GEORGETOWN.

Quere, Whether the mayor of Georgetown, in the district of Columbia, be a justice of the peace of the county. of Washington? Mountz v. Hodgson. 4 Cranch, 324.

GIFT.

1 A parol gift without some act of delivery will not alter the property. Smith v. Smith. 2 Str. 955. 2 A parol gift of land, creates only a tenancy at will. Jackson ex dem. Van Allen v. Rogers. 1 Johns. Cas. 33. 3 To make a valid gift, there must be an immediate possession of the thing delivered to the donee. If A. say to B. I will give you the corn growing in that field, belonging to A. this is not sufficient without delivery. If B. when the corn is ripe, enter the field, and cut and carry it away, he will be considered as a trespasser. Noble v. Smith. 2 Johns. Rep. 52.

4 Quere, Whether corn growing, is susceptible of delivery in any other way, than by putting the donee in possession of the land? Ibid. See Newcomb and others v. Agan, not. 2 Johns. Rep. 421.

5 A gift is not consummate until the delivery of the thing promised; and until the delivery, the party may revoke his promise. Pearson v. Pearson. 7 Johns. Rep. 26.

A parol promise to pay money, as a gift, will not support an action. Ibid.

By the act of assembly of Virginia, of 1758, no gift of a slave was valid unless in writing and recorded; but parol evidence may be admitted of the existence of a deed of gift to show the nature of the possession which accompanied the deed. Spiers v. Willison. 4 Cranch, 398. S. P. Ramsay v. Lee. 4 Cranch,

401.

GLEANING.

By several acts of the legislature from 1804 to 1867, the governor of the state was authorised to draw from the treasury a sum not exceeding $750, in each year, to defray the incidental expences, in administering the government of the state; and the governor having received the sums there appropriated, exhibited his account of his expenditures, equal to the amount received; it was held, that the propriety of the items charged for these incidental expences was not a subject of judicial cognizance; but was necessarily left to the discretion of the executive, under the controul of the legislature, and that the governor was not liable to an action, at the suit of the people, to recover back any part of the money so received and expended, on the ground of its having been improperly expended. The People v. Lewis. 7 Johns. Rep. 73.

GOVERNMENT.

1 It is fairly to be inferred from the general tenor of the act for the revival of the laws, that the legislature thought the separation from Great Britain, worked a dissolution of all government. 1 Dallas, 57. A formal compact is not a necessary foundation of government. Ibid. A kind of government independent of Great Britain, was administered in Pennsylvania before the establishment of its present constitution. Ibid. 2 The constitution of Pennsylvania was a dissolution of the government as far as related to the powers of Great Britain; but not in relation to the powers which had been before exercised by councils and committees. 1 Dallas, 57.

3 When treason may be committed against the government. Ibid. 4 Subject, means being in subjection to some sovereign power, and is not barely connected with the idea of territory: it refers to one who owes obedience to the laws, and is entitled to partake of the elections into public office. Ibid.

GRAND JURY.

1 The court will not set aside a grand juror, because he has been the prosecutor of a person charged with a capital erine, whose case may probably be brought before the grand jury. John Tucker's case.

8 Mass. 285. 2 It is improper and illegal to examine witnesses on behalf of the defendant, while the charge against him lies before the grand jury. 1 Dallas, 236.

GRANT.

14. and B. beiug severally seized of parcels of woody ground, and B.

having other lands adjoining to his woody ground, and intending to make a collery under his ground, A. grants to B. his heirs and assigns, liberty for him, his heirs and assigns, to carry up a sough or drain through A.'s ground into B.'s woody ground, and also liberty for B. his heirs and assigns, to make two litthe sough-pits in A.'s woody ground, for the more easy and safe carrying up the tail of the sough, one of which was to be covered in as soon as conveniently might be after making the sough, and the other to be kept open for examining the sough so long as was necessary for that purpose and no longer and B. covenanted that he, his heirs and assigns, would not damage the trees growing on A.'s woody ground, nor get any of the coals under it, except what should arise in the drift of the intended sough: and that A., his heirs and assigns, from time to time, and at all times after, might go down into any pit or pits of B. his heirs or assigns to discover whether any coals of A. his heirs or assigns should be gotten; and that B. his heirs aud assigns should repair any injury to A.'s fence, &c.: held that by the grant to B. his heirs, &c. of the liberty of making the sough in A's land, the liberty of making sough-pits at any time afterwards, while the object of the grant remained, being necessary for the purpose of repairing the sough, passed an incident thereto and that the use of such sough, or the carrying up of which into B.'s woody ground liberty was granted, was not confined to the getting of coals under B.'s woody ground, but extended also to the adjoining lands of B.; and that the liberty of making new sough-pits for necessary repairs of the sough, after the two original sough-pits had been covered up by mutual consent, was not controlled by the special liberty given for making such original sough-pits, the uses of which were limited by the

