked out in the future, this proposal recognizes the right of the Tamils to a single homeland in a merged Northern Region. This is a concept which the Sinhalese right finds particularly odious. Under this package, the regions are given the right to negotiate directly for foreign loans and investments, and the Northeast is even given the right to maintain its own Tamil army.

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The rationale for the peace package going as far as it does seems to be that since the government didn't get anywhere in their negotiations with the LTTE, they hope to appeal directly to the war-weary Tamil people. The government hopes that by offering the Tamils 90 percent of what they have been asking for, they could win the support of the common people of the North and East, and that they, in turn, would put pressure on the Tigers to accept the arrangement. Whether that peace package will get the northern Tamil support that it hopes, remains to be seen.

A prior question seems to be whether Mrs. Kumaratunga can get the Sinhalese support she would need to amend the constitution by a 2/3 majority in parliament, and to win a national referendum.

The Buddhist Sangha came out against the proposal almost as soon as it was announced. New political groups have emerged on the Sinhalese right hoping to defeat it in the referendum, even if it makes it through parliament. There is considerable pressure on the UNP not to support the package. So far the UNP has not rejected it outright, but it has said there would have to be significant modifications made before they could go along.

At the same time as the government was offering a political solution, they decided that they needed to show both the Sinhalese right and the Tigers that they could be tough, and hand the LTTE a major military humiliation. Accordingly, in late October the government launched yet another military offensive against the Tigers. This time the government has thrown 40,000 troops into the battle. As of this writing I do not know how many people have been killed, but as the troops poise to take Jaffna city, estimates of the number of refugees who are fleeing range from between 100,000 to 500,00. Whether they are fleeing to escape large-scale bombing and shelling into populated areas, as the Tigers claim, or whether they are being forced to flee by the Tigers, as the government claims, is immaterial from a humanitarian point of view. The fact is that there are now perhaps hundreds of thousands of refugees sitting in the North with no sanitation, no water, little food, and even fewer medical supplies. There are also tens of thousands of Sinhalese refugees in camps in the East, driven there by Tiger attacks on Sinhalese and Muslims, intended to force them, by terror, to leave the East. While these refugees are at least being cared for by the Sri Lankan government, the refugees in the North are not, and last week, the government told international donor agencies that too much of the aid they have been supplying to Tamils in the North has been finding its way into Tiger hands, and therefore, from now on, all aid will have to be coordinated by the Sri Lankan government. Obviously, aid coordinated by the government will not get through to refugees in the Tiger-held areas, where the bulk of the newly created refugees are.

If the international community fails to act promptly to see to it that significant amounts of aid - under international supervision - does get through to those refugees, I believe we will see death due to starvation and disease, on a scale we have not seen since Bosnia.