Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes |
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Page 41
But Rusk kept Bowles ' memorandum firmly buried in the State Department files .
Rusk may also have played a similar role in preventing Kennedy and the others
from learning about the strong objections raised by Edward R . Murrow , whom ...
But Rusk kept Bowles ' memorandum firmly buried in the State Department files .
Rusk may also have played a similar role in preventing Kennedy and the others
from learning about the strong objections raised by Edward R . Murrow , whom ...
Page 60
Within the State Department was George Kennan , a leading expert on the Soviet
bloc , who repeatedly made realistic predictions to Secretary Acheson and to
other State Department officials concerning Red China ' s probable reactions to
the ...
Within the State Department was George Kennan , a leading expert on the Soviet
bloc , who repeatedly made realistic predictions to Secretary Acheson and to
other State Department officials concerning Red China ' s probable reactions to
the ...
Page 161
In any case , men on the State Department staff soon realized that the grave
problems of the failing European economies would not be solved by the stopgap
measures that had been taken in dealing with Greece and Turkey , that a more ...
In any case , men on the State Department staff soon realized that the grave
problems of the failing European economies would not be solved by the stopgap
measures that had been taken in dealing with Greece and Turkey , that a more ...
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Contents
Why So Many Miscalculations? | 2 |
The Wrong | 48 |
Or Why the Fortress Slept | 72 |
Copyright | |
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