Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes |
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Page 45
... accept a taboo against voicing critical opposition ? A few clues permit some conjectures to be made , although we have much less evidence to go on than for delineating the pattern of preferential treatment itself . It seems that Allen ...
... accept a taboo against voicing critical opposition ? A few clues permit some conjectures to be made , although we have much less evidence to go on than for delineating the pattern of preferential treatment itself . It seems that Allen ...
Page 69
... accept opposing views of his advisers and to be influenced by them . During the first week of the Korean crisis , for example , Truman was responsive to his advisers ' objections to his strong preference to accept an offer from Chiang ...
... accept opposing views of his advisers and to be influenced by them . During the first week of the Korean crisis , for example , Truman was responsive to his advisers ' objections to his strong preference to accept an offer from Chiang ...
Page 89
... accepting the implications of any new in- formation that could challenge the group's preferred course of action . Naval officers who did not accept the invulnerability myth The assumption that the Japanese would never dare attack the ...
... accepting the implications of any new in- formation that could challenge the group's preferred course of action . Naval officers who did not accept the invulnerability myth The assumption that the Japanese would never dare attack the ...
Contents
Why So Many Miscalculations? | 2 |
The Bay of Pigs | 14 |
The Wrong | 48 |
Copyright | |
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Acheson administration Admiral Kimmel advisers advisory group air strike Allen Dulles alternative American assumptions attack avoid Bay of Pigs blockade bombing Castro Chiefs of Staff Chinese cohesive group Communist concurrence-seeking consensus course of action critical Cuba Cuban missile crisis danger Dean Defense deliberations discussion effect Ehrlichman evidence Executive Committee expected fiasco group dynamics groupthink hypothesis groupthink tendencies Haldeman Hawaii Ibid in-group inner circle invasion plan issues Japanese Johnson Joint Chiefs judgment Kennan Kennedy's Korean War leader major Marshall Plan McNamara meetings military moral naval Nixon North Korea North Vietnam officers participants Pearl Harbor Pentagon Papers policy-making group political present President Kennedy President's pressures problem procedures psychological questions responsible risks Robert Kennedy role Rusk Schlesinger Secretary shared sion social Sorensen Soviet Union stereotypes stress symptoms of groupthink thinking threat tion transcripts Truman Vietnam Vietnam War warning Watergate cover-up White House White House group