Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes |
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Page 73
at that dinner party on the eve of the attack and at the daily conferences held by
Admiral Kimmel during the preceding weeks : “ The prevalent opinion in the Fleet
among the higher command , ” he stated , “ . . . was that the situation permitted of
...
at that dinner party on the eve of the attack and at the daily conferences held by
Admiral Kimmel during the preceding weeks : “ The prevalent opinion in the Fleet
among the higher command , ” he stated , “ . . . was that the situation permitted of
...
Page 85
So far as their own base was concerned , these two officers , like everyone else
in the Navy group , were convinced that the Pacific Fleet concentrated at Pearl
Harbor was a major deterrent against an enemy air or naval attack . The fleet was
...
So far as their own base was concerned , these two officers , like everyone else
in the Navy group , were convinced that the Pacific Fleet concentrated at Pearl
Harbor was a major deterrent against an enemy air or naval attack . The fleet was
...
Page 93
The recipients of the official war warnings of November 24 and 27 , sensitized to
words that fit in with their relatively placid assumptions , noted that a number of
possible targets for a Japanese attack were listed — the Philippines , Guam ...
The recipients of the official war warnings of November 24 and 27 , sensitized to
words that fit in with their relatively placid assumptions , noted that a number of
possible targets for a Japanese attack were listed — the Philippines , Guam ...
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Contents
Why So Many Miscalculations? | 2 |
The Wrong | 48 |
Or Why the Fortress Slept | 72 |
Copyright | |
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accept according action administration Admiral advisers alternative American appears asked assumptions attack avoid Bay of Pigs become called Chiefs cohesive Committee concerning consensus consequences continued course cover-up crisis critical Cuba Cuban danger Dean decision decision-making Defense deliberations Department direct discussion effect errors evidence example Executive expected fact feel fiasco forces give groupthink Haldeman initial invasion issues Japanese Johnson judgment Kennedy leader leading major March meetings military missile moral Nixon norms North objections officers operation participants Pearl Harbor policy-making policy-making group political position possible present President pressures probably problem procedures proposed questions responsible result risks role says Secretary seems Senator shared social Soviet staff stress strong suggested thinking threat tion transcripts Truman United Vietnam warning Watergate White House