Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes |
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Page 170
We can make only some tentative surmises about the critical conditions that
make a difference . One such condition involves setting up a group norm that
gives highest priority to critical appraisal . In the policy - appraising committee ...
We can make only some tentative surmises about the critical conditions that
make a difference . One such condition involves setting up a group norm that
gives highest priority to critical appraisal . In the policy - appraising committee ...
Page 263
Open criticism can also lead to damaged feelings when the members resolutely
live up to their role as critical evaluators and take each other ' s proposals over
the bumps . Feelings of rejection , depression , and anger might be evoked so ...
Open criticism can also lead to damaged feelings when the members resolutely
live up to their role as critical evaluators and take each other ' s proposals over
the bumps . Feelings of rejection , depression , and anger might be evoked so ...
Page 281
It seems equally improbable that McNamara felt too inhibited to raise critical
questions because of the newness of his role as Secretary of Defense and
personal concern about recriminations . It would certainly not be in keeping with
this man ...
It seems equally improbable that McNamara felt too inhibited to raise critical
questions because of the newness of his role as Secretary of Defense and
personal concern about recriminations . It would certainly not be in keeping with
this man ...
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Contents
Why So Many Miscalculations? | 2 |
The Wrong | 48 |
Or Why the Fortress Slept | 72 |
Copyright | |
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accept according action administration Admiral advisers alternative American appears asked assumptions attack avoid Bay of Pigs become called Chiefs cohesive Committee concerning consensus consequences continued course cover-up crisis critical Cuba Cuban danger Dean decision decision-making Defense deliberations Department direct discussion effect errors evidence example Executive expected fact feel fiasco forces give groupthink Haldeman initial invasion issues Japanese Johnson judgment Kennedy leader leading major March meetings military missile moral Nixon norms North objections officers operation participants Pearl Harbor policy-making policy-making group political position possible present President pressures probably problem procedures proposed questions responsible result risks role says Secretary seems Senator shared social Soviet staff stress strong suggested thinking threat tion transcripts Truman United Vietnam warning Watergate White House