grant; it appearing upon the face of it that the grant of the sough was intended to have continuing operation while any coals in B.'s woody ground and adjoining lands remained to be gotten. Hodgson v. Field. 7 East, 613.

2 An inclosure act having directed that the allotments made by the commissioners should forever remain for the benefit of the appoin tees held that an award and assigument of the herbage of a certain close to the surveyors of the highways and their successors for the benefit of the parish of B. though bad as a common law conveyance, the appointees not being a corporation, was yet good as a parliamentary declaration of the persons entitled to take; the same as if the terms of the award had been specifically enacted. And the lord of the manor, in whom the fee of the soil remained, is a trustee for the surveyors of the highways for the time being. Johnson v. Hodgson. 8 East,

5 A tract of land was granted, by letters patent, to A. in 1735, which was surveyed and laid out into lots. In 1736, B. executed leases for several lots to different persons, for lives, reserving rent, in which he asserted his claim to the whole tract, and exercised various acts of ownership, until his death, in 1752, and his heirs also gave leases of some of the lots, in 1767, and his title and that of his heirs continued to be acknowledged by the tenants, and remained undisputed until 1783.

6

In an action of ejectment brought by the heirs of B. against C. who had been in possession since 1772, it was held, that a grant from the original patentees to B. was to be presumed; that entry by him into part, with a claim to the whole, was to be considered as an entry into the whole; and that the entry of C. was in subordination to the title of B. Jackson ex dem. Ganesvoort and others v. Lunn. 3 Johns. Cas.

109,

Where A, granted 86 acres of land to B. reserving the streams of water and the soil under them, with the right of erecting mill-dams, and all such part of the land, as shall be overflowed by water, for the use of the mills for the grantor, and B. sold 40 acres of the premises to C. with the like exceptions, and C. erected a dam on his part of the land, by which the land of B. was overflowed; it was held, that until A. exercised his right and erected dams, the reservation was inoperative; if considered strictly as an exception, it would be void for uncertainty, Thompson v. Gregory. 4 Johns. Rep. 81.

B. may maintain an action on the case, against C. for erecting a dam so near the land of B. as to overflow it. Ibid.

The right reserved by A. being an in

corporeal hereditament, could pass only by deed. Ibid.

A parol permission, given to C. by A. to ereet the dam, was no defence against the action brought by B. for the assignment of such an interest, since the statute of frauds must be in writing. Ibid.

7

A grant of lands under navigable waters to the owners of the adjacent soil, is not presumed without long exclusive possession and use, to warrant such a presumption. Palmer v. Hicks. 6 Johns. Rep. 133. An act of the legislature, extending the bounds of towns over the adjacent navigable waters, does not thereby grant the land covered by

the water, to the town, but is merely for the purposes of civil and criminal jurisdiction. Ibid.

A grant to be valid must be to a corporation, or to some certain person named, who can take by force of the grant, and hold in his own right, or as a trustee. Jackson, ex 1 dem. Cooper & others v. Cory. 8 Johns. Rep. 385.

9 The construction of a grant is matter of law; but its legal effect, deducible from its terms or matter subsequent, which, by showing the sense of the parties, may authorise a larger or narrower construction, so as to include or exclude the premises in controversy, is matter of fact for a jury only to decide. Fr er and others v. Jackson ex dem. Van Allen, in error. 8 Johns. Rep.

495.

10 A grant is a contract executed.

Fletcher v. Peck. 6 Cranch, 89. 11 The grantee of an alien may recover in a real action. 1 Mass, 256. 12 By a grant of a grist-mill with the appurtenances thereon, the soil of a way, immemorially used for the purpose of access to the mill from the highway, does not pass. Mass. 6,

GRAVESEND PATENTS.

