Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes |
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Page 62
... MacArthur assumed that the Chinese had been bluffing all along and had pulled back out of weakness . Truman's advisers did not challenge MacArthur's optimistic interpretation of the mysterious disappearance , although they were puzzled ...
... MacArthur assumed that the Chinese had been bluffing all along and had pulled back out of weakness . Truman's advisers did not challenge MacArthur's optimistic interpretation of the mysterious disappearance , although they were puzzled ...
Page 63
... MacArthur's lines . The effective frontline strength of MacArthur's forces - stretched dangerously thin , as Secretary Marshall had pointed out at an earlier National Security Council meeting - numbered only one hundred thousand ...
... MacArthur's lines . The effective frontline strength of MacArthur's forces - stretched dangerously thin , as Secretary Marshall had pointed out at an earlier National Security Council meeting - numbered only one hundred thousand ...
Page 285
... MacArthur's general advance into North Korea , he was given new instructions that failed to include the cautionary proviso . None of Truman's advisers balked at the abdica- tion of presidential control , which left everything up to ...
... MacArthur's general advance into North Korea , he was given new instructions that failed to include the cautionary proviso . None of Truman's advisers balked at the abdica- tion of presidential control , which left everything up to ...
Contents
Why So Many Miscalculations? | 2 |
The Bay of Pigs | 14 |
The Wrong | 48 |
Copyright | |
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accept according action administration Admiral advisers alternative American appears asked assumptions attack avoid Bay of Pigs become called Chiefs cohesive Committee concerning consensus consequences continued course cover-up crisis critical Cuba Cuban danger Dean decision decision-making Defense deliberations Department direct discussion effect errors evidence example Executive expected fact feel fiasco forces give groupthink Haldeman initial invasion issues Japanese Johnson judgment Kennedy leader leading major March meetings military missile moral Nixon norms North objections officers operation participants Pearl Harbor policy-making policy-making group political position possible present President pressures probably problem procedures proposed questions responsible result risks role says Secretary seems Senator shared social Soviet staff stress strong suggested thinking threat tion transcripts Truman United Vietnam warning Watergate White House