Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes |
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Page 51
Bradley and the Joint Chiefs were so in accord with Truman and Acheson that
they earned from Senator Taft the epithet of ' political generals . " On all the major
Korean War decisions , including those made during the crucial days in early ...
Bradley and the Joint Chiefs were so in accord with Truman and Acheson that
they earned from Senator Taft the epithet of ' political generals . " On all the major
Korean War decisions , including those made during the crucial days in early ...
Page 278
2 When asked by President Kennedy to look into the CIA ' s invasion plan about
two months before the decision was made , the Joint Chiefs at first were skeptical
about the prospects of a small band of exiles overcoming the two hundred ...
2 When asked by President Kennedy to look into the CIA ' s invasion plan about
two months before the decision was made , the Joint Chiefs at first were skeptical
about the prospects of a small band of exiles overcoming the two hundred ...
Page 279
staff noted bitterly that the Joint Chiefs were releasing self - protective statements
to the press . As soon as he felt able to do so , President Kennedy removed
General Lemnitzer , chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff , replacing him with a
military ...
staff noted bitterly that the Joint Chiefs were releasing self - protective statements
to the press . As soon as he felt able to do so , President Kennedy removed
General Lemnitzer , chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff , replacing him with a
military ...
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Contents
Why So Many Miscalculations? | 2 |
The Wrong | 48 |
Or Why the Fortress Slept | 72 |
Copyright | |
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accept according action administration Admiral advisers alternative American appears asked assumptions attack avoid Bay of Pigs become called Chiefs cohesive Committee concerning consensus consequences continued course cover-up crisis critical Cuba Cuban danger Dean decision decision-making Defense deliberations Department direct discussion effect errors evidence example Executive expected fact feel fiasco forces give groupthink Haldeman initial invasion issues Japanese Johnson judgment Kennedy leader leading major March meetings military missile moral Nixon norms North objections officers operation participants Pearl Harbor policy-making policy-making group political position possible present President pressures probably problem procedures proposed questions responsible result risks role says Secretary seems Senator shared social Soviet staff stress strong suggested thinking threat tion transcripts Truman United Vietnam warning Watergate White House