Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes |
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Page 56
... Chinese leaders failed to deter the United States from occupy- ing North Korea by their strong verbal threats of intervening , they resorted in early and mid - October to much more ominous warnings by sending into North Korea ...
... Chinese leaders failed to deter the United States from occupy- ing North Korea by their strong verbal threats of intervening , they resorted in early and mid - October to much more ominous warnings by sending into North Korea ...
Page 61
... Chinese Communist army , Secretary Acheson asserted that " we needed to bear in mind that the Soviet Union was behind every one the Chinese and North Korean moves . " He said that the Chinese attack was a Russian " trap , " an at- tempt ...
... Chinese Communist army , Secretary Acheson asserted that " we needed to bear in mind that the Soviet Union was behind every one the Chinese and North Korean moves . " He said that the Chinese attack was a Russian " trap , " an at- tempt ...
Page 285
... Chinese government in Peking . 2 Truman says that the warning message received from Indian Ambassador Panikkar and sim- ilar messages from Moscow , Stockholm , and New Delhi were regarded as " no more than a relay of Communist ...
... Chinese government in Peking . 2 Truman says that the warning message received from Indian Ambassador Panikkar and sim- ilar messages from Moscow , Stockholm , and New Delhi were regarded as " no more than a relay of Communist ...
Contents
Why So Many Miscalculations? | 2 |
The Bay of Pigs | 14 |
The Wrong | 48 |
Copyright | |
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accept according action administration Admiral advisers alternative American appears asked assumptions attack avoid Bay of Pigs become called Chiefs cohesive Committee concerning consensus consequences continued course cover-up crisis critical Cuba Cuban danger Dean decision decision-making Defense deliberations Department direct discussion effect errors evidence example Executive expected fact feel fiasco forces give groupthink Haldeman initial invasion issues Japanese Johnson judgment Kennedy leader leading major March meetings military missile moral Nixon norms North objections officers operation participants Pearl Harbor policy-making policy-making group political position possible present President pressures probably problem procedures proposed questions responsible result risks role says Secretary seems Senator shared social Soviet staff stress strong suggested thinking threat tion transcripts Truman United Vietnam warning Watergate White House