Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes |
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Page 41
... Hilsman as strange because all the relevant men in his department already had top security clearance . Hilsman assumed that Rusk turned down his urgent request because of pressure from Dulles and Bissell to adhere to the CIA's special ...
... Hilsman as strange because all the relevant men in his department already had top security clearance . Hilsman assumed that Rusk turned down his urgent request because of pressure from Dulles and Bissell to adhere to the CIA's special ...
Page 154
... Hilsman ( the Director of In- telligence in the State Department ) observed , ample time was allowed between each step for the Soviet leaders to weigh the consequences . On October 26 , tension increased when the Executive Committee ...
... Hilsman ( the Director of In- telligence in the State Department ) observed , ample time was allowed between each step for the Soviet leaders to weigh the consequences . On October 26 , tension increased when the Executive Committee ...
Page 156
... Hilsman , who has reviewed the historic events of October 1962 with an eye to explaining how the United States induced the Soviet leaders to back down . Hilsman starts with the premise that the Soviets knew they were facing vastly ...
... Hilsman , who has reviewed the historic events of October 1962 with an eye to explaining how the United States induced the Soviet leaders to back down . Hilsman starts with the premise that the Soviets knew they were facing vastly ...
Contents
Why So Many Miscalculations? | 2 |
The Bay of Pigs | 14 |
The Wrong | 48 |
Copyright | |
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accept according action administration Admiral advisers alternative American appears asked assumptions attack avoid Bay of Pigs become called Chiefs cohesive Committee concerning consensus consequences continued course cover-up crisis critical Cuba Cuban danger Dean decision decision-making Defense deliberations Department direct discussion effect errors evidence example Executive expected fact feel fiasco forces give groupthink Haldeman initial invasion issues Japanese Johnson judgment Kennedy leader leading major March meetings military missile moral Nixon norms North objections officers operation participants Pearl Harbor policy-making policy-making group political position possible present President pressures probably problem procedures proposed questions responsible result risks role says Secretary seems Senator shared social Soviet staff stress strong suggested thinking threat tion transcripts Truman United Vietnam warning Watergate White House