Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes |
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Page 53
Defective decision - making Scholars disagree about the quality of the Truman
administration ' s initial intervention decisions , made in June 1950 , authorizing
American military support to help South Korea resist the North Korean invaders .
Defective decision - making Scholars disagree about the quality of the Truman
administration ' s initial intervention decisions , made in June 1950 , authorizing
American military support to help South Korea resist the North Korean invaders .
Page 94
Their main concern right up until December 7 was how to justify American
intervention to the isolationist - minded American public when the threat to
America ' s security seemed so remote . On November 27 , after authorizing the
war warning ...
Their main concern right up until December 7 was how to justify American
intervention to the isolationist - minded American public when the threat to
America ' s security seemed so remote . On November 27 , after authorizing the
war warning ...
Page 186
Only in America ? Is groupthink essentially an American phenomenon ?
American public administrators and corporation executives are well known for
their peculiar eagerness to invest time and money in brainstorming groups , T -
groups ...
Only in America ? Is groupthink essentially an American phenomenon ?
American public administrators and corporation executives are well known for
their peculiar eagerness to invest time and money in brainstorming groups , T -
groups ...
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Contents
Why So Many Miscalculations? | 2 |
The Bay of Pigs | 14 |
The Wrong | 48 |
Copyright | |
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accept according action administration Admiral advisers alternative American appears asked assumptions attack avoid Bay of Pigs become called Chiefs cohesive Committee concerning consensus consequences continued course cover-up crisis critical Cuba Cuban danger Dean decision decision-making Defense deliberations Department direct discussion effect errors evidence example Executive expected fact feel fiasco forces give groupthink Haldeman initial invasion issues Japanese Johnson judgment Kennedy leader leading major March meetings military missile moral Nixon norms North objections officers operation participants Pearl Harbor policy-making policy-making group political position possible present President pressures probably problem procedures proposed questions responsible result risks role says Secretary seems Senator shared social Soviet staff stress strong suggested thinking threat tion transcripts Truman United Vietnam warning Watergate White House