Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes |
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Page 42
The visitor was Senator J . William Fulbright . The occasion was the climactic
meeting of April 4 , 1961 , held at the State Department , at which the apparent
consensus that had emerged in earlier meetings was seemingly confirmed by an
open ...
The visitor was Senator J . William Fulbright . The occasion was the climactic
meeting of April 4 , 1961 , held at the State Department , at which the apparent
consensus that had emerged in earlier meetings was seemingly confirmed by an
open ...
Page 43
Following discussion of this question — quite remote from the fundamental moral
and political issues raised by Senator Fulbright — the meeting ended .
Schlesinger mentions that the meeting broke up before completion of the
intended straw ...
Following discussion of this question — quite remote from the fundamental moral
and political issues raised by Senator Fulbright — the meeting ended .
Schlesinger mentions that the meeting broke up before completion of the
intended straw ...
Page 207
May 22 : In response to damaging new revelations starting to emerge at the
Senate Watergate Committee hearings chaired by Senator Sam Ervin , President
Nixon publicly admits for the first time that some officials in the White House had ...
May 22 : In response to damaging new revelations starting to emerge at the
Senate Watergate Committee hearings chaired by Senator Sam Ervin , President
Nixon publicly admits for the first time that some officials in the White House had ...
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Contents
Why So Many Miscalculations? | 2 |
The Bay of Pigs | 14 |
The Wrong | 48 |
Copyright | |
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accept according action administration Admiral advisers alternative American appears asked assumptions attack avoid Bay of Pigs become called Chiefs cohesive Committee concerning consensus consequences continued course cover-up crisis critical Cuba Cuban danger Dean decision decision-making Defense deliberations Department direct discussion effect errors evidence example Executive expected fact feel fiasco forces give groupthink Haldeman initial invasion issues Japanese Johnson judgment Kennedy leader leading major March meetings military missile moral Nixon norms North objections officers operation participants Pearl Harbor policy-making policy-making group political position possible present President pressures probably problem procedures proposed questions responsible result risks role says Secretary seems Senator shared social Soviet staff stress strong suggested thinking threat tion transcripts Truman United Vietnam warning Watergate White House