that with many the case may fall out as it did with the unhappy children in the story, who pursued their own course till they quarrelled, and gorged their appetites with rich viands till they were sick, and plunged themselves into difficulties, which, but for timely interference, would have ended fatally.

We say this in religion. It is very possible that freedom of mind may be the means of injury to many, just as it is to the froward child too early released from parental control, or the flippant youth casting off the impressions of a religious education, only to rush into infidelity and atheism. It is a sincere and sound and honest mind only, that can be safely entrusted with perfect liberty. To think freely, to be free from all prejudices of every sort, it is a great trial to the strength and virtue of any mind. Take for illustration the case of your child. Suppose, that having been taught that reason and conscience should govern him, he should, with somewhat unusual precocity, seize upon this notion, and undertake to act upon these principles; that he should begin to question your authority as inferior to these laws. You would look upon that child as in great danger. You might hope much good, but you would fear much evil. So it is with men. Freedom of mind, imperfect freedom, such as might exist in the child,-for we are inclined to say that perfect freedom can belong only to a perfect mind, and would in fact be perfect safety,-freedom of mind, in the ordinary sense, we repeat, is a serious exposure. It is a trial, undoubtedly, from which the noblest form of character may arise; but still it is a trial. This, indeed, is the very theory and explanation of our moral condition in this world. It is a state of severe trial to all our virtues, in order that the noblest character may be produced by it. But it is clear that many fail; that what was designed to be the greatest good to them, becomes the greatest evil. And so it may be with freedom of mind in religion. It must injure bad men. It must injure those who desire to escape from all moral restraint. We do not say, that it were better for them to be slaves of superstition, or of error, or of authority. We believe that God made the mind to be free. We are willing that it should be in the state which was designed for it. We are willing that it should meet its trial, for we believe that is the will of God. But we would warn that mind of its danger; we would admonish it, that no intellectual freedom, no resistance to unlawful coercion, no railing at dogmatical authority, can make, much less show it, to be a good mind.

We say this in politics. We say it more indeed, of bodies. politic, than we do of individual minds. We believe it is better that masses of men should not be placed under free constitutions, till they have the intelligence and virtue that promises success to the experiment. A grand concession,' the opposers of civil liberty, no doubt would say, if any concession from a quarter so humble, could be important. We will turn aside, then, a moment to consider it. For we would show, that if we see cause to admonish the advocates of liberty, we are much further from any sympathy with their opposers. We yield to them, therefore, all the benefit of our caution and anxiety on this subject, and yet we are at issue with them. We agree with them, that liberty has its dangers, and that many communities are unfit for it. But we deny, what in consistency they must maintain, we deny that human nature is necessarily so bad, or that it must continue so bad, that it cannot be trusted with freedom. We deny, that the very theory of a political condition, in which men shall make and amend their own institutions and laws, is fanciful and Utopian. We believe that there is a sufficient prevalence and promise of knowledge and moral habits in this country, to conduct the experiment to a happy issue. We believe that other countries are approaching to the same condition. Be it admitted that liberty is a dangerous thing to a people unprepared for it; but be it contended that the civilized world is advancing, though slowly, to the requisite state of morals and intelligence. And therefore are we still more at issue with those who are advocates for keeping the people in ignorance. They say, it is dangerous to the institutions of the Old World, that the people should be enlightened. Be it so. Then let those institutions be gradually changed, as the wants of the people demand and their intelligence can bear it. Let the shackles burst from the frame that is swelling with the inspiration of generous freedom. Our readers will recollect in this connexion, some remarkable admissions in the late Quarterly Review. From a quarter where concessions are stronger than any arguments, we rejoice to hear it admitted that the institutions of England must be modified to meet the exigences of the times and the spirit of the age. It has long seemed to us as clear as the sun in heaven, that England, in the course of a century, must undergo great changes in her institutions. Heaven grant that her rulers and her aristocracy may have wisdom to yield to the pressure

of growing knowledge and freedom of thought, without that strife and bloodshed which have formerly marked every step in her path to her present degree of liberty. In truth, it is time that England, and other governments in the Old World, were beginning to think of these things. If the light, the kindling warmth that is now pervading the masses of their population be on every side checked and repressed, it will ere long burst forth when no human bidding can restrain it. If it be yet more pent up, it may once again reveal itself in that 'earthquake voice,' which will spread astonishment and horror through the world.

