Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes |
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Page 68
... President set the tone at all the meetings with his advisers , strongly shaping the group consensus as each successive step was taken to deepen America's involvement in North Korea . The President's vociferous advocacy of a hard ...
... President set the tone at all the meetings with his advisers , strongly shaping the group consensus as each successive step was taken to deepen America's involvement in North Korea . The President's vociferous advocacy of a hard ...
Page 145
... President's exclusion of a noncoercive response and argued that no coercive action was necessary because " a missile is a missile " whether it is launched from Cuba or from the Soviet Union . Nitze and others soon convinced McNamara ...
... President's exclusion of a noncoercive response and argued that no coercive action was necessary because " a missile is a missile " whether it is launched from Cuba or from the Soviet Union . Nitze and others soon convinced McNamara ...
Page 281
... President for National Security Af- fairs , his main job , according to Neustadt ( p . 52 ) , was to " review options " and keep the President informed about more than one perspective when facing policy decisions . Ken- nedy restored ...
... President for National Security Af- fairs , his main job , according to Neustadt ( p . 52 ) , was to " review options " and keep the President informed about more than one perspective when facing policy decisions . Ken- nedy restored ...
Contents
Why So Many Miscalculations? | 2 |
The Bay of Pigs | 14 |
The Wrong | 48 |
Copyright | |
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accept according action administration Admiral advisers alternative American appears asked assumptions attack avoid Bay of Pigs become called Chiefs cohesive Committee concerning consensus consequences continued course cover-up crisis critical Cuba Cuban danger Dean decision decision-making Defense deliberations Department direct discussion effect errors evidence example Executive expected fact feel fiasco forces give groupthink Haldeman initial invasion issues Japanese Johnson judgment Kennedy leader leading major March meetings military missile moral Nixon norms North objections officers operation participants Pearl Harbor policy-making policy-making group political position possible present President pressures probably problem procedures proposed questions responsible result risks role says Secretary seems Senator shared social Soviet staff stress strong suggested thinking threat tion transcripts Truman United Vietnam warning Watergate White House