Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes |
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Page 42
Taking account of the mindguard functions performed by the Attorney General
and the Secretary of State , together with the President ' s failure to allow time for
discussion of the few oppositional viewpoints that occasionally did filter into the ...
Taking account of the mindguard functions performed by the Attorney General
and the Secretary of State , together with the President ' s failure to allow time for
discussion of the few oppositional viewpoints that occasionally did filter into the ...
Page 170
But in the Executive Committee that dealt with the Cuban missile crisis , no such
norm developed ; instead , the norm was to discuss openly all doubts about each
alternative course of action . Apparently a similar norm of open critical scrutiny ...
But in the Executive Committee that dealt with the Cuban missile crisis , no such
norm developed ; instead , the norm was to discuss openly all doubts about each
alternative course of action . Apparently a similar norm of open critical scrutiny ...
Page 306
... their own solutions , continually encouraged free discussion of alternatives ,
and explicitly conveyed the norm of airing ... leadership style offered significantly
more solutions to the problem and during their discussion cited significantly more
...
... their own solutions , continually encouraged free discussion of alternatives ,
and explicitly conveyed the norm of airing ... leadership style offered significantly
more solutions to the problem and during their discussion cited significantly more
...
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Contents
Why So Many Miscalculations? | 2 |
The Bay of Pigs | 14 |
The Wrong | 48 |
Copyright | |
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accept according action administration Admiral advisers alternative American appears asked assumptions attack avoid Bay of Pigs become called Chiefs cohesive Committee concerning consensus consequences continued course cover-up crisis critical Cuba Cuban danger Dean decision decision-making Defense deliberations Department direct discussion effect errors evidence example Executive expected fact feel fiasco forces give groupthink Haldeman initial invasion issues Japanese Johnson judgment Kennedy leader leading major March meetings military missile moral Nixon norms North objections officers operation participants Pearl Harbor policy-making policy-making group political position possible present President pressures probably problem procedures proposed questions responsible result risks role says Secretary seems Senator shared social Soviet staff stress strong suggested thinking threat tion transcripts Truman United Vietnam warning Watergate White House