For several years Scipio's father and uncle, Publius the elder and Gnæus, had been in command of the Roman forces there, winning repeated successes until, caught divided, the two brothers were defeated in turn, both falling on the battlefield. The shattered remnants of the Roman forces were driven north of the Ebro, and only a gallant rally by Marcius prevented the Romans being driven out of Spain. Even so their situation was precarious, for many of the Spanish tribes had forsaken the Romans in their hour of adversity. Though the determination of Rome itself, as before, was unbroken, and the disaster only spurred her to retrieve it, the choice of a successor proved difficult. Finally it was decided to call an assembly of the people to elect a pro-consul for Spain. But no candidates offered themselves for the dangerous honour. "The people . . . murmured bitterly that . . . the condition of the commonwealth was so desperate that no one dared undertake the command in Spain. When suddenly Publius Cornelius, son of Publius who had fallen in Spain, who was about twenty-four years of age, declared himself a candidate, and took his station on an eminence by which he could be seen by all" (Livy). His election was unanimous, not only by every century, but by every man there present. "But after the business had been concluded, and the ardour and impetuosity of their zeal

had subsided, a sudden silence ensued, and a secret reflection on what they had donewhether their partiality had not got the better of their judgment. They chiefly regretted his youth; but some were terrified at the fortune which attended his house and his name, for while the two families to which he belonged were in mourning, he he was going into a province where he must carry on his operations amid the tombs of his father and his uncle."

Realising the prevalence of these second thoughts, these doubts, Scipio sought to offset them by summoning an assembly, at which his sagacious arguments did much to restore confidence. The secret of his sway, extraordinary in one so young, over the crowd mind, especially in times of crisis, was his profound self-confidence, which radiated an influence to which the stories of his divine inspiration were but auxiliary. Self-confidence is a term often used in a derogatory sense, but Scipio's was not only justified by results but essentially different, a spiritual exaltation which is epitomised by Aulus Gellius as "conscientia sui subnixus "lifted high on his consciousness of himself."

To the remains of the army in Spain 10,000 foot and 1000 horse were added, and taking these reinforcements Scipio set sail, landed his troops just inside the Spanish frontier, and then marched overland to Tarraco-modern Tarragona. Here

are in winter quarters, and before attempting to formulate any plan he visits the states of his allies and the various parts of his army, seeking always by his attitude even more than by his words to rekindle confidence and dissipate the influence of past defeat. His own moral stature could not be better shown than by his treatment of Marcius, the man who had partly retrieved the Roman disasters, and thus one whom an ambitious general might well regard as a rival to his own position and fame. But 'Marcius he kept with him, and treated him with such respect that it was perfectly clear that there was nothing he feared less than lest any one should stand in the way of his own glory." Napoleon's jealousy of Moreau, his deliberate overshadowing of his own marshals, is in marked contrast with Scipio's attitude, and one of the finest of military tributes to him is the abiding affection felt for him by his subordinate generals.

His first step was to restore and fortify the confidence of his own troops and allies, his next to attack that of his enemies to strike not at their flesh, but at their moral Achilles heel. His acute strategical insight, in a day when strategy as distinct from battle tactics

had hardly been born, made him realise that Spain was the real key to the whole struggle. Spain was Hannibal's real base of operations; there he had trained his armies, and thence he looked for his reinforcements.

Scipio's first move was to apply his appreciation of the moral objective within the Spanish theatre of war. While others urged him to attack one of the Carthaginian armies, he decided to strike at their base, their life-line. First, he concentrated all his troops at one place, leaving but one small but compact detachment of 3000 foot and 300 horse under Marcus Silanus to secure his essential pivot of operationsTarraco. Then, with all the rest, 25,000 foot and 2500 horse -here was true economy of force, he crossed the Ebro, "revealing his plan to no one." "The fact was that he had decided not to do any of the things he had publicly announced, but to invest suddenly "New Carthage-modern Cartagena.

