Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes |
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Page 15
... United States govern- ment had assumed that " use of the exile brigade would make possible the top- pling of Castro without actual aggression by the United States . " The Presi- dent's main advisers certainly did not expect such an ...
... United States govern- ment had assumed that " use of the exile brigade would make possible the top- pling of Castro without actual aggression by the United States . " The Presi- dent's main advisers certainly did not expect such an ...
Page 21
... United States Navy frogmen ( in violation of the President's orders ) , but the United States nevertheless was blamed for the in- vasion from the outset . The CIA's cover story was quickly torn to pieces by the world press . The ...
... United States Navy frogmen ( in violation of the President's orders ) , but the United States nevertheless was blamed for the in- vasion from the outset . The CIA's cover story was quickly torn to pieces by the world press . The ...
Page 22
... United States ground troops . In line with his firm policy of no direct intervention by the United States , President Kennedy explicitly asked the CIA planners if the members of the Cuban exile brigade were willing to risk their lives ...
... United States ground troops . In line with his firm policy of no direct intervention by the United States , President Kennedy explicitly asked the CIA planners if the members of the Cuban exile brigade were willing to risk their lives ...
Contents
Why So Many Miscalculations? | 2 |
The Bay of Pigs | 14 |
The Wrong | 48 |
Copyright | |
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accept according action administration Admiral advisers alternative American appears asked assumptions attack avoid Bay of Pigs become called Chiefs cohesive Committee concerning consensus consequences continued course cover-up crisis critical Cuba Cuban danger Dean decision decision-making Defense deliberations Department direct discussion effect errors evidence example Executive expected fact feel fiasco forces give groupthink Haldeman initial invasion issues Japanese Johnson judgment Kennedy leader leading major March meetings military missile moral Nixon norms North objections officers operation participants Pearl Harbor policy-making policy-making group political position possible present President pressures probably problem procedures proposed questions responsible result risks role says Secretary seems Senator shared social Soviet staff stress strong suggested thinking threat tion transcripts Truman United Vietnam warning Watergate White House