Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes |
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Page 56
... Chinese leaders failed to deter the United States from occupy- ing North Korea by their strong verbal threats of intervening , they resorted in early and mid - October to much more ominous warnings by sending into North Korea ...
... Chinese leaders failed to deter the United States from occupy- ing North Korea by their strong verbal threats of intervening , they resorted in early and mid - October to much more ominous warnings by sending into North Korea ...
Page 61
... Chinese Communist army , Secretary Acheson asserted that " we needed to bear in mind that the Soviet Union was behind every one the Chinese and North Korean moves . " He said that the Chinese attack was a Russian " trap , " an at- tempt ...
... Chinese Communist army , Secretary Acheson asserted that " we needed to bear in mind that the Soviet Union was behind every one the Chinese and North Korean moves . " He said that the Chinese attack was a Russian " trap , " an at- tempt ...
Page 285
... Chinese government in Peking . 2 Truman says that the warning message received from Indian Ambassador Panikkar and sim- ilar messages from Moscow , Stockholm , and New Delhi were regarded as " no more than a relay of Communist ...
... Chinese government in Peking . 2 Truman says that the warning message received from Indian Ambassador Panikkar and sim- ilar messages from Moscow , Stockholm , and New Delhi were regarded as " no more than a relay of Communist ...
Contents
Why So Many Miscalculations? | 2 |
The Bay of Pigs | 14 |
The Wrong | 48 |
Copyright | |
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Acheson administration Admiral Kimmel advisers advisory group air strike Allen Dulles alternative American assumptions attack avoid Bay of Pigs blockade bombing Castro Chiefs of Staff Chinese cohesive group Communist concurrence-seeking consensus course of action critical Cuba Cuban missile crisis danger Dean Defense deliberations discussion effect Ehrlichman evidence Executive Committee expected fiasco group dynamics groupthink hypothesis groupthink tendencies Haldeman Hawaii Ibid in-group inner circle invasion plan issues Japanese Johnson Joint Chiefs judgment Kennan Kennedy's Korean War leader major Marshall Plan McNamara meetings military moral naval Nixon North Korea North Vietnam officers participants Pearl Harbor Pentagon Papers policy-making group political present President Kennedy President's pressures problem procedures psychological questions responsible risks Robert Kennedy role Rusk Schlesinger Secretary shared sion social Sorensen Soviet Union stereotypes stress symptoms of groupthink thinking threat tion transcripts Truman Vietnam Vietnam War warning Watergate cover-up White House White House group