Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes |
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Page 153
It was not easy to maintain this open - ended view at a time when strong Soviet
provocation evoked resentment and readiness to retaliate . Khrushchev had lied
and made a fool of President Kennedy by deceiving the United States
government ...
It was not easy to maintain this open - ended view at a time when strong Soviet
provocation evoked resentment and readiness to retaliate . Khrushchev had lied
and made a fool of President Kennedy by deceiving the United States
government ...
Page 154
The Navy ' s first boarding was deliberately postponed until a non - Soviet ship
arrived on the third day of the blockade , a Lebanese freighter under charter to
the Soviets , which , as expected , had no arms on board . This vessel was
selected ...
The Navy ' s first boarding was deliberately postponed until a non - Soviet ship
arrived on the third day of the blockade , a Lebanese freighter under charter to
the Soviets , which , as expected , had no arms on board . This vessel was
selected ...
Page 156
The President and the others present at that last crucial meeting , during which
the formal letter was drafted , realized that the Soviet leaders might have already
moved too far along the path toward a military confrontation to back down .
The President and the others present at that last crucial meeting , during which
the formal letter was drafted , realized that the Soviet leaders might have already
moved too far along the path toward a military confrontation to back down .
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Contents
Why So Many Miscalculations? | 2 |
The Wrong | 48 |
Or Why the Fortress Slept | 72 |
Copyright | |
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accept according action administration Admiral advisers alternative American appears asked assumptions attack avoid Bay of Pigs become called Chiefs cohesive Committee concerning consensus consequences continued course cover-up crisis critical Cuba Cuban danger Dean decision decision-making Defense deliberations Department direct discussion effect errors evidence example Executive expected fact feel fiasco forces give groupthink Haldeman initial invasion issues Japanese Johnson judgment Kennedy leader leading major March meetings military missile moral Nixon norms North objections officers operation participants Pearl Harbor policy-making policy-making group political position possible present President pressures probably problem procedures proposed questions responsible result risks role says Secretary seems Senator shared social Soviet staff stress strong suggested thinking threat tion transcripts Truman United Vietnam warning Watergate White House