Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes |
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Page 74
intercepted Japanese messages , in the words of Herbert Feis , “ gave an almost
daylight picture of the mind of the Japanese government . " The historian Roberta
Wohlstetter has described the enormous amount of information about ...
intercepted Japanese messages , in the words of Herbert Feis , “ gave an almost
daylight picture of the mind of the Japanese government . " The historian Roberta
Wohlstetter has described the enormous amount of information about ...
Page 84
It was apparent that Japan was getting ready to take some drastic military
counteraction to nullify the blockade . “ But the ... Had the members of the Navy
group attempted to look at the situation through Japanese eyes , instead of
relying on a ...
It was apparent that Japan was getting ready to take some drastic military
counteraction to nullify the blockade . “ But the ... Had the members of the Navy
group attempted to look at the situation through Japanese eyes , instead of
relying on a ...
Page 287
5 - 70 ) : November 16 , 1941 : United States naval combat intelligence in Hawaii
reported losing track of Japanese aircraft carriers . ( All six of them were
proceeding toward Hawaii for the planned attack on Pearl Harbor . ) From this
time on ...
5 - 70 ) : November 16 , 1941 : United States naval combat intelligence in Hawaii
reported losing track of Japanese aircraft carriers . ( All six of them were
proceeding toward Hawaii for the planned attack on Pearl Harbor . ) From this
time on ...
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Contents
Why So Many Miscalculations? | 2 |
The Wrong | 48 |
Or Why the Fortress Slept | 72 |
Copyright | |
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accept according action administration Admiral advisers alternative American appears asked assumptions attack avoid Bay of Pigs become called Chiefs cohesive Committee concerning consensus consequences continued course cover-up crisis critical Cuba Cuban danger Dean decision decision-making Defense deliberations Department direct discussion effect errors evidence example Executive expected fact feel fiasco forces give groupthink Haldeman initial invasion issues Japanese Johnson judgment Kennedy leader leading major March meetings military missile moral Nixon norms North objections officers operation participants Pearl Harbor policy-making policy-making group political position possible present President pressures probably problem procedures proposed questions responsible result risks role says Secretary seems Senator shared social Soviet staff stress strong suggested thinking threat tion transcripts Truman United Vietnam warning Watergate White House