The inhabitants of Gravesend, are not the owners of a certair neck of land, described in an agreement entered into between them and one Brown in 1670, but the same belongs to the persons holding under Brown; nor have the innabitants of Gravesend a right to take and carry away seaweed from the beach or shore of the said neck of land. Emans v. Turnbull and others, 2 Johns. Rep. 313.

GREGORY'S PLANTATION.

The boundary of the tract of land on New-York Island, called Gregory's plantation, is not to be construed to

Where A. by writing, for a valuable consideration, guarantied the payment of a sum of money from B. to C. and B. on demand, refused to pay at the time; and C. gave notice of the failure of payment to A. and demanded the amount of him; it was held that the demand of payment of B. and refusal by him, and notice thereof to A. were sufficient to entitle C. to recover against A. on his guaranty, without a previous suit against B. Bank of Newyork v. Livingston. 2 Johns. Cas. 409.

Where A. gave a note to B. for stock, deliverable on the 1st May, 1792, and C. having guarantied the performance of the contract, compounded with B. in March, and took up the note, and afterwards brought his action against A, for the amount, it was held that C. had a right to settle with B. and take up the note before it was due; and that A. was bound to pay him the amount of the stock, according to its value, on 1st May, 1792. Armstrong & Barnwall v. Cilchrist, in error. 2 Johns. Cases, 424.

What words import a guaranty, or promise, to pay the debt of another. 3 Dallas, 415 to 425,

GUARDIAN.

The guardians of Marshpee Indians can bind the children of their poor only by indenture. 1 Mass. 172. The court has no authority to licence the sale of real estate of spendthrifts by their guardians. 2 Mass.

157.

for the payment of debts: where the petition is for licence to sell more of the estate than is necessary for the payment of the debts, upon the ground that by a partial sale of the residue will be greatly injured, the certificate of the judge of probate is necessary. Exparte T. R. Williams. 3 Mass. 397. 4 Upon a petition of a guardian for authority to sell the real estate of his ward for the payment of his debts, accompanied with a certificate from the probate office that the 1 facts alledged are true, the court will order notice to the presumptive heirs of the ward, before granting

the petition. Exparte William
Lufkin & al. 3 Mass. 398.

5 The father of minor children, hav-
ing property of their own is, not-
withstanding, bound to support
them, if he has ability: otherwise
of the mother. Dawes, Judge, &c.
v. Howard & al. 4 Mass. 97.
6 Where the father, having little or
no property of his own, takes the
guardianship of his minor children
so situated, he will be allowed a
reasonable charge for their board
in his family during their minority.
Ibid.

7 Under the statute of 1791, c. 60,
the guardian of a person non com-
pos may, on being duly licenced
therefor, lawfully sell in fee sim-
ple the estate tail of his ward du-
ring his life, for the payment of
his debts, and by such sale the
estate tail is extinguished, and
the remainders legally barred.
Williams et al. v. Hitchburn et al.
4 Mass. 189.

8 Assumpsit lies against a spendthrift under guardianship, in which he may defend by his guardian. Brown v. Chase. 4 Mass. 436.

Guardians of spendthrifts have no controul of the persons of their wards, Boyden v. Boyden. 5 Mass.

427.

10 In an action of debt on a bond, against the surety for two guardians, appointed by the court of chancery,

2

g

4

Where A. died possessed of land, leaving a widow and infant children, and the widow entered and kept possession, it was held that she might maintain trespass; the presumption of law being that she entered as guardian in socage to her children, and was in possession by right. Byrne v. Van Hoesen. 5 Johns. Rep. 66.

A guardian in socage, has the custody of the land, and may receive the rents and profits for the benefit of the heirs. Ibid.

Such a guardianship ceases, when the infant arrives at the age of fourteen; but if the infant does not then choose another guardian, the former guardianship will continue. Ibid.

A. died seized of land in 1771, leaving an only son, his heir at law, and a daughter. The widow entered into possession of the land; and the daughter having married B. the widow gave permission to B. and his wife to take possesion and occupy a part of the land, and B. continued in possession, claiming to hold in right of his wife. In an action of ejectment brought by the heir at law against B. it was held that the legal intendment was that the widow entered as guardian in socage to her infant son; and that the defendant, having entered by permission of the guardian, and under the title of the heir at law, could not set up a title in a third person, in contradiction to the title under which he so entered. Jack