But to return to our position; we repeat, that the liberty of a people is a severe trial of its character, and one that no people has yet been able to bear. We need not dwell upon examples and instances. We need not say, that ancient times and modern times, that countries of the Old World and of the New World, unite to give this testimony and warning. We need not say, that the earth is tracked over with flaming beacons to show the perils of liberty; that Judea, for the Jews were the freest people in the ancient world, and Greece and Rome and France and Spain, are names that bring admonition with them, and that Peru and Colombia and Mexico are now added to the portentous catalogue of facts and instances. We need not dwell upon these examples, not only because they are familiar by repetition, or near to us by local position, but because the lesson they enforce arises from the very genius and character of free institutions. What is it for a people to be free? It is for every man to be a voter at elections, for every man in his turn to sit in judgment on the rights and property of his fellow citizens, for every man to be eligible to office, and the highest office; for every man to have a voice in making or amending the laws, for every man, in short, to do his pleasure in as many ways as the common good will permit.. Despotic rule, hereditary trusts, fixed institutions, are all removed in a free state, to make way for the single element of individual responsibility. It must be a great responsibility, for everything depends upon it, the whole fabric of government rests upon it. It is universal; it presses upon every man. is a moral responsibility; it demands fidelity, it exacts obedience. Men must be virtuous, disinterested, sober, watchful, wise, to a certain extent, or they cannot be free; that is to say, they cannot preserve any rational freedom. This condi

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tion of society implies in its members, a mutual respect for each other's rights and interests. And such a charge can be safely sustained only by reasonable and considerate men. Το commit free institutions to the rude, the reckless, and violent, is to commit a fabric of frail and loose materials to the wild and tumultuous waves of the ocean. The responsibility implied in this state of things, we must add, is peculiar; it is greater than is involved in any other political condition. A despotism may stand, and has often stood, for ages, without either virtue or intelligence to support it. It stands in prescription; it stands in the fear of the people. It is strengthened by the very ignorance of the people. But it cannot be so with a republic. Take an illustration on a small scale. So long as the slaves on a plantation are under the absolute rule of a master, they are quiet and safe; their motions are regular as those of machinery, and their individual responsibility amounts to almost nothing. But form them into a free community, and into what danger do you throw them, and what consequence is attached to the conduct of every individual! So it is with the citizens of a free state. Freedom can only keep pace with improvement. It implies in its possessors self-control. It is a trust, and nothing but fidelity can discharge it. Let the passions of men be like untamed wild animals, and it is better that they should be fenced in and fettered by prescription, and guarded in cages, than be suffered to go loose. It is better for the men themselves during the passing generation, though free and more violent action might in the long course of things work out higher results.

We have been laboring to show that liberty is a trust, and a dangerous trust. To the same purpose we now offer another remark; which is, that the institutions of a free state, are altogether of the nature of a defence against the passions of men, and are constructed upon the very supposition that those passions are dangerous.

Let us look, then, at some parts of the machinery of a free government; and since it is so constantly and exclusively a theme of boasting, let us consider the nature of the defence with which it provides us. It ought not to be said of freemen that they cannot count the cost, and weigh, against all objections, the worth of their privileges.

The truth is that free institutions are nothing but burdensome and expensive provisions against the selfish and violent

VOL. VII.-N. S. VOL. II. NO. I.

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passions of men. The system of representation is an instance of this. Ten men, the best and wisest that could be found, and chosen for life, could more skilfully, more discreetly and calmly legislate for us, than one or two hundred chosen annually, and therefore inexperienced; chosen at hazard from the people, and therefore less qualified; or chosen under high party excitement, and therefore comparatively disqualified. And who, indeed, had not rather refer to one man, distinguished for his knowledge, wisdom, and virtue, the decision of some difficult state question, that to commit it to a popular assembly? But here is the difficulty, we cannot trust one man or ten men, with such a responsibility at all; much less permanently. There is more danger of ambition, more exposure to bribery, to corrupt influence, more liability to act on partial and selfish views, among a few. We fear that unless the interests of all are represented in form, the interests of all will not be taken into the account in fact. Hence the land must be often agitated and embroiled with contested elections; prejudices and jealousies must be stirred up between neighbours and friends; time must be expended, and after all, property must be taxed, to pay the expense of our costly privileges. This is freedom, and we value it; but we see reason to put a sober estimate upon it. It is not exempt from that law which has passed upon every outward blessing of life; to wit, that it must be procured at an expense proportioned to its value.

Look again at the structure of a free government in itself considered. What are checks and balances, as they are called, in its political organization, but checks upon the passions and caprices of men, and balances of their selfish interests? We must have an unwieldy organization of three branches in the government, and a law cannot pass, till it has gone round to them all and secured their concurrence; and all this lest one branch should have an interest to do what it ought not to do, and what may be prevented by the others.

Once more; our boasted trial by jury is liable to the same exceptions. It is a security, in some cases an indispensable one, but still a clumsy and costly security. The practice, which prevails on the continent of Europe, of trial by judges alone, gives a far more speedy, and, in many cases, a far more correct decision. It must unavoidably happen, that twelve men, drawn by lot from the mass of the people, are incompetent to analyze and resolve many of the complicated cases of