Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes |
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Page 39
Suppression of personal doubts The sense of group unity concerning the
advisability of going ahead with the CIA ' s invasion plan appears to have been
based on superficial appearances of complete concurrence , achieved at the cost
of self ...
Suppression of personal doubts The sense of group unity concerning the
advisability of going ahead with the CIA ' s invasion plan appears to have been
based on superficial appearances of complete concurrence , achieved at the cost
of self ...
Page 66
During the meeting , there appears to have been considerable discussion about
who was to blame for the debacle . Dean Acheson held the Soviet Union
responsible . Vice President Barkley was deeply perturbed about the “ incredible
hoax ...
During the meeting , there appears to have been considerable discussion about
who was to blame for the debacle . Dean Acheson held the Soviet Union
responsible . Vice President Barkley was deeply perturbed about the “ incredible
hoax ...
Page 229
Their only concern in each instance appears to have been whether they could
get away with it . Consequently , the only warranted answer to the question
above is no , this particular symptom of groupthink was not observed . 8 Did the
group ...
Their only concern in each instance appears to have been whether they could
get away with it . Consequently , the only warranted answer to the question
above is no , this particular symptom of groupthink was not observed . 8 Did the
group ...
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Contents
Why So Many Miscalculations? | 2 |
The Wrong | 48 |
Or Why the Fortress Slept | 72 |
Copyright | |
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Common terms and phrases
accept according action administration Admiral advisers alternative American appears asked assumptions attack avoid Bay of Pigs become called Chiefs cohesive Committee concerning consensus consequences continued course cover-up crisis critical Cuba Cuban danger Dean decision decision-making Defense deliberations Department direct discussion effect errors evidence example Executive expected fact feel fiasco forces give groupthink Haldeman initial invasion issues Japanese Johnson judgment Kennedy leader leading major March meetings military missile moral Nixon norms North objections officers operation participants Pearl Harbor policy-making policy-making group political position possible present President pressures probably problem procedures proposed questions responsible result risks role says Secretary seems Senator shared social Soviet staff stress strong suggested thinking threat tion transcripts Truman United Vietnam warning Watergate White House