To this end "he gave secret orders to Gaius Lælius, who commanded the fleet, to sail to that place-it was Lælius alone who was aware of the project,-while he himself with his land forces marched rapidly against it." As Polybius sagely emphasises, calculation marked this youth, for "he, in the first place, took in hand a situation pronounced by most people as desperate . . . and secondly, in dealing with it he put aside the measures obvious to any one, and

planned out and decided on a course which neither his enemies nor his friends expected." "On his arrival in Spain he inquired from every one about the circumstances of the enemy, and learnt that the Carthaginian forces were divided into three bodies": : Mago near the pillars of Hercules-Gibraltar; Hasdrubal, son of Gisco, near the mouth of the Tagus; and Hasdrubal Barca besieging a city in Central Spain not far from modern Madrid. None of them were within less than ten days' march from New Carthage; he himself, as the event proved, was within seven days' forced marches of it. The news of his attack must take several days to reach them, and if he could take it by a surprise coup de main, he would forestall any aid; and "in the event of failure he could, since he was master of the sea, place his troops in a position of safety." Polybius further tells us how, "during the winter, he made detailed inquiries from people acquainted with it." He learnt that it stood almost alone among Spanish cities in possessing harbours fit for a fleet and for naval forces, and also that it was for the Carthaginians the direct sea crossing from Africa. Next he heard that the Carthaginians kept the bulk of their money and their war material in this city, as well as their hostages from the whole of Spain, and, what was of most importance, that the trained soldiers who garrisoned the citadel were only about a

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thousand strong, because no one dreamt that while the Carthaginians were masters of nearly the whole of Spain it would enter any one's head to besiege the city; while the remaining population was exceedingly large, but composed of artisans, tradesmen, and sailors, men very far from having any military experience. This he considered to be a thing that would tell against the city if he appeared suddenly before it "the moral calculation again. Abandoning, therefore, all other projects, he spent his time while in winter quarters in preparing for this," but "he concealed the plan from every one except Gaius Lælius." The account shows that he was master of two more attributes of generalship the power to keep his intentions secret until their disclosure was necessary for the execution of the plan, and the wisdom to realise that military success depends largely on the thoroughness of the previous preparation.

On the seventh day from the start of the march Scipio arrived before the city and encamped, the fleet arriving simultaneously in the harbour, thus cutting off communication on all sides. This harbour formed a circular bottle, its mouth almost corked by an island, while Cartagena itself was like a candle stuck in the bottom of the bottle, the city standing on a narrow rocky spit of land protruding from the mainland. This small peninsula bore a distinct resemblance

could both see what was going on, and being seen by all his men he inspired the combatants with great spirit. The consequence was that nothing was omitted which was necessary in the engagement, but the moment that circumstances suggested any step to him he set to work at once to do what was necessary."

In modern war no feature has told more heavily against decisive results than the absence of the commander's personal observation and control. Scipio's method, viewed in the light of modern science, may suggest a way to revive this influence. Peradventure the commander of the future will go aloft in an aeroplane, protected by a patrol of fighters, and in communication by wireless telephony with his staff.

Scipio had achieved his first object of wearing down the defenders, and checking the likelihood of further interference with his plans from Carthaginian sorties. The way was thus paved for his next decisive move. To develop this he was only waiting for the ebb of the tide, and this design had been conceived by him long since at Tarraco, where, from inquiries among fishermen who knew Cartagena, he had learnt that at low water the lagoon was fordable.

For this project he assembled 500 men with ladders on the shore of the lagoon, and meanwhile reinforced his forces in the isthmus with both men and ladders, enough to ensure that in the next direct assault "the

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whole extent of the walls should be covered with escaladers "an early example of the modern tactical axiom that a fixing attack should be on the broadest possible front in order to occupy the enemy's attention, and prevent him turning to meet the decisive plan elsewhere. He launched this assault, simultaneously with a landing attack by the fleet, and when it was at its height "the tide began to ebb and the water gradually receded from the edge of the lagoon, a strong and deep current setting in through the channel to the neighbourhood, so that to those who were not prepared for the sight the thing appeared incredible. But Scipio had his guides ready, and bade all the men told off for this service enter the water and have no fear. He, indeed, possessed a particular talent for inspiring confidence and sympathy in his troops when he called upon them. Now when they obeyed and raced through the shallow water, it struck the whole army that it was the work of some god... and their courage was redoubled" (Polybius). Of this episode Livy says: "Scipio, crediting this discovery, due to his own diligence and penetration, to the gods and to miracle, which had turned the course of the sea, withdrawn it from the lake, and opened ways never before trodden by human feet to afford a passage to the Romans, ordered them to follow Neptune as their guide"; but it is interesting to see that, while exploiting