Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes |
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Page 39
... appears to have been based on superficial appearances of complete concurrence , achieved at the cost of self - censorship of misgivings by several of the members . From post - mortem discussions with participants , Sorensen concluded ...
... appears to have been based on superficial appearances of complete concurrence , achieved at the cost of self - censorship of misgivings by several of the members . From post - mortem discussions with participants , Sorensen concluded ...
Page 66
... appears to have been a spontaneous emotional re- sponse , and there is no reason to doubt that he sincerely believed what he was saying . Truman launched a second verbal attack against the pro - Republican press later during the same ...
... appears to have been a spontaneous emotional re- sponse , and there is no reason to doubt that he sincerely believed what he was saying . Truman launched a second verbal attack against the pro - Republican press later during the same ...
Page 229
... appears to have been whether they could get away with it . Consequently , the only warranted answer to the question above is no , this particular symptom of groupthink was not observed . Did the group rely on crude stereotypes ? The ...
... appears to have been whether they could get away with it . Consequently , the only warranted answer to the question above is no , this particular symptom of groupthink was not observed . Did the group rely on crude stereotypes ? The ...
Contents
Why So Many Miscalculations? | 2 |
The Bay of Pigs | 14 |
The Wrong | 48 |
Copyright | |
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accept according action administration Admiral advisers alternative American appears asked assumptions attack avoid Bay of Pigs become called Chiefs cohesive Committee concerning consensus consequences continued course cover-up crisis critical Cuba Cuban danger Dean decision decision-making Defense deliberations Department direct discussion effect errors evidence example Executive expected fact feel fiasco forces give groupthink Haldeman initial invasion issues Japanese Johnson judgment Kennedy leader leading major March meetings military missile moral Nixon norms North objections officers operation participants Pearl Harbor policy-making policy-making group political position possible present President pressures probably problem procedures proposed questions responsible result risks role says Secretary seems Senator shared social Soviet staff stress strong suggested thinking threat tion transcripts Truman United Vietnam warning Watergate White House