Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes |
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Page 51
... Joint Chiefs were so in accord with Truman and Acheson that they earned from Senator Taft the epithet of ' political ' generals . " On all the major Korean War decisions , including those made during the crucial days in early November ...
... Joint Chiefs were so in accord with Truman and Acheson that they earned from Senator Taft the epithet of ' political ' generals . " On all the major Korean War decisions , including those made during the crucial days in early November ...
Page 278
... Joint Chiefs at first were skeptical about the prospects of a small band of exiles overcoming the two hundred thousand or more men in Castro's armed forces . Their ... staff noted bitterly that the Joint Chiefs were releasing self 278 NOTES.
... Joint Chiefs at first were skeptical about the prospects of a small band of exiles overcoming the two hundred thousand or more men in Castro's armed forces . Their ... staff noted bitterly that the Joint Chiefs were releasing self 278 NOTES.
Page 279
... Joint Chiefs were releasing self - protective statements to the press . As soon as he felt able to do so , President Kennedy removed General Lemnitzer , chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff , replacing him with a military man of his ...
... Joint Chiefs were releasing self - protective statements to the press . As soon as he felt able to do so , President Kennedy removed General Lemnitzer , chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff , replacing him with a military man of his ...
Contents
Why So Many Miscalculations? | 2 |
The Bay of Pigs | 14 |
The Wrong | 48 |
Copyright | |
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accept according action administration Admiral advisers alternative American appears asked assumptions attack avoid Bay of Pigs become called Chiefs cohesive Committee concerning consensus consequences continued course cover-up crisis critical Cuba Cuban danger Dean decision decision-making Defense deliberations Department direct discussion effect errors evidence example Executive expected fact feel fiasco forces give groupthink Haldeman initial invasion issues Japanese Johnson judgment Kennedy leader leading major March meetings military missile moral Nixon norms North objections officers operation participants Pearl Harbor policy-making policy-making group political position possible present President pressures probably problem procedures proposed questions responsible result risks role says Secretary seems Senator shared social Soviet staff stress strong suggested thinking threat tion transcripts Truman United Vietnam warning Watergate White House