Lobbyists and Legislators: A Theory of Political Markets

administrative American Business analysis Anthony Dexter Anthony Downs Bauer benefits bill Business and Public chap committee conflict conflictual demand patterns Congress congressmen consensual constituency consumer costs decision delegation Democracy Democratic Dexter distributive arena efforts electoral entrepreneurs example exchange theories federal find it rational Fiorina Frances Fox Piven free rider problem given issue Gordon Tullock gray lobbies Greenstone group activity group leaders group struggle Ibid incentives income industry interest groups James Q Labor legislative process legislators and lobbyists legitimacy Lindblom lobbying success lobbyists logrolling Lowi Lowi's market failure Medicare membership groups Nadel National non-zero-sum nondecision Olson's organizational outcomes overcome the free perfect competition policy processes policymakers political markets Political Organizations politicians Pool potential pressure group protection provides public interest Public Policy redistributive regard regulatory Salisbury Schattschneider seek self-interest social Stigler strategy Sugar Act suggests symbolic reassurances tariff tend tion typically typology variables voters voting Wilson