Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes |
From inside the book
Results 1-3 of 31
Page 42
... Senator Fulbright after the Senator had made known his concern about newspaper stories forecasting a United States invasion of Cuba . At the meeting , Fulbright was given an opportunity to present his opposing views . In a " sensible ...
... Senator Fulbright after the Senator had made known his concern about newspaper stories forecasting a United States invasion of Cuba . At the meeting , Fulbright was given an opportunity to present his opposing views . In a " sensible ...
Page 43
... Senator Fulbright , but there was also no time to call upon Schlesinger , the one man present who the President knew strongly shared Senator Fulbright's mis- givings . Of course , one or more members of the group could have prevented ...
... Senator Fulbright , but there was also no time to call upon Schlesinger , the one man present who the President knew strongly shared Senator Fulbright's mis- givings . Of course , one or more members of the group could have prevented ...
Page 207
... Senate Watergate Committee hearings chaired by Senator Sam Ervin , President Nixon publicly admits for the first time that some officials in the White House had engaged in a cover- up . But he claims that he did not participate in it ...
... Senate Watergate Committee hearings chaired by Senator Sam Ervin , President Nixon publicly admits for the first time that some officials in the White House had engaged in a cover- up . But he claims that he did not participate in it ...
Contents
Why So Many Miscalculations? | 2 |
The Bay of Pigs | 14 |
The Wrong | 48 |
Copyright | |
7 other sections not shown
Other editions - View all
Common terms and phrases
accept according action administration Admiral advisers alternative American appears asked assumptions attack avoid Bay of Pigs become called Chiefs cohesive Committee concerning consensus consequences continued course cover-up crisis critical Cuba Cuban danger Dean decision decision-making Defense deliberations Department direct discussion effect errors evidence example Executive expected fact feel fiasco forces give groupthink Haldeman initial invasion issues Japanese Johnson judgment Kennedy leader leading major March meetings military missile moral Nixon norms North objections officers operation participants Pearl Harbor policy-making policy-making group political position possible present President pressures probably problem procedures proposed questions responsible result risks role says Secretary seems Senator shared social Soviet staff stress strong suggested thinking threat tion transcripts Truman United Vietnam warning Watergate White House