Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes |
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Page 98
As Ithiel Pool , one of the few American professors of political science who
supported the Johnson administration ' s basic Vietnam policy , points out : “ It is
hard to understand how intelligent men could believe that aerial bombardment ...
As Ithiel Pool , one of the few American professors of political science who
supported the Johnson administration ' s basic Vietnam policy , points out : “ It is
hard to understand how intelligent men could believe that aerial bombardment ...
Page 99
President Johnson ' s inner circle During the Johnson administration the major
Vietnam decisions were made by a small inner circle of government officials ,
most of whom remained for a few years and then were replaced , one at a time .
President Johnson ' s inner circle During the Johnson administration the major
Vietnam decisions were made by a small inner circle of government officials ,
most of whom remained for a few years and then were replaced , one at a time .
Page 129
If historical research on the Johnson administration proves Hoopes to be right ,
we shall have strong evidence that the President , like other members of the inner
circle , was a victim of groupthink . But any definitive judgment of whether this ...
If historical research on the Johnson administration proves Hoopes to be right ,
we shall have strong evidence that the President , like other members of the inner
circle , was a victim of groupthink . But any definitive judgment of whether this ...
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Contents
Why So Many Miscalculations? | 2 |
The Wrong | 48 |
Or Why the Fortress Slept | 72 |
Copyright | |
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accept according action administration Admiral advisers alternative American appears asked assumptions attack avoid Bay of Pigs become called Chiefs cohesive Committee concerning consensus consequences continued course cover-up crisis critical Cuba Cuban danger Dean decision decision-making Defense deliberations Department direct discussion effect errors evidence example Executive expected fact feel fiasco forces give groupthink Haldeman initial invasion issues Japanese Johnson judgment Kennedy leader leading major March meetings military missile moral Nixon norms North objections officers operation participants Pearl Harbor policy-making policy-making group political position possible present President pressures probably problem procedures proposed questions responsible result risks role says Secretary seems Senator shared social Soviet staff stress strong suggested thinking threat tion transcripts Truman United Vietnam warning Watergate White House