Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes |
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Page 68
... President set the tone at all the meetings with his advisers , strongly shaping the group consensus as each successive step was taken to deepen America's involvement in North Korea . The President's vociferous advocacy of a hard ...
... President set the tone at all the meetings with his advisers , strongly shaping the group consensus as each successive step was taken to deepen America's involvement in North Korea . The President's vociferous advocacy of a hard ...
Page 145
... President's exclusion of a noncoercive response and argued that no coercive action was necessary because " a missile is a missile " whether it is launched from Cuba or from the Soviet Union . Nitze and others soon convinced McNamara ...
... President's exclusion of a noncoercive response and argued that no coercive action was necessary because " a missile is a missile " whether it is launched from Cuba or from the Soviet Union . Nitze and others soon convinced McNamara ...
Page 281
... President for National Security Af- fairs , his main job , according to Neustadt ( p . 52 ) , was to " review options " and keep the President informed about more than one perspective when facing policy decisions . Ken- nedy restored ...
... President for National Security Af- fairs , his main job , according to Neustadt ( p . 52 ) , was to " review options " and keep the President informed about more than one perspective when facing policy decisions . Ken- nedy restored ...
Contents
Why So Many Miscalculations? | 2 |
The Bay of Pigs | 14 |
The Wrong | 48 |
Copyright | |
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Acheson administration Admiral Kimmel advisers advisory group air strike Allen Dulles alternative American assumptions attack avoid Bay of Pigs blockade bombing Castro Chiefs of Staff Chinese cohesive group Communist concurrence-seeking consensus course of action critical Cuba Cuban missile crisis danger Dean Defense deliberations discussion effect Ehrlichman evidence Executive Committee expected fiasco group dynamics groupthink hypothesis groupthink tendencies Haldeman Hawaii Ibid in-group inner circle invasion plan issues Japanese Johnson Joint Chiefs judgment Kennan Kennedy's Korean War leader major Marshall Plan McNamara meetings military moral naval Nixon North Korea North Vietnam officers participants Pearl Harbor Pentagon Papers policy-making group political present President Kennedy President's pressures problem procedures psychological questions responsible risks Robert Kennedy role Rusk Schlesinger Secretary shared sion social Sorensen Soviet Union stereotypes stress symptoms of groupthink thinking threat tion transcripts Truman Vietnam Vietnam War warning Watergate cover-up White House White House group