Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes |
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Page 45
Why would President Kennedy give preferential treatment to the two CIA
representatives ? Why would Bundy , McNamara , Rusk , and the others on his
team fail to challenge this preferential treatment and accept a taboo against
voicing critical ...
Why would President Kennedy give preferential treatment to the two CIA
representatives ? Why would Bundy , McNamara , Rusk , and the others on his
team fail to challenge this preferential treatment and accept a taboo against
voicing critical ...
Page 282
Note that Kennedy ' s appraisal , as summarized by Wyden , is the same as that
of the key members of his team who advised him to accept the plan ( see the last
half of Note 3 ) . He shared with them the overoptimistic expectation that the risks
...
Note that Kennedy ' s appraisal , as summarized by Wyden , is the same as that
of the key members of his team who advised him to accept the plan ( see the last
half of Note 3 ) . He shared with them the overoptimistic expectation that the risks
...
Page 318
Major criteria for sound decision - making : See the discussion of defective
decisionmaking in Chapter 1 , pp . 9 - 10 . Kennedy ' s dangerous " game of
chicken " : Horowitz , 284 – 287 . " emerged from . . . political consequences ” ' :
Ibid . , 286 .
Major criteria for sound decision - making : See the discussion of defective
decisionmaking in Chapter 1 , pp . 9 - 10 . Kennedy ' s dangerous " game of
chicken " : Horowitz , 284 – 287 . " emerged from . . . political consequences ” ' :
Ibid . , 286 .
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Contents
Why So Many Miscalculations? | 2 |
The Bay of Pigs | 14 |
The Wrong | 48 |
Copyright | |
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