force, merely giving these tribes the services of good men such as Mr. Orpen, to organise them for defence and secure them from the improper aggression of their neighbours and the crushing exactions and arbitrary rule of their own chiefs. It was our policy to convince the independent tribes that it was to their interest to be at peace and on friendly terms with us and those under us, and that our rule was even better than that of their own chiefs, being juster and more regardful of their individual interests.

When the war between Kreli and Gangelizwe broke out in October 1872, the frontier districts of the Colony were in a most critical condition, as the disturbances might extend to the tribes within our frontier, in which case we should have been obliged to take sides, as we eventually had to do in 1877. This war led the Government of Mr. Molteno to consider what would be the best course to prevent the recurrence of such a contingency, and what policy should be adopted to secure the peace and tranquillity of our frontier, not only in regard to the natives beyond our border, but for the protection of our frontier districts as well. It was believed that the establishment of our authority in the country ceded to us by Faku would be the best and easiest means of attaining this object. A powerful federation was being formed between Kreli and Moni and the Pondos. This alliance threatened the Tembus, who were friendly, and whom it was our policy to protect. If we united the tribes under us in No Man's Land they would be in a position to menace Kreli in the event of any hostile movement on his part either against our friends the Tembus or against ourselves, and they would prevent the Pondos forming a junction with Kreli. The great weakness of the Pondomisi themselves had been their feuds with each other, which enabled the Pondos to fall on them in detail, but under Mr. Orpen they were reconciled together; his measures for the defence of all the natives under our protection in that part of the territory put an

end to the Pondo attacks; and the country, which had been almost depopulated by incessant warfare, was fast becoming re-occupied by tribes who were attached to us, owing to the security which our rule gave them.

While benefiting these natives, we were receiving a legitimate reward in the important commercial advantages thus secured, for until this time the people, harassed by continual inter-tribal wars, raised but little produce, and the trade carried on with them in consequence was quite insignificant. The Colony could, however, look in a few years for a very considerable development of it. The main body of the people of this great country were sunk in the lowest degradation and barbarism; wars which for generations had been carried on with scarcely any interruption had so accustomed them to bloodshed that little value was attached to human life, and yet there was a strong desire manifested for education. This was to be met by the establishment of various missions in connection with the different religious denominations, and Dr. Stewart was about to start his institution based on lines similar to those of Lovedale.

Viewed in a merely selfish light our policy had made us the gainers to a large extent, and this would be the case still further if the proposed annexations were carried out. In this short time the close attention, the profound knowledge, and the evident desire on the part of the Government to benefit the natives, together with its prompt suppression of disturbances, had immensely improved our position in regard to them. The Basutos had been detached from the confederacy and alliance of other tribes. They were formerly in friendly relationship with the natives of Natal and the Zulus. But the surrender of Langalibalele to the Governor's agent, which had been brought about by the prompt manner in which the Cape Government had moved up the Frontier Armed and Mounted Police, thus giving their support to all who were well disposed to them among

the Basutos, had caused a breach of friendship between the latter and the Zulus. Molapo had sent an embassy to Cetewayo about this time; the messengers were, however, insulted and their lives endangered, and further negotiations between the tribes were thus completely broken off.

Similar feelings towards the tribes of Natal were also in existence, and the Basutos were thrown more than ever into our arms, and their confidence in us was daily increasing. Had they not been under our rule, Langalibalele would have been received by them, and in conjunction with the Zulus a combination most dangerous to Natal would have been formed. In like manner with the tribes under Mr. Orpen. Had we not stepped in at the time we did they would have been crushed and absorbed by the Pondos, and as these were in alliance with Moni and Kreli, a powerful alliance would have been formed on our borders, and had the Basutos still been independent, they together with the Zulus would probably have been added to this confederacy. Our policy had frustrated this object. We had thus been the gainers politically as well as commercially. The annexation of Basutoland and our movement in the Transkei had counteracted the combination of the tribes. We had secured peace and freedom from attack for our native allies, while securing the peace of our own borders.

With the advent of responsible government a higher view began to be taken of our mission towards the barbarous tribes upon our borders; we were no longer content to govern them simply from interested motives. The obligation was felt to be incumbent upon us to elevate and enlighten them and to raise them in the scale of civilisation, not only by securing peace for them, but by eradicating and changing their savage habits and customs. This change could not in the nature of things be a rapid one. Firmly and deeply rooted in the growth of centuries, these habits could only be altered slowly, and any improvement could only be percep

tible to those who had long been in contact with the natives; yet there was a confidence that this improvement would come about. The most effective agents in the great work were the magistrates and agents whom we had placed among the natives, who endeavoured to attach them to us by a just and righteous administration. We contributed also largely to the advancement of education, and in connection with this work the missionaries were the chief agency by which the people were being enlightened and educated.

The Government was at this time singularly fortunate in possessing the services of Messrs. Griffith and Orpen, the two chief executive officers under the native department. They were men singularly qualified to discharge the high duties imposed upon them. Combined with great energy and ability, they had the additional qualification, without which all others would be of little value, of a thorough interest in and sympathy with the natives, sentiments soon perceived and reciprocated, and conferring great power and influence upon their possessors. In all who read the able and sympathetic reports of the then Secretary for Native Affairs there will arise a feeling that the real and best interests of the natives were in able hands, and that the policy then pursued gave promise of valuable results for the future. A comparison of these patient, careful, and conciliatory methods with the dragooning of Zulus and disarming of Fingoes and of the administration by ultimatums as pursued by Sir Bartle Frere, must, we think, lead, in the minds of all impartial men, to a preference for the former policy.

It is interesting to observe that Lord Carnarvon's attention had been drawn to the advancement of the natives and the success of the policy pursued by the responsible Government at the Cape, and in his despatch to Governor Pine of Natal, he uses these words: That the natives are capable of great improvement I cannot doubt after reading the very

1 Blue Book on Native Affairs, 1875.

interesting accounts of the condition and progress of kindred tribes given in the Blue Book on Native Affairs in the Cape that has lately reached me.' It is evident from this that Lord Carnarvon was satisfied that the native policy of the Cape had been successful, and he was holding it up as a model to the Imperial officers who were controlling the native policy of Natal. On many subsequent occasions he expressed his approval of the native policy of the Cape Government.1

Mr. Molteno held strongly that all inhabitants of the country should receive even-handed justice, and that all should be secured in their personal rights; whether the newly annexed tribe were fitted for the exercise of political rights did not at that time call for consideration, but it was open to any native in the Colony who possessed the requisite qualifications to obtain and exercise the franchise. Sir Henry De Villiers writes:

His native policy, so long, at all events, as I was in the Ministry, and, I have no doubt, subsequently also, was one of justice and firmness combined. He was opposed to any policy which would oust loyal natives from the land occupied by them and their fathers before them, while at the same time he wished to prepare them for the time when they would cease to be under the fostering guardianship of the Government of the country. I know that he always favoured the policy of giving individual title to land to such natives as deserved it; but I think he would have strongly disapproved of any condition being inserted into the title deeds that the land should be inalienable in perpetuity.

All this good work and all this steady progress was soon to be interfered with and arrested by a good-intentioned visionary, who dreamt of glory and honour to be won by the immediate execution of a simple task, the welding of all the various communities of South Africa into one great confederation. As in the case of the Canadian Confederation, so here; the conception of such a scheme, as we shall see, was one to which Lord Carnarvon could lay no claim.

1 See I. P., C-1776, p. 3.