Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes |
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Page 137
Whether or not Kennedy ' s initial decision to preclude a diplomatic approach is
judged to have been an act of brinkmanship , the Executive Committee could be
criticized for conforming too readily with the President ' s way of defining its ...
Whether or not Kennedy ' s initial decision to preclude a diplomatic approach is
judged to have been an act of brinkmanship , the Executive Committee could be
criticized for conforming too readily with the President ' s way of defining its ...
Page 317
Robert Kennedy and Theodore Sorensen were key members of the Executive
Committee and attended practically all sessions . These two men also had
private conversations with President Kennedy and were privy to his personal ...
Robert Kennedy and Theodore Sorensen were key members of the Executive
Committee and attended practically all sessions . These two men also had
private conversations with President Kennedy and were privy to his personal ...
Page 347
Executive Committee of the National Security Council and , 152 - 153 Marshall
Plan and , 164 Truman ' s advisory group and , 59 , 61 , 68 U - 2 and , 156 see
also Cuban missile crisis ; Marshall Plan Standard operating procedures ...
Executive Committee of the National Security Council and , 152 - 153 Marshall
Plan and , 164 Truman ' s advisory group and , 59 , 61 , 68 U - 2 and , 156 see
also Cuban missile crisis ; Marshall Plan Standard operating procedures ...
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Contents
Why So Many Miscalculations? | 2 |
The Wrong | 48 |
Or Why the Fortress Slept | 72 |
Copyright | |
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accept according action administration Admiral advisers alternative American appears asked assumptions attack avoid Bay of Pigs become called Chiefs cohesive Committee concerning consensus consequences continued course cover-up crisis critical Cuba Cuban danger Dean decision decision-making Defense deliberations Department direct discussion effect errors evidence example Executive expected fact feel fiasco forces give groupthink Haldeman initial invasion issues Japanese Johnson judgment Kennedy leader leading major March meetings military missile moral Nixon norms North objections officers operation participants Pearl Harbor policy-making policy-making group political position possible present President pressures probably problem procedures proposed questions responsible result risks role says Secretary seems Senator shared social Soviet staff stress strong suggested thinking threat tion transcripts Truman United Vietnam warning Watergate White House