Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes |
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Page 82
Doesn ' t “ any direction ” logically include their direction , an attack against Pearl
Harbor ? Not very probable perhaps , but still a contingency to be fully prepared
for ? In his history of United States naval operations in World War II , Samuel ...
Doesn ' t “ any direction ” logically include their direction , an attack against Pearl
Harbor ? Not very probable perhaps , but still a contingency to be fully prepared
for ? In his history of United States naval operations in World War II , Samuel ...
Page 85
But when Layton and Pye talked about the flank , according to their subsequent
testimony , they had in mind only remote places — the Philippines or Guam - not
Pearl Harbor . So far as their own base was concerned , these two officers , like ...
But when Layton and Pye talked about the flank , according to their subsequent
testimony , they had in mind only remote places — the Philippines or Guam - not
Pearl Harbor . So far as their own base was concerned , these two officers , like ...
Page 345
See also Advisory group ( Kimmel ' s ) in Pearl Harbor Quagmire myth , Vietnam
War and , 102 , 107 Pace , Frank , 49 , 51 . See also Advisory group ( Truman ' s )
in North Korean occupation Pacific fleet , see Advisory group ( Kimmel ' s ) in ...
See also Advisory group ( Kimmel ' s ) in Pearl Harbor Quagmire myth , Vietnam
War and , 102 , 107 Pace , Frank , 49 , 51 . See also Advisory group ( Truman ' s )
in North Korean occupation Pacific fleet , see Advisory group ( Kimmel ' s ) in ...
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Contents
Why So Many Miscalculations? | 2 |
The Bay of Pigs | 14 |
The Wrong | 48 |
Copyright | |
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accept according action administration Admiral advisers alternative American appears asked assumptions attack avoid Bay of Pigs become called Chiefs cohesive Committee concerning consensus consequences continued course cover-up crisis critical Cuba Cuban danger Dean decision decision-making Defense deliberations Department direct discussion effect errors evidence example Executive expected fact feel fiasco forces give groupthink Haldeman initial invasion issues Japanese Johnson judgment Kennedy leader leading major March meetings military missile moral Nixon norms North objections officers operation participants Pearl Harbor policy-making policy-making group political position possible present President pressures probably problem procedures proposed questions responsible result risks role says Secretary seems Senator shared social Soviet staff stress strong suggested thinking threat tion transcripts Truman United Vietnam warning Watergate White House