Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes |
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Page 11
Nor do I expect that every defective decision , whether arising from groupthink or
from other causes , will produce a fiasco . Defective decisions based on
misinformation and poor judgment sometimes lead to successful outcomes . We
do not ...
Nor do I expect that every defective decision , whether arising from groupthink or
from other causes , will produce a fiasco . Defective decisions based on
misinformation and poor judgment sometimes lead to successful outcomes . We
do not ...
Page 145
Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes Irving Lester Janis ...
President Kennedy ' s initial decision ( before the first meeting of the Executive
Committee ) was that some form of coercive action would have to be taken to ...
Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes Irving Lester Janis ...
President Kennedy ' s initial decision ( before the first meeting of the Executive
Committee ) was that some form of coercive action would have to be taken to ...
Page 196
Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes Irving Lester Janis ...
There are , in addition , as Leon Mann and I point out in our book Decision
Making , ( various ) flaws and limitations in human information processing , such
as the ...
Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes Irving Lester Janis ...
There are , in addition , as Leon Mann and I point out in our book Decision
Making , ( various ) flaws and limitations in human information processing , such
as the ...
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Contents
Why So Many Miscalculations? | 2 |
The Wrong | 48 |
Or Why the Fortress Slept | 72 |
Copyright | |
6 other sections not shown
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accept according action administration Admiral advisers alternative American appears asked assumptions attack avoid Bay of Pigs become called Chiefs cohesive Committee concerning consensus consequences continued course cover-up crisis critical Cuba Cuban danger Dean decision decision-making Defense deliberations Department direct discussion effect errors evidence example Executive expected fact feel fiasco forces give groupthink Haldeman initial invasion issues Japanese Johnson judgment Kennedy leader leading major March meetings military missile moral Nixon norms North objections officers operation participants Pearl Harbor policy-making policy-making group political position possible present President pressures probably problem procedures proposed questions responsible result risks role says Secretary seems Senator shared social Soviet staff stress strong suggested thinking threat tion transcripts Truman United Vietnam warning Watergate White House