Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes |
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Page 77
2 Kimmel ' s congenial group of advisers As the various warnings were received ,
each decision by the naval command at Hawaii was made after considerable
discussion in formal conferences and informal conversations , which Admiral ...
2 Kimmel ' s congenial group of advisers As the various warnings were received ,
each decision by the naval command at Hawaii was made after considerable
discussion in formal conferences and informal conversations , which Admiral ...
Page 79
Smith succeeded , · however , in persuading Kimmel to take time off for recreation
and enlisted Admiral Pye ' s help to get him to the golf course from time to time .
Staff subordinates usually had more impersonal conversations with Kimmel , but
...
Smith succeeded , · however , in persuading Kimmel to take time off for recreation
and enlisted Admiral Pye ' s help to get him to the golf course from time to time .
Staff subordinates usually had more impersonal conversations with Kimmel , but
...
Page 92
Admiral Stark , the chief of naval operations and a member of the President ' s
War Council , personally regarded the danger of a full - scale attack against Pearl
Harbor as extremely small . In both the formal directives and the informal letters ...
Admiral Stark , the chief of naval operations and a member of the President ' s
War Council , personally regarded the danger of a full - scale attack against Pearl
Harbor as extremely small . In both the formal directives and the informal letters ...
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Contents
Why So Many Miscalculations? | 2 |
The Wrong | 48 |
Or Why the Fortress Slept | 72 |
Copyright | |
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accept according action administration Admiral advisers alternative American appears asked assumptions attack avoid Bay of Pigs become called Chiefs cohesive Committee concerning consensus consequences continued course cover-up crisis critical Cuba Cuban danger Dean decision decision-making Defense deliberations Department direct discussion effect errors evidence example Executive expected fact feel fiasco forces give groupthink Haldeman initial invasion issues Japanese Johnson judgment Kennedy leader leading major March meetings military missile moral Nixon norms North objections officers operation participants Pearl Harbor policy-making policy-making group political position possible present President pressures probably problem procedures proposed questions responsible result risks role says Secretary seems Senator shared social Soviet staff stress strong suggested thinking threat tion transcripts Truman United Vietnam warning Watergate White House