Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes |
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Page 24
... Cuba , that at least twenty thousand more were sym- pathizers , and that CIA contacts inside Cuba were requesting a large number of arms drops . Long after events had shown that the assumption of a Cuban uprising was completely mistaken ...
... Cuba , that at least twenty thousand more were sym- pathizers , and that CIA contacts inside Cuba were requesting a large number of arms drops . Long after events had shown that the assumption of a Cuban uprising was completely mistaken ...
Page 132
... Cuba to protect the installations . Shortly after detecting missile sites scattered throughout Cuba , United States military intelligence experts estimated that the installations represented about one - third of the Soviet Union's ...
... Cuba to protect the installations . Shortly after detecting missile sites scattered throughout Cuba , United States military intelligence experts estimated that the installations represented about one - third of the Soviet Union's ...
Page 145
... Cuba to protect the installations . Shortly after detecting missile sites scattered throughout Cuba , United States military intelligence experts estimated that the installations represented about one - third of the Soviet Union's ...
... Cuba to protect the installations . Shortly after detecting missile sites scattered throughout Cuba , United States military intelligence experts estimated that the installations represented about one - third of the Soviet Union's ...
Contents
Why So Many Miscalculations? | 2 |
The Bay of Pigs | 14 |
The Wrong | 48 |
Copyright | |
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Acheson administration Admiral Kimmel advisers advisory group air strike Allen Dulles alternative American assumptions attack avoid Bay of Pigs blockade bombing Castro Chiefs of Staff Chinese cohesive group Communist concurrence-seeking consensus course of action critical Cuba Cuban missile crisis danger Dean Defense deliberations discussion effect Ehrlichman evidence Executive Committee expected fiasco group dynamics groupthink hypothesis groupthink tendencies Haldeman Hawaii Ibid in-group inner circle invasion plan issues Japanese Johnson Joint Chiefs judgment Kennan Kennedy's Korean War leader major Marshall Plan McNamara meetings military moral naval Nixon North Korea North Vietnam officers participants Pearl Harbor Pentagon Papers policy-making group political present President Kennedy President's pressures problem procedures psychological questions responsible risks Robert Kennedy role Rusk Schlesinger Secretary shared sion social Sorensen Soviet Union stereotypes stress symptoms of groupthink thinking threat tion transcripts Truman Vietnam Vietnam War warning Watergate cover-up White House White House group